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Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation
on the Paradigms and Politics of
Environmental Law Reform
Donald T. Hornsteint
Although reform of federal pesticide regulation is often described as a
simple choice between "scientific risk assessments" and "mere politics," such
reductionism assumes away perhaps the fundamental challenge facing
progressive reformers: how to improve political and market institutions that
minimize trade-offs among deeply held public values. Professor Hornstein
argues that an improved framework for environmental law reform, a "cause-
oriented approach," vastly improves the prospects for developing workable
incentive structures that can promote a more sustainable agriulture. More
broadly, Professor Hornstein develops a positive political theory of pesticide
regulation capitalizing on both public choice and public purpose explanations
-of collective political behavior, to argue that effective regulatory design must
openly acknowledge the full complexities of both the "politics" and "science"
of environmental protection.
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Introduction
To paraphrase Albert Einstein, environmental problems and solutions
should be put as simply as possible-but no simpler. Yet despite such
common sense, debates over the reform of environmental law often frame
policy disputes too simply. The point is well illustrated by one of the first
environmental problems to come before the Clinton Administration and the
103rd Congress: the reform of federal pesticide policy. The policy debate is
now framed as a choice between evaluating pesticide residues on processed
foods with modem risk assessment techniques or continuing the blanket
prohibition of such residues now found in the so-called "Delaney Clause."2
Although described as a referendum on "science" versus "politics, the Delaney
debate in fact avoids much of the important science governing pest
management, ignores virtually all of the economics of pesticide use, and
marginalizes many of the public health and environmental values implicated
by agricultural chemicals. To avoid being misunderstood, this criticism does
not reflect a conviction that Delaney is necessarily good policy. There is
plausible evidence that a blanket prohibition on all detectible carcinogenic
residues can be counterproductive. 3 But there is also plausible evidence that
risk assessments frequently sit atop both suspect data and contentious
methodological assumptions. More to the point, the use of risk assessments to
discern "reasonable risk" under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRAY has arguably led to one of the most colossal
regulatory failures in Washington. Yet despite these well-known criticisms, the
Delaney debate continues as if the only policy options for sound pesticide
policy-and environmental regulation in general-were the status quo or a new
regime dominated by scientific risk assessments. In its persistence and
oversimplification, the current debate resembles nothing so much as Winston
Churchill's definition of character: the ability to go from failure to failure
without a loss of enthusiasm.5
1. I am indebted to Chris Whipple of Clement International Corporation for the attribution of this
aphorism to Albert Einstein. Mr. Whipple's helpfulness, however, should not necessarily be considered
support for the arguments I advance here. Mr. Whipple is a thoughtful defender of the risk-oriented reforms
this Article critiques.
2. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (1988) (prohibiting pesticide residues and other "food additives" on
processed foods "found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal"). See infra text accompanying
notes 107, 315-16 (further discussing Delaney Clause).
3. 1 discuss infra at notes 448-50, evidence of the so-called "Delaney paradox" in which application
of the Delaney Clause can lead to greater risks than are prevented.
4. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (Supp. 1991). See infra notes 95-101 (discussing FIFRA's major
provisions).
5. Dr. Charles Benbrook recounted this insight of Churchill's in Food Safety Issues: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture, of the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1992) (testimony of Dr. Charles Benbrook).
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This Article argues for an alternative framework of environmental law
reform, one more aggressive in identifying and addressing the causes of envi-
ronmental problems than either existing regulatory programs or reform propos-
als that emphasize risk-based priority-setting. This alternative framework would
focus especially on the role played by existing economic incentives in causing
environmental problems and the role that better-designed incentives can play
in solving them. And, although any system of responsible environmental
regulation cannot ignore questions of cost or scientific estimates of risk, the
alternative framework suggested here would integrate such information into a
flexible, solution-oriented regulatory structure that reflects both the dangers of
asking more of risk assessments than they can deliver and the importance of
honoring nonscientific values that inevitably drive our collective preferences
for environmental policy.
After distinguishing in Part I reform strategies that focus on the risk-based
effects of environmental contamination from those that focus on underlying
causes, I apply the distinction in Part II to the current dialogue on pesticide
regulation. There, I argue that reformers who urge exclusive attention to the
risk-based effects of pesticides offer no real reform at all. Although recent
litigation over the Delaney Clause has precipitated political tensions that can,
and should, be temporarily defused,6 the opportunity for meaningful reform
would be squandered merely by replacing Delaney with a risk-based strategy
of "counting" environmental effects such as cancers, birth defects,
contaminated aquifers, and fish kills. Indeed, it is precisely this strategy that
has spawned two decades of failure under FIFRA. In contrast, a cause-based
approach to pesticide regulation would emphasize pest control technologies that
can reduce pesticide use without significantly decreasing crop yields or
growers' profitability. A cause-based approach would also address existing
economic incentive structures that lead growers to forego improved
technologies in favor of pesticide use which actually exceeds economically
optimal levels.
Part III takes up the important question of "politics." The question is
important because, as I've argued in an earlier work,7 risk-based decision-
making is grounded in expected utility theory, which does not insist on a
single rational way for society to make decisions about environmental risks.
6. An obvious starting (and perhaps ending) point would be for Congress to toll the enforcement of
the Delaney Clause for a reasonably short period of time (say, six months to one year) to allow Members
the opportunity to reframe the debate over pesticide policy into more fundamental questions about mean-
ingful reform. Of course, during the pendency of this enforcement moratorium, the Environmental
Protection Agency could still proceed with the numerous adjudications and rulemakings occasioned by the
order of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993); the Agency simply would be prohibited from reaching final decisions on Delaney-
related matters during the moratorium.
7. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992).
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Rather, the founders of expected utility theory acknowledged that society must
employ collective mechanisms to form social policies toward risk. Thus, those
who view reform merely as a matter of "science" versus "politics" dangerously
oversimplify; not only is there a political dimension to the type of science
these reformers choose to emphasize, but their apparent disdain for everyone
else's politics is hardly a matter of scientific truth. Yet politics, or rather, a
theory of politics, can pose more complex theoretical questions for
environmental law reform. If, for example, public-choice or other "capture"
theories of politics are roughly correct, then risk-based scientific
expertise-however incomplete or nonobjective-might still offer
improvements in public decisionmaking over systematically skewed political
outcomes. On the other hand, if politics is more commendable than capture
theories suggest, then risk-based decisionmaking- especially if it reflects a
hidden political structure of its own-might do vastly more harm than good.
I develop in Part III a positive political theory of federal pesticide regulation
to test the various possibilities. I conclude that the political history of pesticide
regulation undermines any single political theory of environmentalism-there
is ample evidence to reflect both private-interest-regarding and public-interest-
regarding outcomes and processes. There is also evidence that legislators have
long used risk-based decisionmaking both procedurally and symbolically to
favor political outcomes rather than simply to arrive at scientific truth. If the
reader is left gasping at the quaintness of these conclusions, it is important to
appreciate that they are not without significant implications. If politics are not
as bad, and risk-based decisionmaking not as neutral, as risk-based reformers
claim, then we are seriously misled to believe that reform is simply a matter
of choosing "good" science in lieu of outcomes we are told to despise as
"politics." More constructively, if we open ourselves to the complexities of
both science and politics, there are reasons to believe that the cause-based
reforms advocated here can better frame meaningful debates over
environmental law reform and, by recognizing the limits of each, make the
most out of both science and politics.
I. The Debate over Environmental Law Reform
There has always been a spirited debate over the proper form of modem
environmental regulation. The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments' and the 1972
Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments9 emphasized, respectively, the
so-called "environmental-quality" and "technology-based" approaches to
8. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7671q (1988)).
9. Federal Water Pollution and Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1386 (1988)).
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pollution control,10 yet both statutes were roundly criticized for imposing
overly rigid bureaucratic commands that resulted in inefficiencies: both over-
control and undercontrol in different parts of the economy."I Although modest
attempts at flexibility were subsequently made,'" the basic command-and-
control structure of regulation survived not only in the federal air and water
programs, but also in newly fashioned regulatory programs aimed at toxic
chemicals under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 3 and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA or Superfund)." By 1985, the central debate over environmental
law reform was captured in a much-noted exchange between Professor Howard
Latin, who defended uniform, technology-based regulation in the name of
administrability,15 and Professors Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, who
argued for the use of more flexible, market-like mechanisms in the name of
10. "Environmental-quality-based" (or "media-quality-based") approaches decide first on the level of
acceptable public health or environmental risks and then calculate the appropriate level of regulatory action
needed to achieve the goal. JOHN E. BON1NE & THOMAS 0. McGARrrY, THE LAW OF ENViRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 215 (2d ed. 1992). Typically, such approaches do not tolerate any significant risk and impose
regulatory requirements without regard to cost or technological feasibility. See Thomas 0. McGarity,
Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental
Regulation, 46 LAW & CONrrEMP. PROBS. 159, 159-60 (Summer 1983). In contrast, "technology-based"
approaches do not tolerate risks that can "feasibly" be eliminated and begin the regulatory enterprise with
an inquiry into technological and economic feasibility. See BONINE & McGARrry, supra at 216.
Although parts of the Clean Air Act are generally associated with environmental-quality-based
regulation, see, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. 1990) (requiring air quality
standards for criteria air pollutants to be established without regard to cost and based on an adequate
margin of safety) and parts of the Clean Water Act with technology-based regulation, see, e.g., CleanWater
Act §§ 301(b)(2)(E), 304(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(E), 1314(b)(4) (1988) (providing for best
conventional pollutant control technology considering economic feasibility under a limited cost-benefit test),
the two statutes are more accurately viewed as ideological blends of the two approaches, see, e.g., Clean
Air Act § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (Supp. 1990) (maximum achievable degree of emission
reduction of hazardous air pollutants taking cost into consideration); Clean Water Act § 31 l(b)(3), 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988) (prohibiting discharge of oil in any quantities that may be harmful).
11. See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-
Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 327-28 (1974) (uniformly imposed national standards are inefficient
because they deny states the "equally legitimate" choice of growth over health and they ignore the
variances in "costs of pollution" across the country).
12. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j) (1988) (waivers for innovative technological
systems); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (k) (1988) (extensions of compliance deadlines available if
"innovative production processes" are used). See generally Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and
Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981) (addressing interaction of
regulation and innovation and arguing for more incentive-minded regulatory policies).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992g (1988) (adopting a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory scheme).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). Although Superfund (and the 1986 Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act) emphasizes approaches that vary from the command-and-control model (for example,
the liability and right-to-know provisions), there is also an extremely active "regulatory" program that
superintends the listing of cleanup sites on the National Priorities List as well as the selection of technologi-
cal remedies at those sites; see id. § 9605 (a), (c) (use of national contingency plan to guide selection of
cost-effective remedies and of hazard ranking system to select and prioritize clean-up sites).
15. Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards
and 'Fine-Tuning' Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1332 (1985) (arguing that economic
incentive-based regulation would increase decisionmaking costs and create "opportunities for manipulative
behavior by regulated parties").
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economic efficiency. 6 The outcome of this debate, however, was relatively
undramatic, with federal programs retaining their command-and-control struc-
tures albeit with the occasional nod toward more flexible regulatory com-
mands'7 'and even the use of limited market-like mechanisms of social con-
trol.I8
The lack of closure, however, ensured that arguments for basic reform
would continue. Driving these arguments in part were the annual costs of
complying with environmental regulations, which began to hover in the neigh-
borhood of two and three percent of the country's gross domestic product
($115 billion in 1990 and growing), causing some critics to complain that this
level of expenditure was unjustified by the sometimes intangible benefits
achieved.' Equally strident critics argued that present efforts were
insufficient, citing evidence that significant public health risks and
environmental degradation continued despite these massive clean-up
expenditures. 2' A variety of other important criticisms were made:
16. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 1333, 1364 (1985) ("[tlo focus on administrative costs, without considering the societal benefits
of more intelligent regulation, produces penny-wise but pound-foolish public policies"). See also Bruce
A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 189 (1988) (technology-based regulation focuses public attention
on arcane technological questions rather than the more normative question, "Idluring the next n years,
should we instruct the EPA gradually to decrease (or increase) the number of pollution rights by x
percent?"). Professor Stewart has conceded that systems of transferable pollution permits may not be
appropriate for problems involving toxic chemicals such as pesticides, either because their risks are not
readily quantifiable or because they can present such localized dangers that a sufficiently wide market
cannot be defined. See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives,
13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 153, 161 (1988); see also Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental
Protection: A Brief Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 151-52 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 12, at 1268-69 (noting and urging further increased use of
"performance standards" over "specification standards" by federal regulators to increase dischargers'
flexibility in selecting pollution-control measures).
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651 (Supp. 1991) (tradable emission permit scheme for acid
deposition control in 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments); ROBERT LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION
REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROtBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE 62-67 (1986) (describing emissions trading
scheme in EPA's "bubble" policy for existing sources of air pollution).
19. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS: The COST OF A CLEAN
ENVIRONMENT ch. 5, at 5-1 to 5-36 (1990). Pollution control expenditures grew from 0.9% of gross
national product in 1972 to 2.1% in 1990, see 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 1065 (Aug. 16, 1991), and
are projected to increase to 2.6% (approximately $170-185 billion annually) by the year 2000, see Compli-
ance with RCRA, Superfund Rules Hurts Economic Growth, Research Group Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 7, at 657 (June 12, 1992). For an example of the criticism engendered by this level of expenditure,
see Compliance, Cleanup Costs May Harm Credit for U.S. Companies, Moody's Investor Service Says, 22
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 128 (May 17, 1991) (environmental compliance costs may affect competitive
position of U.S. companies). But see Acid Rain Sections Would Cost $4.5 Billion, But Could Create 50,000
New Jobs, CRS Reports, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1777 (Feb. 16, 1990) (Title IV of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments can create between 25,000 and 50,000 worker-years of new jobs).
20. Despite massive expenditures under all federal environmental programs, American manufacturing
industries released 4.8 billion pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment in 1990. See Industry
Reduced Chemical Releases in 1990, Continuing Trend that Began in 1987, EPA Says, 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at 424 (May 29, 1992) (reporting results of 1990 Toxic Release Inventory but noting that
these discharges were down from the 5.7 billion pounds reported in 1989). As to conventional ("non-
toxic") pollutants, emissions of six common air pollutants have only held steady since 1981, with nitrogen
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environmental law, it was argued, regulated new technologies excessively;
merely sought end-of-the-pipe pollution "management" rather than more
fundamental ways to build pollution "prevention" into the country's economic
subsystems; ignored inequitable risk distributions; and had lost sight of
broader, ecological risks. As these criticisms mounted, the movement to reform
environmental law began to coalesce around a different set of competing
paradigms.
A. Risk-Oriented Reform: Prospects and Problems
It was. perhaps inevitable that the concept of risk-oriented decisionmaking
would. appeal to proponents of legal and policy reform. Once the basic
environmental statutes were enacted and major implementing regulations put
in place, the new but inevitable salience of "costs" (both costs to government
agencies in terms of administrative resources and compliance costs in dollars
to regulated entities) naturally could be expected to raise the question: how
much environmental protection are we really buying for our efforts?2
Quantitative risk assessments, which could be used to estimate the effects of
putative environmental problems and thus the marginal benefits of the
government's environmental programs,22  soon raised the tantalizing
intellectual prospect of using "risk reduction" as a common metric against
which to measure and compare both existing and prospective efforts. The
stature of risk reduction as a model was surely enhanced by the growing
oxide emissions actually increasing, leading most analysts to despair of the possibility of any major urban
center attaining in the foreseeable future the health standards established as long ago as 1970, see James
E. Krier, The Political Economy of Barry Commoner, 20 ENVTL. L. I1, 17 (1990). As for water pollution,
"average trends in standard measures suggest that the nation has suffered at least a slight decline in surface
water quality, despite the supposedly heady requirements of the Clean Water Act. The groundwater picture
is equally unsatisfying, and ... is expected to get worse." Id.
21. Political scientist Anthony Downs speaks of a policy cycle in which "alarmed discovery and
euphoric enthusiasm" is inevitably followed by the "recognition of costs" and a "decline in intense public
interest." Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue-Attention Cycle, 28 PUB. INTEREST 39
(1972). The growing salience of costs was indicated by, among other things, President Reagan's
requirement of cost-benefit analysis of environmental programs. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127
(1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601nt (Supp. 1989).
22. The basic technique multiplies the potency of a chemical or pollutant by the exposure to it of
human and nonhuman populations. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information,
Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 278 (1991). "More specifically,
risk assessment is often described as a four-step process that (1) identifies hazards as causing in a
qualitative sense some adverse health effects, (2) models the dose-response relationships to predict more
firmly the degree of adverse effects at a given level of exposure, (3) estimates exposures, and (4) combines
the foregoing into a predicted number or range of numbers of expected deaths or injuries." Hornstein,
supra note 7, at 570 n. 30 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 3 (1983)). This technique can be used to highlight marginal
differences in dollars-spent-per-statistical-life saved across governmental health, safety, and environmental
programs. See CAss R. SUNsTEN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 240-41 (1990) (describing as
"seemingly irrational" comparative figures for expenditures per life saved under different programs).
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respect quantitative risk assessment was earning as a scientific discipline23
and by the federal government's experience with and capabilities for using risk
assessments in regulatory standard-setting within many of its environmental
programs.u Especially for those uncomfortable with the sometimes-frenetic
political atmosphere in which environmental policies could be made, risk
reduction promised to put policymaking on steadier footing.2 5 The paradigm
of risk reduction also offered reformers a conceptual vehicle to engraft a
planning process which might integrate all-too-disparate regulatory
programs.26
Whatever the sources of its appeal, risk reduction quickly became a leading
(if not the leading) paradigm for environmental law reform. On the basis of a
1990 report by its Science Advisory Board27 (SAB) and an earlier report by
senior agency administrators," the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA
or Agency) began to integrate the goal of risk reduction into the Agency's
strategic planning and budgetary processes.29 In 1991, both the Office of
Management and Budget and the General Accounting Office endorsed greater
emphasis on risk reduction in setting budget priorities for environmental
23. See Mary L. Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Legitimacy: An Introduction
to the Symposium, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 296 (1989) ("Scientists largely agree that [quantitative risk
analysis] is science .... ); Robert Cummings, Is Risk Assessment a Science?, I RISK ANALYSIS 1 (1981)
("[Tihe field is jostling for recognition as a legitimate scientific discipline .... ").
24. See, e.g., Homstein, supra note 7, at 565 ("For over a decade, EPA had elevated the concept of
risk, and the quantitatively formal techniques of risk analysis, into increasingly important roles in the
Agency's regulatory programs").
25. See Reducing Risk, Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection: Hearings on
Recent Science Advisory Board Report Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1991) [hereinafter Reducing Risk] (statement of William Reilly, Administrator, EPA)
(EPA must ground itself on solid science rather than being "transported by middle-class enthusiasms").
26. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk Information, and Regulatory Structure
in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 320, 346 (1992) (planning through priority setting
addresses allocation of scarce resources, however planners might choose to define which risks are "worst").
27. RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES COMM'N., SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK:
SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990) [hereinafter EPA SCIENCE
ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK].
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter EPA's UNFINISHED BUSINESS].
29. In a 1990 memorandum, EPA Administrator William Reilly charged the Agency's regional and
program offices to use risk reduction as the guiding light in fashioning their budgets: "To an unprecedented
degree, your strategic plans use the risk reduction potential of EPA programs to organize activities and set
priorities .... I expect to see evidence of this focus on risk reduction in your major budget decisions."
Memorandum on Fiscal Year 1992 Budget Guidance from the Administrator of the EPA to Assistant
Administrators, General Counsel, Inspector General, Regional Administrators, Associate Administrators I,
3 (Apr. 26, 1990), quoted in David Clarke, Chasing Rainbows: Is An Integrated Statute the Pot of Gold
for Environmental Policy?, 22 ENVTL. L. 280, 292-93 (1991). Even prior to official release of the SAB
Report, Reilly had instructed EPA's program offices to develop four-year strategic plans oriented around
the central goal of risk reduction. See Memorandum on EPA Strategic Planning and Budgeting from the
Administrator of the EPA to Assistant Administrators, General Counsel, Inspector General, Associate
Administrators, Regional Administrators 1, 2 (Mar. 27, 1989) ("in preparing plans, programs should address
(and the Administrator will review) th[is] key issue[]: What areas of risk reduction can the program feasibly
address .... ), quoted in Clarke, supra at 290.
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programs generally. 3 One observer of policymaking at EPA has called the
new emphasis on risk reduction a "quiet revolution."'3' A senior EPA admin-
istrator concluded in 1991, "[i]ncreasingly, the environmental agenda is being
shaped around a cost-benefit, risk-reduction paradigm, with potentially
profound legal, economic, budgetary, policy, and ultimately environmental
implications. '32  In this context, accordingly, there was nothing anomolous
when arguments in favor of strictly enforcing the Delaney Clause in 1992 were
met with a firestorm of criticism that modem risk assessment techniques
allowed scientists to make far inore discriminating judgments about the risks
posed by carcinogenic pesticide residues than Delaney's blanket prohibition.
Risk reduction, of course, is not without its problems. EPA's Science
Advisory Board acknowledged that the information base on which risk assess-
ments are made is often "woefully" inadequate,33 and work in the economics
of information suggests that we cannot expect either unbiased information or
enough information until we get much closer to designing incentive systems
which address the "public goods" nature of health and safety data.34
Estimates of risk, moreover, often emphasize the overall incidence of death or
injury (by which criterion, for example, the risks of hazardous waste sites may
be reasonable when compared with other risks) and not other attributes of risk
such as its equitable distribution (by which criterion the unequal distribution
of hazardous waste risks between caucasians and people of color may be
shameful).35  More generally, it has long been argued that the measurement
of risk cannot be separated from value judgments in risk assessment
30. "In February 1991 ... OMB proposed a 'risk reduction pilot project' to determine spending
priorities among environmental programs within the Departments of Defense and Energy for fiscal year
1992." Hornstein, supra note 7, at 563-64. In testimony before the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, one of GAO's environmental program officers also endorsed the use of "relative risks" to
"better enable the nation to achieve environmental goals with limited resources." U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S BUDGET REQUEST
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992, 2 (1991) (statement of Richard L. Hembra, Director Environmental Protection
Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, 102d Congress, 1st Session (1991)).
31. Leslie Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA, 249 SCd. 616, 616 (1990).
32. John Atcheson, The Department of Risk Reduction or Risky Business, 21 ENvTL. L. 1375, 1376
(1991). (Mr. Atcheson is chief of EPA's Prevention Integration Branch).
33. See Hornstein, supra note 7, at n.227, citing EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK,
supra note 27, at app. B., 2 (SAB criticized incompleteness of risk data used in EPA's UNFINISHED
BUSINESS report as making the resultant risk assessments "tenuous"); see also Hornstein, supra note 7 at
n.227, citing EPA's UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 28, at 14 (UNFINISHED BUSINESS authors themselves
admitted that underlying risk data or assessment methodologies were "weak," "poor," "incomplete," or
nonexistent).
34. See infra notes 248-49 (sources describing that, because information is a "public good" that
cannot easily be controlled for profit by its producer, there are no market incentives in the private sector
to produce good information).
35. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection 22 (Working Paper Series No. 92-7-1, Washington University School of Law,
July 7, 1992) (forthcoming in NW. U. L. REV.) (recounting study by United Church of Christ Commission
for Racial Justice showing disproportionately high likelihood of siting a hazardous or solid waste facility
in a minority neighborhood).
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methodologies; to the extent this is true, risk assessments can reflect merely
the nonscientific and idiosyncratic values of the assessors rather than scientific
conclusions.
3 6
Criticisms such as these, however, seem to have only slightly diminished
the enthusiasm for risk-based reform. In its transition report to the Clinton
Administration, the General Accounting Office recommended that EPA base
its program priorities "on actual risk to public health and the environment..
. [which] should be determined by science, not by public perceptions."37 One
of the first environmental bills introduced in the 103rd Congress was a
proposal by Senator Daniel Moynihan to make comparative risk assessments
a major consideration for government-wide environmental policymaking.38
Prior to the 1992 presidential election, President Bush had reportedly
considered an executive order "that would establish uniform principles of risk
assessment and management throughout EPA and possibly throughout the
entire federal government."39 Several reform proposals introduced in both the
102nd and 103rd Congresses have urged the use of "acceptable cancer risks"
based on risk assessments as regulatory screening devices.'
36. The most notorious illustration involves two risk assessments of the same chemical. These efforts
which differ only in the assessors' choice between plausible models for extrapolating information from
animal bioassays produce risk estimates which differ by a millionfold-a level of indefiniteness akin to
"'not knowing whether you have enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off the national debt."' Carl
F. Cranor, Scientific Conventions, Ethics and Legal Institutions, I RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY
155, 157 (1990) (citing Seth Cothem et al., Estimating Risks to Health, 20 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 111
(1986)).
Perhaps for reasons such as these, EPA has acknowledged that comparing risks, especially, involves
inescapable political questions and has encouraged states and localities to fashion regional risk- reduction
strategies through relatively open, "town-meeting"-type planning processes. See generally OFFICE OF
POLICY, PLANNING, AND EVALUATION, U.S. E.P.A., AN OVERVIEW OF RISK-BASED PRIORITY SETTNG AT
EPA (1992) (draft prepared for the Center for Risk Management, Resources for the Future) (copy on file
with author) (describing Agency's grant program to promote priority-setting planning processes at the state
and local level); COMPARATIVE RISK BULLETIN 16, at 4-6 (Sept. 1992) (describing status of state and local
comparative risk projects).
Currently, it is unclear how these "softer" versions of risk reduction might interrelate with "harder"
versions of risk-based priority-setting; nor is it clear how town-meeting-style approaches might handle the
problem of preference "cycling" that economist Kenneth Arrow predicted from such relatively unstructured
democratic institutions or the problem of policy outcomes skewed by the undue influence of local special
interests predicted by Mancur Olson's "logic of collective action."
37. See General Policy: Changes in Policy, Management Practices Recomnended at EPA by GAO
Transition Report, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 2356 (Jan. 15, 1993); cf id (also encouraging the use
of incentive-based environmental regulation, including incentives to encourage environmentally responsible
agricultural practices).
38. See S. 110, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also S. 2132, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (related
bill introduced by Senator Moynihan in 102nd Congress).
39. See Alan Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals,
19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 269, 358-59 (1992). In the spirit of risk reduction, former EPA Deputy Administrator
Henry Habicht chaired an interagency committee on risk assessment which tried to harmonize risk
assessment practices throughout the executive branch. See id. at 358. Among other things, the committee
is "developing assessment guidelines for cancer risks and for such noncancer risks as neurotoxicity,
developmental effects, and reproductive effects." Id.
40. The leading example in the 103rd Congress is, of course, legislation introduced to replace the
Delaney Clause. See S. 331, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 872, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1.993); H.R.
1627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Two proposals introduced in the 102nd Congress would have
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Among academicians, Professor John Applegate appreciates many of the
limitations of risk reduction but nonetheless leans toward effects-based
planning mechanisms "to confront directly the need for allocation and priority
setting across the various areas of EPA's responsibility."'" Less cautiously,
analyst Peter Huber argues that only "an aggressive calculus of risk created
and risk averted" can provide a "progressive transformation of the risk
environment."42 And Professor Richard Stewart endorses risk-oriented reform
when he speaks of ranking environmental problems followed by the
progressive reduction of overall risk in the country's risk "portfolio."' 43
Although it is unclear whether any such centralized and comprehensive
regulatory regimes might soon be adopted, they all reflect the gravitational pull
of risk-oriented reform.
B. Cause-Oriented Reform: Prospects and Problems
As a general matter, cause-oriented reforms focus on reducing human
pressures on natural resources, often by encouraging "clean" technologies or
changes in consumption and use patterns. Roughly speaking, this approach
contrasts with the focus of risk-based reforms on managing environmental
effects to some level of acceptable risk."4 For all the attention given risk-
based reform, cause-oriented approaches to policymaking may actually pack
as much force in explaining many recent changes in environmental law. For
example, there has been an increased tendency to build environmental
protection directly into statutory programs governing production processes in
transportation, energy, and agriculture, without any attempt to justify the,
programs in risk-reduction terms.45  Thus, the Intermodal Surface
incorporated a one-in-one-million threshold into different provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act. See S. 1074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) & H.R. 2342, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (amending the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act); H.R. 2084, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (amending the Clean
Water Act). As it is, informal bright line distinctions may be drawn by states in developing "acceptable risk
levels" for carcinogens in surface waters under the Clean Water Act. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 39,
at 358. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act already establishes one of the few "bright lines" drawing a risk
threshold for further regulatory action. See 42 U.S.C. §7412(c)(9)(B)(i), (f)(2)(A) (Supp. 1990).
41. Applegate, supra note 26, at 352.
42. Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 278, 335 (1985).
43. Richard B. Stewart, The Role of the Courts in Risk Management, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,208 (1986).
44. It is certainly not impossible, however, for risk-oriented reforms to be used in pollution
prevention efforts. See, e.g., infra note 57 (discussing EPA's 33/50 program, which relies on risk
assessments to identify high-risk chemicals but then encourages source reductions that are not finely
calibrated with formal risk-reduction methodologies).
45. Indeed, changes in statutory programs are often made despite risk-based objections. See, e.g.,
HERBERT INHABER, ENERGY RISK ASSESSMENT 5, 42-43 (1982) ("the risk from nonconventional energy
sources can be as high as, or even higher than, that of some conventional sources"); CY A. ADLER,
ECOLOGICAL FANTASIES 89-90 (1973) (criticizing link between mass transit and cleaner air in New York
City); STEVEN J. TAFF, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE: POLICY REFORM IS NOT ENOUGH I (Staff Paper P90-
34, Staff Paper Series, University of Minnesota Department on Agricultural & Applied Economics, 1990)
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Transportation Efficiency Act of 199146 establishes programs for mass transit
and transportation planning to address the "underlying causes" of many
environmental problems.47 The 1992 National Energy Policy Act" creates
programs to foster energy conservation and includes tax benefits to promote
renewable energy sources, with explicit congressional references to addressing
the "underlying causes" of pollution problems."9 The 1985 and 1990 Farm
Bills 50  both contain provisions designed to encourage "alternative"
agricultural production techniques in the name of their environmental
benefits.'
Cause-oriented reforms also seem better able to explain recent legislative
and regulatory efforts toward pollution prevention and source reduction. These
(policy reform for sustainable agriculture can be oversold); Leonard P. Gianessi, Alternative Agriculture:
Insights into the Benefits of Agrichemicals 1 (1989) (paper presented at the 1989 Fall Conference of the
National Agricultural Chemicals Association) (copy on file with author) ("close examination of the data
and case studies in [the NAS Report supporting "alternative" agriculture] makes it unclear how [the NAS']
conclusion was arrived at. The case studies, in particular, support almost the exact opposite conclusion").
46. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914
(codified in part in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C. (Supp. 1991)).
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-171, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1991) (the Act encourages states "to
develop the best [transit] solutions from the standpoint of national productivity, cleaner air, and energy
efficiency"); id. at 14 ("intermodal planning" should be conducted in concert with planning for cleaner air
[and] congestion management). See also Hearings on National Mass Transit Reauthorization, Before the
Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991) (statement of Sen. Cranston)
("[T]he need for mass transit is greatly heightened by increasing air pollution"); Hearings on Oversight of
the Federal Aid Highway Program, Part 111, Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources, Transportation and
Infrastructures of the U.S. Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1990) (statement of Sen. Robert Graham) ("One of the key strategies for obtaining clean air standards is
by providing alternatives for the use of the private passenger vehicle, particularly automobiles .... Mass
transportation programs can play an influential role in helping . . . attain these higher air quality
standards").
48. Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992)
(codified in part in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (1993)).
49. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13401 (1993) ("It is the goal of the United States in carrying out energy
supply and energy conservation research and development ... (3) . .. to [develop] an environmentally
sustainable energy system; .. "); id. § 13457 ("... The Secretary .... is authorized to continue to carry
out a . . . program to improve the energy efficiency and cost effectiveness of pollution prevention
technologies and processes, including source reduction and waste minimization technologies and processes.
The purposes of this section shall be to-(1) apply a systems approach to minimizing adverse
environmental effects of industrial production... ; and (2) incorporate consideration of the entire materials
and energy cycle with the goal of minimizing adverse environmental impacts."); id. § 13316 (development
of a renewable energy technology transfer program to encourage renewable and sustainable development
in the United States and abroad).
50. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 99-198, 99 Stat. 13544(codified in part in scattered
sections of 7, 16, 12, and 15 U.S.C. (1986)); Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No 101-624, 104 Star. 3359 (1990) (codified in part in scattered sections of 7, 16, 12, and 15 U.S.C.
(Supp. 1991)).
51. The major provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill deny federal subsidies, loans, or credits to farming
operations that destroy wetlands or produce crops on highly erodible land. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 3811 (1993).
The 1990 Farm Bill places a greater emphasis than any earlier farm legislation on reducing agricultural
runoff and nonpoint source pollution of surface water. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3838-3838(0 (1993). See
generally John E. Ikerd, Environmental Issues in the 1990 Farm Bill Debate, 1990 J. AGRIBUSINESs 5
(Spring 1990); John A. Davidson, Environmental Analysis of the Federal Farm Programs, 8 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 235 (1989), Linda A. Malone, Conservation at the Crossroads: Reauthorization of the 1985 Farm Bill
Conservation Provisions, 8 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 215 (1989).
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efforts seek to shift policy away from the current regulatory emphasis on
"pollution control," which often imposes relatively expensive after-the-fact
cleanup requirements, toward more direct incentives for less polluting produc-
tion processes or product design.52 Although risk-reduction rationales are
sometimes articulated for these new incentives, 53 as often the new measures
are the subject of skepticism by those wedded to the risk-reduction
paradigm.' For this reason, such measures as solid-waste recycling or
packaging requirements, 5  which have proliferated explosively at the state and
local level over the past five years,56 seem more likely to reflect the influence
of cause-oriented policymaking. So too, programs designed expressly to
eliminate toxic chemicals in industrial57 and agricultural58 processes, without
52. See Stephan M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Prevention Act, 17
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 153, 155 (1992) ("Legislation and regulations encourage firms to invest hundreds of
millions of dollars in pollution control technologies rather than to explore improvements in feedstocks or
production methods, plant maintenance, or other pollution prevention techniques that would cost less to
implement and would achieve higher levels of environmental protection"); see also Krier, supra note 20,
at 24 ("[wihereas the first round of devices had cut by ninety percent whatever was being emitted, and
whereas the second round cuts the remainder by ninety percent again .... the costs of this [second] modest
gain exactly equals that of the far greater gains accomplished the first time around. This explains why the
marginal costs of more stringent pollution controls typically escalate so rapidly").
53. See Reducing Risk, supra note 25, at 22, 25 (arguing for both pollution-prevention and
sustainability-based techniques within the framework of a comparative risk regime).
54. See, e.g., Lynn Scarlett, Five Green Myths, THE STRArrs TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1992, at 5 (some
recycling programs use large amounts of energy and produce high volumes of water waste).
55. Such programs include voluntary and mandatory curbside pick-up of recyclable materials, as well
as the creation of drop-off locations for recyclables. See David H. Folz, Recycling Program Design,
Management, and Participation: A National Survey of Municipal E-perience, 51 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 222,
223 (1991). Beverage container ("bottle bill") legislation is another such program. See Anthony T. Drollas,
Jr., Note, The New Jersey Statewide Mandatory Source Separation and Recycling Act: The Nation's First
Comprehensive Statewide Mandatory Recycling Program, 12 SEa'ON HALL LECIS. J. 271, 278 (1989).
56. At least six states have enacted mandatory statewide recycling requirements, and twenty-three
states have legislation or executive orders establishing a preference in state procurement practices for items
made from recycled materials. See, e.g., Act Approved July 2, 1987, 1987 Conn. Acts 544 (Reg. Sess.)
(codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-241 to 22a-241b, §§ 22a-241e to 22a-241g (West
Supp. 1993)) (mandatory statewide recycling); Act Approved June 24, 1988, 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 130
(codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §403.702 (West Supp. 1993)) (mandatory statewide recycling); Act Approved
May 27, 1988, 1988 Md. Laws 536 (codified as amended at MD. ENvut. CODE ANN. §§ 9-1701 to 9-1706)
(Supp. 1992)) (mandatory statewide recycling); 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws 63 (codified at ALASKA STAT.
§ 29.71.050 (1992)) and 1990 Alaska Sess. Laws 175 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 36.30.339 (1992))
(procurement preference for recyclables); 1989 Cal. Stat. 1094 (codified at CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE §§
12150 to 12163, §§ 12300 to 12310 (West Supp. 1993)) (procurement preference for recyclables); 1988
Mich. Exec. Order 2 (procurement preference for recyclables). See generally Wiliam L. Kovacs, The
Coming Era of Conservation and Industrial Utilization of Recyclable Materials, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 537
(1988) (describing state and local programs).
57. In February 1991, EPA launched its "33/50" program, designed to encourage industry to reduce
voluntarily toxic pollutants at the source. See 205 Firms Sign up for Industrial Toxics Project; EPA Aims
for 50% Cut in Releases by 1995, 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 262 (May 24, 1991). The object
of the plan is to reduce 33% of the output of the 17 most high-risk toxic pollutants by 1992, and to reduce
output by 50% by 1995. Id. Although the initial designation of the toxic chemicals is based on risk analysis,
the actual reductions are based on source limitation and pollution control possibilities. See Reilly's
Corporate Volunteerism Campaign Marred by Skepticism, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 2682 (Apr. 3, 1992).
As a general matter, the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (Supp. 1990),
encourages as a matter of policy the control of toxic chemicals and emissions through source reduction
techniques. The Act seeks to encourage, among other approaches, equipment and technology modification,
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obsessive reliance on risk assessments to parse the contours of these
programs,59 seem best described as cause-oriented reforms. The increasing
willingness to rely on zoning and other forms of land-use planning to
effectuate environmental policy6° also fits better into a cause-based, rather
than risk-based, approach to reform."
reformulation and redesign of products, substitution of raw materials, and improvement in management,
inventory control, or other general operational phases of industrial facilities. Id. § 13106(b)(3).
58. In 1989, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service established an Integrated Crop
Management Program to "encourage the adoption of farm management systems that incorporate the use
of integrated pest management and nutrient management practices." REPORT OF THE POLICY CONSTRAINTS
RESOLUTION TEAM, NATIONAL INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT FORUM, INTEGRATED PEST
MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL POLICY CONSTRAINTs OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 32 (June 1992) [hereinafter POLICY
CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM] (unpublished report on file with author). In the 1990 Farm Bill,
Congress authorized an Integrated Farm Management Program to reduce the disincentives to low-input farm
management systems that may be caused by the commodity support programs of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. Id. at 33. See infra note 166 (discussing these efforts).
59. See note 57 supra (risk assessments are used to select which chemicals to target but not to define
with precision how much risk from these chemicals is "acceptable").
60. The link between land-use control and environmental protection, although plain in theory, has
often been resisted politically for fear of developing national land-use planning. Perhaps the most vivid
example of this resistance is the reaction to EPA's proposed "indirect source" regulation under the Clean
Air Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,893 (1973) (proposed amendment at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52), which would have required
the regulation of such indirect sources of air pollution as parking decks that attract large numbers of drivers.
The reaction to this attempt at transportation planning was "overwhelmingly critical," R. SHEP MELNICK,
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 309 (1983), and Congress in 1977 pro-
hibited EPA from requiring such regulation, see 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (1988). See generally
Patrick Del Duca & Daniel Mansueto, Indirect Source Controls: An Intersection of Air Quality Management
and Land Use Regulation, 24 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 1131 (1991). To appreciate how attitudes toward such
planning efforts may be changing, however, it is useful to recognize that Congress in 1991 encouraged
transportation planning in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, see supra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text. For an analysis of the relationship between environmental protection and land-use, see
Linda A. Malone, The Necessary Interrelationship Between Land Use and Preservation of Groundwater
Resources, 9 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1990).
61. One of the best illustrations of this may be drinking water protection. The dominant federal
program is the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1986). The Safe Drinking Water Act
establishes "national primary drinking water regulations" by requiring EPA to specify "maximum contami-
nant levels" for contaminants (listed on the basis of risk assessments) and then specifying recommended
treatment techniques (developed on the basis of available technology). See generally Kenneth F. Gray, The
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986: Now a Tougher Act to Follow, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10338 (1986). In contrast to this mix of risk-based and technology-based standards, seventeen
states have adopted watershed protection plans that depend far more on land-use restrictions to minimize
the underlying causes of drinking water pollution. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-17.1-2(d) (Supp. 1992)
(setting up planning branch in department of environment to review and approve legislatively mandated
watershed protection plans); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-214.5 (1992) (mandatory watershed protection plans);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-1311,.§ 22a-319 (West 1985) (authorizing watershed protection projects);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 161A.7 (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing watershed protection "operations"); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 25, § 184 (1990) (authorizing public watershed associations to carry out works of improvement
and to develop "plans" for watershed protection); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 278.160 (Vernon 1993) (authorization
for soil and water districts to carry out watershed protection "programs"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-320.01
(1991) (authorizing counties to construct "works" for watershed protection); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 61-16.1-
01 to 61-16.1-63 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (authorizing watershed protection "districts"); 32 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 818 (1967) (authorizing interstate compact with Delaware for purposes of watershed protection); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 48-17-10 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (creating Authority to institute and operate "programs of
watershed protection"); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 201.024 (West 1982) (authorizing contracts for "state-
approved watershed protection plans"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43-27A.090 (West Supp. 1993) (author-
ity to "assemble plans for watershed protection"); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-2-8(d) (1992) (authorizing
"procedures" for watershed protection planning); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103C.331, sub. 12(a) (West Supp.
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Cause-oriented reform, like risk-based reform, also has its problems. Apart
from the difficulties of deciding when the search for cause has gone too far or
not far enough,62 cause-oriented reform might discourage human activity that
"causes" significant social benefits as well as environmental harm.63 More-
over, the uneven loss of benefits among different classes of citizens, no less
than the uneven distribution of risks, is capable of adversely affecting our
collective preferences for equity (such as when factories lay-off disproportion-
ately high numbers of low-income workers and replace them with "clean"
technologies).6' Further, without some way to measure comparative environ-
mental effects, cause-oriented reforms might pick clean technologies that turn
out in fact to be worse environmentally than the technologies they supplant.
65
Finally, a "pure" cause-based regime that does not make any attempt to
measure risk scientifically seems dangerously manipulable; as cultural
anthropologists remind us, no one in 15th Century Europe cared much about
waterborne diseases from public water supplies until it was suggested to have
been "caused" by the Jews. 66
Criticisms such as these provoke responses from cause-oriented reformers
that theirs is not a system without a role for scientific inquiry and
investigation, but only a system that employs scientific analysis within the
1993) (authorizing soil and water conservation districts to administer watershed protection "projects");
IDAHO CODE § 42-3601 (1990) (acknowledging desirability of watershed protection).
62. In an essay forthcoming in Environmental Science and Technology, policy analyst Adam Finkel
contrasts risk-oriented and (what I term) cause-oriented approaches with the metaphor of a physician who
uses risk assessment techniques to diagnose symptoms in a patient such as stressed joints, high blood
pressure, and narrowing arteries and then to prioritize a course of treatment such as ibuprofen, diuretics,
coronary angioplasty, and so on. "But for this hypothetical patient," Finkel observes, "the problem isn't
a constellation of circulatory and skeletomuscular symptoms-it's being overweight-and the priority for
treatment might well be ... exercise and diet rather than a menu of 'risk reductions' involving drugs and
surgery." See Adam Finkel, Into the Frying Pan, ENVTL. ScL & TECH. (forthcoming 1993) (copy on file
with author). Although the point of Finkel's insightful metaphor is to highlight the importance of "cause,"
it also highlights how difficult reliance on "cause" can be. To keep with Finkel's example, what if the
overweight patient is overweight precisely because she cannot rely on her own sense of self and self-
discipline to exercise or diet (not a particularly hypothetical set of circumstances). In such a case, the best
(or is it second best?) course of treatment might well be to ignore underlying causes and focus on the
pharmaceuticals and surgery.
63. Professor Christopher Schroeder uses the insecticide DDT as an example and argues that, "[tlo
ban its production or use ... ignores the individual claim of potential malaria victims to have their bodily
integrity respected ... [an argument that injury from DDT residue is wrong] because caused by human
agency [rather than "naturally occuring" malaria] seems to put far too much weight on the distinction
between actions and nonactions." Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risk, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495,
517-18 (1986) (emphasis in original).
64. See Albert L. Nichols, Risk-Based Priorities and Environmental Justice 7 (paper presented to the
Resources for the Future Conference on Setting Environmental Priorities, Nov. 16, 1992) (air quality
management plan for southern California would put low-income workers most at risk of employment losses
as pollution-intensive industries shut down their operations in response to higher control costs).
65. A commonly cited example is the fumigant EDB, which was replaced. by a fumigant said to
present even greater risks to grain milling workers. See William R. Havender, EDB and the Marigold
Option, 1984 REG. 13, 16 (Jan.-Feb. 1984).
66. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION
OF TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 7 (1982).
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larger project of internalizing environmental externalities. In contrast to risk-
reduction's outermost hope for a system of triage within a national risk
"portfolio,"67 cause-oriented reformers urge the need for the responsible
integration of public health and environmental concerns into our definition of
social progress. Ambitious reformers propose the replacement of current
measurements of gross domestic production with an index of "sustainable"
economic indicators,6" and the creation of mechanisms that can integrate
environmental costs into the price structure of goods and services.69 Proposals
for more centralized and bureaucratic reforms can also be found, including
those that would establish population controls7" and national (or even
international) land-use planning in an effort to conform the levels and
distribution of human resource consumption to the "carrying capacities" of
various ecosystems.7 Although proposals such as these are no more likely to
be adopted soon than are national risk "portfolios," they all reflect the distinct
gravitational pull of the cause-oriented paradigm.
C. Policymaking Paradigms and the Case for "Probing" in Environmental
Law Reform
This Article makes the case for deliberate and careful experimentation in
the near term with cause-oriented reforms without either jettisoning too soon
existing regulatory structures or abandoning appropriate insights from quantita-
tive risk assessments. Such a deliberate strategy of "probing"72 for measures
that might ameliorate the underlying causes of environmental problems, despite
the caution I believe is required in the undertaking, would represent a
watershed in the development of environmental law. It would constitute a
strategy best capable of experimenting with incentive-based rather than
command-and-control regulation, best able to achieve a new round of
67. See Stewart, supra note 43.
68. See, e.g., HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD 401-55 (1989);
ROBERT REPETTO ET AL., WASTING RESOURCES: NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE NATIONAL INCOME
ACCOUNTS 8 (1989); ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE 182-91 (1992).
69. See, e.g., JUSTIN WARD ET AL., REAPING THE REVENUE CODE 56-57 (1989) (discussing benefits
of a modest excise tax on pesticides); Christopher Flavin, Creating a Sustainable Energy Future, in STATE
OF THE WORLD 22, 26-27 (Linda Starke ed. 1988) ("Energy prices are the key to a rational energy system
.... One means of ensuring that cheap imported oil does not undermine alternative energy investments
is to tax oil or oil products").
70. See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, HEALING THE PLANET 241 (1991) ("Con-
trolling population growth is critical .... Because of the built-in time lags, unless the surge in human
numbers is halted soon and a gradual population shrinkage begun, there is no hope of solving fenviron-
mental] problems ....") (emphasis in original).
71. See generally ANNE MATTHEWS, WHERE THE BUFFALO ROAM (1992) (discussing controversial
and widely discussed proposal by Rutgers Professors Frank and Deborah Popper to "zone" a "buffalo
commons" out of 139,000 square miles of the Great Plains in ten states).
72. The term "probing" is taken from CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, INQUIRY AND CHANGE: THE
TROUBLED ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND AND SHAPE SOCIETY 29 (1990).
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environmental gains, and most likely to accommodate in a workable fashion
the uncertainties and diverse values in environmental policymaking.
To put cause-oriented probing in perspective, it is useful to recall the
description offered by Dean Colin Diver over a decade ago of two basic
decisionmaking paradigms.7 3 One of these paradigms, Diver observed, is
"comprehensive rationality"-a four-step process in which goals are specified,
all possible methods for achieving goals are identified, the effectiveness of
each method is evaluated, and alternatives chosen that represent the greatest
progress toward desired goals.74 The other is "incrementalism"-a less
synoptic process in which "lofty visions of some preferred social state play no
role," small changes are adopted in response to errors, only a handful of
alternatives are identified and compared, and decisionmaking is decentralized
throughout many levels of government and in society at large.75 Diver argued
that comprehensive rationality had "triumphed" as the modern decisionmaking
paradigm,76 and noted how it was often seen as especially well suited to
environmental policymaking. 7
Today's risk-oriented reformers argue that environmental policymaking
needs to be even more comprehensive. With an eye to fully integrated environ-
mental management, these reformers argue that only a single interrelated risk-
reduction system can prevent cross-media pollution, assure that regulatory
action against toxic substances does not lead to even worse substitutes, and
coordinate trade-offs among disparate programs to optimize overall compliance
expenditures.7 1 In their quest for synoptic rationality, risk-oriented reformers
argue for regulatory comparisons that measure carcinogenic, neurotoxic,
mutogenic, teratogenic, and ecological risk79 and even more demanding algo-
rithms that factor in the health risks of low income and unemployment."0
Although Professor James Krier has observed that truly comprehensive risk
analysis would require an "everything" model, 8 1 many risk-oriented reformers
seem to take this as a challenge rather than as fundamental criticism.
73. See Colin S. Diver,. Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393
(1981).
74. Id. at 396.
75. Id. at 399.
76. Id. at 409-21.
77. See id. at 415 (use of comprehensive rationality in Toxic Substances Control Act), 416-17 (use
of comprehensive rationality in National Forest Management Act and National Environmental Policy Act),
422-28 (speculating on Supreme Court's support for comprehensive rationality and distrust of public
participation).
78. See Homstein, supra note 7, at 580-84 (speaking of the "allure" of synopticism).
79. Id. at 574-78.
80. See OMB Criticizes OSHA Health Regulation, Resurrects Issue of Risk-Risk Analysis, 16 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1199 (Oct. 2, 1992) (OMB believes that any unintended health effects caused
by lower wages or unemployment brought about by industry compliance costs with environmental regula-
tions must be considered in determining the cost-benefit rationality of health and safety measures).
81. James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 119, 126-27
(1991).
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Yet this quest for super synopticism in environmental law arises at a time
when enthusiasm generally for the paradigm of comprehensive rationality has
tempered. An impressive body of literature has documented how synoptic
ideals can impose informational and analytical burdens that make effective
governmental intervention impossible, even if goals can be specified and
agreed upon. 2 Indeed, administrative law scholars increasingly are arguing
that the success of informal rulemaking as a social mechanism may depend on
it being "de-ossified" from overly analytical straightjackets. 3 Even more
fundamentally, a large body of literature has documented the normative
difficulties in accurately discovering "preferences" for environmental
protection on which the whole synoptic enterprise depends,' because public
preferences themselves will adapt to the creativity and range of possible
societal arrangements (or lack thereof).85 Forcing the electorate to prioritize
its multiple concerns about environmental protection and then to trade off
"environmental" preferences against each other and against "economic"
preferences (say, for jobs or "competitiveness") altogether misses the point of
perhaps the most commonly expressed preference: for environmentally
sustainable economic policies that minimize the need for trade-offs. It is no
answer to argue that some trading off is inevitable in this life (a truism which
merely restates the economic concept of opportunity costs). The fundamental
policy debate is about how society might better organize itself through legal
rules and public policies to avoid unnecessary trade-offs among deeply held
public values.
There are reasons to believe that cause-oriented reform, if properly ap-
proached, can make progress toward sustainability where more synoptic risk-
based reform cannot. Identifying the reasonably proximate causes of environ-
mental problems (the qualifier "reasonably proximate" is important),86 will
in many instances require far less information than developing full-fledged
82. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 164
(1990) ("[tlhe bureaucratic aspiration to comprehensive rationality is tempered both in doctrinal an-
nouncement and in practice by some appreciation of reality"); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying " the Rulemaking Process, 1992 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400-10 (1992) (hurdles created for informal
rulemaking by substantive requirements for comprehensive rationality).
83. See McGarity, supra note 82, at 1385-86 (referring to former EPA General Counsel and current
Yale Law School professor Donald Elliott as coining the phrase "ossification of rulemaking").
84. See, e.g., LINDBLOM, supra note 72, at 18-21; Hornstein, supra note 7, at 618, n. 256; Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interferences With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986).
85. See, e.g., LINDBLOM, supra note 72, at 21-22; Homstein, supra note 7, at 620-21; Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 620-21.
86. Of course, I am mindful that there are "ultimate" catises of environmental degradation (including
perhaps psychological, anthropological, or religious causes), and so I use designedly the qualifier "proxi-
mate." And, to avoid the possibility of socially constructed but scientifically imaginary causes, I designedly
use the full term "reasonably proximate," which accepts the need for some degree of scientific link between
cause and effect but without necessarily requiring something on the order of a fully developed dose-
response curve.
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dose-response relationships to pinpoint environmental effects.817 Once some
degree of scientific screening separates out real from truly nonexistent prob-
lems,88 cause-oriented reform is more likely than effects-based regulation to
identify and address human activity that can cause multiple environmental
problems.8 9 Perhaps most importantly, the focus of cause-oriented reform
should be on incentives most likely to ameliorate environmentally harmful
activity without greatly reducing the benefits of such activity. Because
incentive structures can be difficult to design, cause-oriented reform may in
many instances need to proceed experimentally. To that extent, it envisions a
far more dynamic and incremental regulatory process than the static
calibrations of comprehensive rationality and risk-oriented reform. Yet such a
dynamic approach to regulation not only promises to avoid large
miscalculations by government but also promises to develop incentives for
cost-effective innovation among private market participants.
As I develop more fully below with the case of pesticides, properly de-
signed cause-based reform can be more effective, more normatively defensible,
and even more cost-effective than either current regulatory programs or pro-
posed risk-oriented regimes.
II. Reframing the Debate over Pesticide Policy
At the core of federal pesticide regulation is a tale of two statutes, the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 9 and, secondari-
ly, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).91 In contrast to
more pervasive federal environmental laws that regulate broader fields of
economic activity,92  FIFRA might be viewed as an "off-center"
environmental statute, governing a discrete subset of toxic substance use.93
FIFRA has central relevance for risk-oriented reform, however, because it was
the first environmental statute to adopt an "unreasonable risk" standard for
87. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 23, at 291 (discussion of the intensity of informational needs and
complexities of structuring meaningful dose-response curves).
88. Of course, I recognize that "cause" and "problem" must be linked by sufficient scientific
information to screen out those "problems" that might not exist by any criterion or which are by all
appropriate criterion truly de minimis.
89. Pesticide use, for example, can cause more than eight different categories of harm. See infra text
accompanying notes 131-38.
90. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (Supp. 1991).
91. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988).
92. See Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (PM-222A),
Environmental Problem Area Profiles, 3 (July 20, 1991) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (control
of criteria air pollutants under the Clean Air Act accounted for 30% of public and private expenditures for
environmental protection in 1987).




decisionmaking and it thus is in FIFRA that the country has accumulated its
most lengthy experience with risk-based environmental policymaking.94
Under FIFRA, no one may distribute or sell for a specific use a "pesti-
cide"--def'med broadly to include any insecticide, herbicide, or other substance
for the control of a "pest" 95-unless the pesticide has been "registered" with
EPA for that specific use.96 EPA will register new pesticides and "reregister"
older ones97 so long as the pesticides are designed to accomplish their
intended effects without causing "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment," 98 a standard defined as "any unreasonable risk to man or the
environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs
and benefits of [the pesticide's] use." 99  If new information leads EPA to
suspect that a registration can no longer be supported, it may begin
proceedings to "cancel" the pesticide's registration, either in whole or as to
specific applications." EPA may also "suspend" a pesticide's registration
during the pendency of cancellation proceedings if necessary to prevent an
imminent hazard to the public.' 0'
If a pesticide's use is expected to cause residues to remain in or on food,
EPA will not register that use under FIFRA unless it has also granted a residue
"tolerance" under FFDCA. 02 Tolerance-setting is governed by FFDCA Sec-
tions 408 and 409. Section 408 governs tolerances for "raw" agricultural
commodities such as milk and fresh produce. 03  Like a pesticide's
registration under FIFRA, a Section 408 tolerance is granted on the basis of
a risk-benefit calculus;"° accordingly, EPA may, and has, granted tolerances
94. See Applegate, supra note 22, at 268.
95. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988) (the term "pesticide" means "any substance ... intended for
preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest" and "any substance ... intended for use as a plant
regulator, defoliant, or desiccant"). See also id. § 136(t) (the term "pest" means "any insect, rodent,
nematode, fungus, weed . . . or any other form of terrestrial or acquatic plant or animal life or virus,
bacteria or other micro-organisms [except those on living humans or animals]").
96. Id. § 136a(a).
97. In 1972, FIFRA was amended to require the "reregistration" of previously registered pesticides
under contemporary standards of "unreasonable risk." See Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, § 2(z), (bb), §
3(c)(5), 86 Stat. 973, 979-81 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136(z), (bb) and 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1972))
(amended 1991).
98. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C),(D) (1988).
99. Id. § 136(bb).
100. Id. § 136d(b) (1988). See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
101. Id. § 136d(c).
102. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 346a, 348 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 152.112(g) (1991). EPA expresses tolerances
as pans per million of pesticide residue in or on the food being evaluated.
103. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a).
104. See id. (Administrator shall establish tolerances "to the extent necessary to protect human
health" after giving "appropriate consideration" to the need for the production of an adequate, wholesome
and economical food supply); Food Safety Amendments of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 1725 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong.,
Ist Sess. 133-38 (1989) (testimony of EPA Acting Deputy Director John A. Moore) (EPA uses a subjective
risk-benefit analysis for each case).
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for residues of oncogenic pesticides (those pesticides which can cause tumors
in laboratory test animals under certain conditions) when the agency believes
that the health risks to human beings are relatively small.1 5 Section 409
governs tolerances for "processed" foods such as applesauce. ic In contrast
to the risk-benefit standard for raw commodity tolerances, Section 409 is
governed by the special decisional rule of the Delaney Clause, which prohibits
any pesticide residues in processed foods "found to induce cancer in humans
or animals."'0 7
Although much of pesticide regulation is found in the evolution and intrica-
cies of FIFRA and FFDCA, there are certainly other relevant bodies of law.
In different factual settings, the manufacture, use, or disposal of pesticides can
trigger regulatory concern under the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA),' 5 the Clean Air Act,"°9 the Emergency Planning and Community
105. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COuNcIL., REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY
PARADOX 67 (1987) ("EPA has about 2,500 section 408 tolerances for oncogenic pesticides").
106. See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1988). EPA, however, does not require a Section 409 tolerance for
processed foods containing pesticide residues at or below the Section 408 tolerance level.
107. The Clause is named after Representative James Delaney of New York who chaired extensive
hearings on the safety of pesticides over a two-year period between 1950 and 1952. See Hearings Before
the House Select Comm. to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics, 81 st Cong., 2d Sess
(1950), 82d Cong., Ist Sess. (1951), and 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (popularly known as the "Delaney
Committee" hearings). There are actually two "Delaney Clauses" in different sections of the FFDCA. See
21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c), 360b(d)(I)(1). Although the Clause seems unequivocally to allow no room for
consideration of a carcinogen's dose, see Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legisl-
ator's Guide to the Food Safety Provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 171, 181 (1978), EPA has since 1988 adopted a de minimis standard that allows the Agency to avoid
the zero-risk impact of the Delaney Clause where the Agency believes the human dietary risk from a
pesticide residue is "at most negligible," see Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney
Paradox Policy Statement, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,104 (1988) (giving notice of EPA's intent to adopt a negligible
risk exception to the Delaney Clause) (issued Oct. 14, 1988). In July 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected EPA's policy as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. See Les v. Reilly, 968
F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993).
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988). TSCA's broad definition of "chemical substance" specifically
excludes any pesticide "when manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce for use as a pesticide",
id. § 2602(2)(B)(ii). Under this exclusion, however, TSCA reaches chemical substances such as "inert
ingredients" that are not yet a pesticide component or "intermediate substances" that are used in
manufacturing pesticides; neither of these two categories of substances are considered a "pesticide" by
EPA. See 42 Fed. Reg. 64,572, 64,586 (1977) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 710). Even substances intended
for use as pesticides will come under TSCA scrutiny while undergoing research and development. Until
the manufacturer intends to receive a benefit in pest control from the substance's use, it is not subject to
FIFRA and will fail under TSCA. See 51 Fed. Reg. 15,096, 15,098 (1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 720).
109. Pesticide manufacturers who emit quantities of their products into the air are subject to Section
112 of the Clean Air Act, which lists among its "hazardous air pollutants" such pesticides as toxaphene,
chlordane, and heptachlor, see 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1988). Section 112 subjects "major sources" of
hazardous air pollutants to special emission standards based on emission controls achieed by the "best
controlled similar source" (for new sources) or the average emission controls achieved by the "best
performing 12 percent of the existing sources" for each pollutant. Id. §§ 7412(d)(3), 7414(d)(3)(A). In
determining whether pesticide manufacturing plants are major stationary sources, fugitive emissions are
"counted" because pesticide manufacturers are defined within the special category of "chemical process
plants." See 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a)(1)(iv)(c)(20) (1992).
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Right to Know Act,"' RCRA,"' CERCLA,1 2 the Safe Drinking Water
Act,"13  the Clean Water Act," 4  the Occupational Safety and Health
Act," 5 and NEPA. t"6 There is also an impressive body of state and,
110. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Title In, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C. (1986)). Pursuant to this Title, EPA promulgates
a list of "extremely hazardous substances," many of which are pesticides, see 40 C.F.R. § 355, app. A
(1992), for which "threshold planning quantities" are given. A facility possessing a listed pesticide in
amounts greater than the thresholds is required to prepare Material Safety Data Sheets as well as emergency
and hazardous chemical inventory forms for each pesticide and submit them to the state and local
emergency response agencies and to the local fire department. Companies processing or manufacturing
pesticides must also estimate any amounts released into the environment and report such releases annually
on Toxic Chemical Release Forms, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988), 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.20-370.25 (1992).
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6982k (1988). Pesticides are listed RCRA "hazardous wastes," see 40C.F.R.
§ 261 (1992), making generators subject to record keeping, labeling, storage, handling, and reporting
requirements, see 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1992). Further requirements may apply if pesticides are stored (as they
often are) at pesticide manufacturing plants. Id. § 6924(a).
112. CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" in ways that can implicate pesticides, such as
hazardous air pollutants listed under Clean Air Act Section 112, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. 1990), but
also provides an exemption from liability for certain pesticide uses, id. § 9607(i) ("no person ... may
recover under the authority of this section for any response costs or damages resulting from the application
of a pesticide product registered under [FIFRA]"). EPA, however, does not consider a pesticide spill to be
an "application" of a pesticide within the meaning of the exemption. See 50 Fed. Reg. 13,456, 13,465
(1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 117 & 302). Although sellers of pesticides can be excluded from
CERCLA liability if there is no evidence of an arrangement on their part for disposing of the pesticide, see
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Alis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990), pesticide
producers that contract out to formulators certain processes are considered to retain ownership of the
pesticides and liable for spills by the formulators, see United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chem. Corp., 872
F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting producer's argument that it could be liable only if it "intended" to
arrange for disposal).
113. See supra note 61.
114. The pesticide industry is considered a "primary industry" under the Clean Water Act's National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System provisions and individual plants need permits to discharge
pollutants. See 40 C.F.R. § 122, app. A (1990). Many pesticides, moreover, are listed as "toxic pollutants"
under Section 307, see id. § 116.4, requiring notification of discharges above listed "reportable quantities."
Id. § 117.3. Since 1977, EPA has controlled toxic pollutants using health-based regulations that often
impose more stringent standards on pesticide manufacturers than might have been imposed under the Clean
Water Act's technology-based limitations on conventional pollutants. See Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding use of health-based standards in regulating discharges of the pesticides
endrin and toxaphene).
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988). A 1990 Memorandum of Understanding between EPA and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) establishes a framework for notification, consulta-
tion, and coordination to assist EPA in identifying environmental problems involving pesticides and OSHA
in identifying any resulting workplace health and safety problems. Memorandum of Understanding between
the U.S. Dep't of Labor, OSHA and the Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement (Nov. 23, 1990).
OSHA has established exposure limits for pesticides determined to be air contaminants, see 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1000 (1992), and other regulations for pesticides of concern, see id. § 1910.1047. OSHA may regulate
pesticides in areas where EPA has not exercised its authority. See Public Citizen Health Research Group
v. Auchter, 554 F.Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1983) (OSHA may set an emergency standard for EtO (a pesticide)
when concerned with the health effects to workers stemming from its use as a hospital sterilant). OSHA
may not, however, regulate pesticides when EPA has exercised regulatory control. See Organized Migrants
in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (OSHA may not set standards
concerning time of reentry for farm workers with respect to fields treated with pesticides, where EPA has
already promulgated regulations).
116. Although EPA is not required to comply with NEPA (by performing an environmental assess-
ment or environmental impact statement) when registering pesticides, see Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776
(9th Cir. 1986), NEPA has been used to halt or delay federal programs that involve the spraying of
pesticides, see, e.g. Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1988)
(injunction issued, and then dissolved, upon "adequate discussion of alternatives" in environmental impact
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increasingly, local regulatory law"7 as well as state common law."18 But,
despite the occasional significance of these other sources of pesticide law,
regulation under FIFRA and FFDCA remains the center of gravity of federal
pesticide policy.
For all its complexity, however, it is important to underscore what pesticide
regulation is not: it is not a body of law that addresses in any strategic way the
underlying prevalence of pesticides in American agriculture, nor is it a body
of law designed to minimize pesticide use. On reflection, this characteristic is
especially striking because the impetus for modem pesticide regulation, if not
for the modem environmental movement in general, was the argument made
in 1962 by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring"9 for developing just such a
strategic environmental law. In what she called "the other road," Carson
argued for the development of pesticide policies based on the biological
understanding of pests as "living organisms ... [within] 'the whole fabric of
life to which [they] belong."' 2 Although EPA still chooses occasionally to
boast that the Agency exists as "the extended shadow of Silent Spring,'' l
in truth the defining features of modem pesticide regulation languish far too
much in the "shadow" of Rachel Carson's vision of what an enlightened
strategy for crop protection should be-a fact perhaps demonstrated most
succinctly by an increase in pesticide usage between 1964 and 1982 of
statement); Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1983) (requiring site-
specific, rather than programmjatic environmental impact statement, for aerial spraying of herbicides on
public forests).
117. Nearly all states have generic labeling requirements that supplement federal law, see, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 22-3401(3) (Supp. 1992). There is also a growing number of notification requirements and
other restrictions imposed on residential pesticide spraying operations (particularly affecting commercial
lawn care services). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-365 (1989) (certain pesticides may not be
applied within specified distance of schools, day care centers, and health care centers); CAL. FOOD &
AGRIC. CODE § 29080 (West Supp. 1992) (beekeepers must be notified of local pesticide spraying); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-66a (West 1991) (pesticide applicators must inform owner of property of the
identity of the pesticide being used, any hazards associated with it and any emergency precautions
available, and leave notification signs posted on treated property).
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, I1l S. Ct. 2476 (1991), the Supreme Court held that local
governmental regulation of pesticides was not preempted by FIFRA. More recently, California's Proposition
65 survived a preemption challenge against Its requirements for point-of-sale warnings. See Chemical
Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1992). The pesticide industry has mounted an
aggressive legislative effort to encourage states to adopt legislation prohibiting local pesticide regulation.
As of June 1992, thirteen states had adopted such legislation in the wake of the Mortier decision. See One
Year After Local Pesticide Use Controls Upheld, Debate Continues in State Legislatures, City Halls, Con-
gress, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 687 (July 3, 1992).
118. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FIFRA does not
preempt state tort suits based on inadequate labeling). But see Papas v. Upjohn, 926 F.2d 1019 (1 1th Cir.
1991) (FIFRA impliedly preempts state common law tort claims for inadequate labeling). The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari to resolve the emerging split among the circuits-but to no avail. See
Arkansas-Platte Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chemical Co., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 314
(1992), reaffid, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993).
119. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
120, Id. at 277, 278.
121. Id. at 6, cited in H. PATRICIA HYNES, THE RECURRING SILENT SPRING 49 (1989).
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170%.22 It is to explore the forces which have shaped both pesticide use and
pesticide regulation that I now turn.
A. A Cause-Oriented Perspective on Pesticide Use: Prisoners' Dilemmas and
Technology Treadmills
It is useful at the outset to question what is perhaps the most direct reason
often given for pesticide use in the United States: because it works.'23 The
critical issue, of course, is what one means by "works." From the perspective
of productivity gains, there is certainly impressive evidence that for many
crops, pesticides increase yields and reduce labor costs, at least in the near
term; aggregate estimates of productivity gains indicate a 400% rate of return
on the pesticide dollar." Yet there is also evidence that these gains are often
not sustained over the long run, due to the counterproductive tendency of
pesticides to induce genetic "resistance" in target pests'25 and to destroy
beneficial insects that previously had helped to check target pest popula-
tions.'26 Accordingly, there are aggregate data which reveal that the country
lost in 1987 almost precisely the same percentage of its crops to pests as it did
in 1900-despite the application in 1987 of some 430 million pounds of
122. BOARD ON AGRIC., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE 44 (1989) (hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].
123. See, e.g., Hearings on FIFRA Before the House Comm. on Agric., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 133
(1977) (statement of Arthur Bassett, Onondaga County, New York, Pest Control Association) ("Without
pesticides, our concern will not be that of a silent spring, but a silent summer, silent autumn, silent winter
and a silent world. Silence will be broken only by those crying for food. The name of that game is
famine!"); HOUSE COMM. ON AGRIC., 94TH CONG., IST SESS., BUSINESS MEETINGS ON FIFRA EXTENSION,
pt. 2, 129 (Comm. Print 1976) (remarks of Rep. Poage) ("Without pesticides every one of us is going to
starve in about three weeks. It is inevitable. You cannot feed the world and go back to the ecology that
existed here when this country was discovered").
124. David Pimentel et al., Benefits and Costs of Pesticide Use in U.S. Food Productio,, 28 BIOSCL.
772, 781 (1978).
125. Although individual pest organisms, of course, cannot "become" resistant, pesticides operate
on the genetics of pest populations by killing off most individuals and leaving those which happen to enjoy
some measure of genetic resistance to become the breeding stock for a resistant population. In 1938,
"scientists knew of just seven insect and mite species that had acquired resistance to pesticides. By 1984,
that figure had climbed to 447, and included most of the world's pests." Sandra Postel, Controlling Toxic
Chemicals, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1988, 122 (Linda Starke ed. 1988) (citing George P. Georghiou, The
Magnitude of the Resistance Problem, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDE RESISTANCE:
STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR MANAGEMENT (Wash. D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986)). Perhaps the
most notorious example of resistance in the United States involved a resistant tobacco budworm which fed
on cotton and caused the collapse of cotton-growing in southern Texas between 1968 and 1975. See P. L.
Adkisson et al., Controlling Cotton's Insect Pests: A New System, 216 ScI. 19-22 (1982).
126. There are actually several related effects. "Resurgence" occurs when a pesticide eliminates the
natural enemies of a pest and the surviving pest individuals quickly surpass their original numbers. See
Angus A. Maclntyre, Why Pesticides Received Extensive Use in America: A Political Economy of
Agricultural Pest Management to 1970, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 533, 552 (1987). "Secondary pest
outbreaks" occur when a species that had not theretofore been a pest suddenly attains harmful densities
(and becomes a pest) after pesticides kill off the species' natural enemies. Id. at 552-53.
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pesticides.'27 By yet another measure, which considers the marginal benefits
of pesticides over "alternative" pest control measures,"'2 there are data show-
ing that pesticide use on some (and perhaps many) crops could be cut in half
without significant decreases in yields. 29
If it is unclear whether the intended effects of pesticides can support the
nonqualified claim that pesticides "work," certainly any final judgment on the
question must also consider unintended effects. EPA's Science Advisory Board
concluded in 1990 that, when compared with dozens of other risks, pesticides
presented one of the country's more widespread and severe environmental
problems. 3 ° Apart from accelerating the development of resistant pests,
pesticides can cause at least eight other broad types of unintended effects:
acute or chronic health effects among workers in the manufacturing
process;'13  acute or chronic health effects on third parties due to accidents
in manufacturing or transport; 32 acute and chronic health problems among
applicators and farmworkers; 133  contamination of groundwater due to
leaching;134  contamination of surface waters from farm run-off;135
127. See Postel, supra note 125, at 122 ("Insects and weeds now reduce crop production by about
30 percent, apparently no less than before the chemical age dawned").
128. For descriptions of these measures, see infra at notes 172-77.
129. See JENNIFER CURTIS ET AL., HARVEST OF HOPE: THE POTENTIAL FOR ALTERNATIVE AGRICUL-
TURE TO REDUCE PESTICIDE USE 4 (1991) ("A new study by Cornell University Entomologist, David
Pimentel, estimates that if 50 percent of pesticides now used in American agriculture were replaced by
nonchemical control techniques, crop yields would not decline and food prices would rise less than one per-
cent") (citing David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Impacts of Reducing U.S. Agricultural
Pesticide Use, in HANDBOOK OF PEST MANAGEMENT IN AGRICLULTURE (1991); COMM
. 
ON THE ROLE OF
ALTERNATIVE FARMING METHODS IN MODERN PRODUCTION AGRICULTURE, BOARD ON AGRIC., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE 209-12 (1989) (an evaluation of IPM for insects on nine
crops in ten states shows in every case higher average per acre yield for 1PM users over nonusers growing
same crop in same state despite reduced pesticide use, reduced costs of production, or both).
130. . EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 27, at 8; Office of Policy, Planning'& Evaluation,
supra note 92, at 12.
131. See Elise M. Burton, Note, Interagency Race to Regulate Pesticide Exposure Leaves Farm-
workers in the Dust, 8 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 294 (1989) (discussing extent of OSHA's regulation of
workplace exposure to pesticides, including exposure during the manufacturing process).
132. Certainly the most notorious example was the explosion of Union Carbide's pesticide
manufacturing plant in Bhopal, India that killed over 2,000 people. See Eliot Marshall, The Rise and
Decline of Temik, 229 Sol. 1369, 1369 (1985). A similar plant owned by Union Carbide in Institute, West
Virginia leaked pesticide fumes in August 1985, sending 135 people to the hospital but causing no
permanent injuries. Id.
133. The Bureau of Labor Statistics'estimates that each year, between 800 and 1,000 people die and
between 80,000 and 300,000 become injured as the direct result of occupational exposure to agricultural
pesticides. See OSHA Field Sanitation: Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,050 (1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1928); R. WASSERTOM & R. WILES, FIELD DUTY: U.S. FARMWORKERS AND PESTICIDE SAFETY 3 (1985).
134. EPA has confirmed that 46 pesticides have contaminated the groundwater of 26 states as a result
of normal agricultural use, See EPA Threatens Grants Cut, Construction Ban for Lack of Auto Inspection
Program in Ohio, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1755-56 (Dec. 23, 1988). Other researchers, using the
same data base as EPA, have concluded that 73 pesticides have contaminated the groundwater of 34 states.
Id. One study has concluded that the cost simply of monitoring wells for groundwater contamination could
cost $7 billion. CURTIS ET AL., supra note 129, at 7 ("USDA estimates that first-time monitoring costs of
private wells and community water systems for pesticides and nitrate would cost more than $1.4 billion.
... Actual clean-up is expected to cost much more").
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poisoning of wildlife;' 36 acute and chronic health problems among consumers
due to residues on food;'37 and contamination of the environment due to
improper disposal of unused pesticides and their containers.'38 Although there
have been few attempts to measure the overall magnitude of these losses (other
than the SAB's recent assessment), a sense of scale may be taken from
evidence suggesting that pesticides are involved in 15 percent of the wastes at
federal Superfund sites imposing extensive remediation costs;'39 there are
over 27,000 yearly instances of poisonings by pesticides among applicators and
farmworkers;'" pesticide residues on food are estimated to cause each year
hundreds of "excess" chronic health effects, including cancers, among consum-
ers;' 4' and pesticides are responsible for significant wildlife losses, including
in some instances irreparable losses among populations of threatened or endan-
gered species. 142 From a cost-benefit perspective, the cumulative losses may
well outweigh the cumulative benefits of pesticides. 43
For the purposes of my argument, however, it is unnecessary to conclude
dispositively that the aggregate costs of pesticides outweigh the aggregate
135. See, e.g., John H. Davidson, Environmental Analysis of the Federal Farm Programs, 8 VA.
•ENvTL. L.J. 235, 235 (1989) ("Twenty-seven states have explicitly recognized agriculture as the primary
cause of nonpoint source problems on rivers, and twenty-four states have found agriculture to be the largest
nonpoint source polluting lakes").
136. See infra text accompanying notes 319-23 (discussing effects on wildlife of government
eradication campaigns in the 1950s). See also CARSON, supra note 119, at 103-52.
137. The National Research Council has estimated that if worst case assumptions were valid, there
would be an increased risk of 5,800 cancers per million people over a 70-year lifetime, which translates
into 1.4 million additional cases for the current population or 20,000 additional cases yearly. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 74. See also Meta-Analysis of Studies Indicates Higher Risks of
Certain Cancers in Farmers, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1153 (Sept. 25, 1992) (National
Cancer Institute's new meta-analysis of epidemiological studies suggests that the "rising rates for some
tumors" among the general population may in fact be due to consumer exposure to agricultural chemicals.).
138. See JOHN D. CONNER, JR. ET AL., PESTICIDE REGISTRATION HANDBOOK 361-70 (3d ed. 1991).
139. In a 1987 sample of Superfund sites involving treatment of wastes, pesticides represented 7%
of solid wastes and 8% of aqueous wastes for a total of 15% of total wastes. Donald C. White et al.,
Summary of Hazardous Waste Treatment at Superfund Sites, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 1122 (Aug.
21, 1987). EPA predicted in May. 1992 that it would cost $200,000 simply to stabilize one pesticide
Superfund site in Imperial County, California designated for emergency response action. Abandoned
Pesticide Storage Facility Target of $200,000 Emergency Cleanup By EPA, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5,
at 434 (May 29, 1992).
140. See, e.g., I HANDBOOK OF PESTICIDE ToxICOLOGY 281-282, tables 7.5 & 7.6 (W. Hayes, Jr.
& E. Laws, Jr. eds. 1991) (in 1985, there were 35,999 pesticide poisonings reported to poison control
centers in the United States; global estimates for accidental poisonings range from 500,000 (with 5,000
annual deaths) to 2.9 milion (with 200,000 deaths)).
141. On oncogenic effects, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REGULATING PESTICIDES IN FOOD:
THE DELANEY PARADOX, supra note 105 (worst-case possibility of 20,000 additional cases yearly);
Chemical Exposure During Pregnancy Linked to Fetal Death, Birth Defects, 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 49, at 1790 (Mar. 13, 1992) (congenital abnormalities in higher-than-expected numbers in women
exposed to pesticides during first trimester).
142. See, e.g., Possible TSCA Changes, Pollution Prevention Emphasis, Pesticide Reregistration,
HMTA Rules Sees Top 1992 Issues, 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1496 (Jan. 17, 1992); Use Of
37 Chemicals May be Restricted by North Dakota Endangered Species Program, 15 Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 15, at 467 (July 12, 1991) (adverse effects on wildlife have forced North Dakota to prohibit
applications of 37 different kinds of pesticides under its endangered species program).
143. See Pimentel et al., supra note 129, at 1-123; Pimentel et al., supra note 124, at 772-81.
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benefits. In fact, there are insufficient data for such a comprehensive analysis
and the precise structure of the calculation would be complex and contest-
able.'" But it is enough that there is a plausible case against the simple ex-
planation that pesticides are used in America because, on balance, they
"work." For if this most direct justification is questionable, it highlights the
possibility that there may well be other factors which account for the pervasive
use of pesticides in American agriculture.
There are several economic reasons why individual farmers might use
pesticides to a greater extent than might be justified by an aggregate cost-
benefit calculation. First, the unintended effects of pesticides might be true
economic externalities-losses borne by others without corrective legal mecha-
nisms which can bring back (internalize) the losses to the individual pesticide
users. 45 Second, even for those losses that farmers will themselves experi-
ence, such as the eventual effects of pesticide-resistant pests, it may still be
economically rational for an individual farmer to continue unabated her level
of pesticide use. This is because of what Garrett Hardin termed "the tragedy
of the commons": the pesticide user will be able to reap the full benefits of
high pesticide use in the short term (greater yields on her crops) but will only
bear part of the costs of the common problem she will share with all other
farmers in the future (resistant pests).' Third, there can operate classic
prisoners' dilemmas: farmers know they would be better off cooperating to
reduce pesticide use; but, fearing "cheating" by other farmers, each decides to
maintain the current level of pesticide use even though all will end up the
worse for it.147
144. See J.C. HEADLEY & J.N. LEWIS, THE PESTICIDE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
PUBLIC POLICY 37-60 (1967) (problems in categorizing spillovers as negative or positive and benefits as
real or ostensible are significant and complex conceptual problems in constructing a cost-benefit calculation
of pesticide use).
145. See, e.g., id. at 1-62 (categorizing numerous possible negative spillovers).
146. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCi. 1243, 1244 (1968) (because of
imbalance between reaping rewards and sharing burdens, "freedom in a commons brings ruin to all");
James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 334 (1992)
(describing Hardin's insight) ("[tlhe resulting depletion is costly, but the costs are spread across all
members of the community. The benefits of exploitation, in contrast, accrue to the individual. The logic
is remorseless .... "); Uri Regev et al., Pests as a Common Property Resource: A Case Study of Alfalfa
Weevil Control, 58 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 186, 195 (1976) (because resistance in weevil will be a shared
problem among neighboring farmers, it "constitutes a 'common property resource' and a nonregulated
market would not yield the optimal solution"); Eli Heuth & Uri Regev, Optimal Agricultural Pest
Management With Increasing Pest Resistance, 56 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 543 (1974) (single farms contribute
little to pesticide resistance so individual farmers have little incentive to modify their pest control practices
even though collectively their actions lead to declining profits) (described in Maclntyre, supra note 126,
at 553-54).
147. See Brian P. Baker, Pest Control in the Public Interest: Crop Protection in California, 8 UCLA
J. EN VTL. L. & POL'Y 31, 33 (1988) (noting that pesticide programs requiring collective action among
farmers raise the prospects of "hold outs" which can undermine cooperation among farmers). On prisoners'
dilemmas in general, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-3 (1982) (in the classic prisoners'
dilemma each of two prisoners charged with commiting a crime jointly believes it to be to his advantage
to confess to the following "deal" put to him by the prosecutor, even though the result is worse than if both
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The structure of American agriculture provides ample room for these
economic forces to operate. Agriculture remains a keenly competitive
enterprise in which individual farmers take large financial risks on their ability
to produce a crop. 4 8 Although there are mechanisms by which farmers can
cushion the possibilities of unexpected crop losses or downward market
swings,'49 farmers remain classic "price takers"-in most cases unable to
influence either the price of inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, labor) or the prices
received for their products.' ° As Professor Gerald Torres explains, "[a
farmer's] principal control over income is in the number of units he produces
for sale."' 5
From an individual farmer's point of view, the importance of crop yield
can inflate the attractiveness of pesticides beyond what a purely neutral eco-
nomic calculation might predict. As a matter of straightforward marginal
analysis, one would expect a farmer to apply pesticides only up to the point
where the direct, marginal benefits (increased yield due to the added pesticide
application) is outweighed by the additional application's cost.'52 Yet the use
of pesticides beyond this point can also be perceived by the individual farmer
as "insuring" against the worst-case possibility of pest infestations that can
wipe out a season's crop.'53 Indeed, the insurance function of pesticides has
become especially relevant since early in the Twentieth Century, when the
advent of synthetic fertilizers made crop rotations unnecessary to condition
farmers' fields, causing a transition to monocultures that are far more
susceptible to pest blights that can wipe out entire crops." Although
commercial and public crop insurance later developed that might have, in
theory, reduced the added incentive for prophylactic "insurance sprayings,"
insurers typically demanded, and still demand, that farmers follow arbitrarily
prisoners cooperated: "If you confess and testify against your partner, he'll get life but you'll go free; the
only hitch is that if you both confess, you'll both get a sentence of six years for armed robbery"),
148. Maclntyre, supra note 126, at 537 ("[tjhis single feature, more than any other, has predisposed
farmers to adopt technological innovations that reduce production costs and insure their investments against
the vicissitudes of nature").
149. Professor Gerald Torres explains that "hedging, forward contracting, price later contracting,
and other devices are used primarily to stabilize prices farmers receive." Gerald Torres, Theoretical
Problems with the Environmental Regulation of Agriculture, 8 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 206 n.59 (1989).
150. Id. at 206.
151. Id.
152. See HEADLEY & LEWIS, supra note 144, at 1-19.
153. The literature on the "insurance" function of prophylactic pesticide applications is large. See,
e.g., Uri Regev, An Economic Analysis of Man's Attraction to Presticides, in PEST AND PATHOGEN
CONTROL 441 (G. Conway ed. 1984) (as risk-averse entrepreneurs, farmers have tended to use pesticides
as part of a "minimax" strategy of reducing year-to-year variability in net income rather than maximizing
gains in a given year) (citations omitted); Maclntyre, supra note 126, at 541 ("[iln addition to increasing
farm productivity, pesticides provide a measure of protection against uncertainty").
154. See, e.g., JOHN PERKINS, INSECTS, EXPERTS, AND THE INSECTICIDE CRISIS 11-12 (1982)
(decline in crop rotation magnified insect pest, crop disease, and weed problems); Maclntyre, supra note
126, at 540 (chemical fertilizers and pesticides allowed farmers to adopt monoculture cropping which made
farm crops more prone to pest outbreaks).
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high "routine" spraying schedules or "locally acceptable" customs of pesticide
use as a condition of coverage.'55 Because legal mechanisms to internalize
the adverse effects of pesticides are nonexistent or weak, the net effect is a
pervasive system of structural incentives for farmers to overspray to protect
crop yields.
The incentive to overspray is further compounded by what is known as the
"agricultural treadmill." As crop yields rise, of course, the resulting surpluses
drive prices down. Although this prospect might be expected to encourage
cooperation to prevent surpluses, the existence of output-enhancing technolo-
gies such as fertilizers and pesticides instead trap farmers within a classic
prisoners' dilemma: individual farmers are forced to increase productivity lest
other farmers increase their yields and create surpluses which drive market
prices lower. 156  Moreover, the developing consumer preference for
cosmetically "perfect" produce (itself induced by the high level of cosmetic
quality achievable with pesticides) reinforces the incentives for individual
farmers to use pesticides to avoid being relegated to secondary produce
markets at even further reduced prices.'57 The result is a commonly observed
pattern in agriculture: farmers Who do not adopt improved technologies are
"left with shrunken incomes since their unit costs of production remain high
while prices received [are] falling."'158 Few rational farmers can afford to step
off the agricultural treadmill.
Although federal farm programs were designed to address in some respects
the forms of market failure I've described, as to pesticides they have tended
merely to add their own structural incentives to overspray (even despite recent
legislative attempts to reduce these incentives). The country's modem farm
program was originally framed by the Agriculture Adjustment Acts of 1933
and 1938,19 and is now found in the "permanent legislation" of the
Agricultural Act of 194916° to which policy reverts in the event Congress
fails to enact a new "Farm Bill" every five to seven years."'6 Taken together,
farm legislation seeks to moderate the destructive effects of surpluses and price
155. POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58, at 14-17 (key management practices
used to evaluate loan applications stifle shift away from conventional pesticide use); A. NELSON & W.
MURRAY, AGRICULTURAL FINANCE 288 (1967) (pesticide-favoring practices of private lenders).
156. See CHRISTOPHER J. BoSso, PESTICIDES AND POLrICS 26 (1987) ("if each fanner maximizes
production to protect personal income, the inevitable aggregate outcome is a glut. The ensuing surplus
pounds down commodity prices ... [but] the individual farmer will not or cannot lower production
unilaterally to reduce the surplus, because such a decision would be economically irrational").
157. See Maclntyre, supra note 126, at 540 (with advent of pesticides, markets became less tolerant
of damaged produce).
158. Id. at 541.
159. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 24
(1988)), ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1359 (1988)).
160. Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81439, 63 Stat. 1051 (1949) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, and 16 U.S.C. (Supp. 1989)).
161. See POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58, at 7.
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fluctuations on farmers' incomes by a mix of acreage requirements,162
"deficiency" payments, 63 and nonrecourse loans.' Unfortunately, all of
these programs can collectively and independently create disincentives to
optimal pesticide use. Although the economic literature on these effects is large
and not entirely free from controversy,'65 it is worth highlighting three
economically inefficient distortions on which there seems to have developed
a consensus. First, the programs themselves encourage especially intensive
agriculture and high yields whenever acreage is restricted and farmers are
rewarded for getting as much as they can out of what acres remain 66 and
whenever farmers are guaranteed deficiency payments, beyond market prices,
for however many bushels they produce on "enrolled" acres. 67 Second, the
programs are structured to encourage monoculture (a cropping pattern that
162. Acreage requirements are designed to reduce output and are imposed through "set asides,"
which are not commodity (crop) specific, see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1445b(l)(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) -
(wheat), and through specific "acreage limitations," which restrict the amount of cropland a farmer can
plant to a particular crop, see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1445b-l(e) (wheat) (upland cotton); § 1444(i) (rice); §
1444d(e) (corn and other feed grains) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
163. In 1973, Congress allowed for the establishment of "target" prices for certain crops. See
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (1973) (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 612c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). If market prices fail to reach the target, farmers enrolled in
"deficiency" programs receive "deficiency payments" equal to the difference between the market and target
prices. See 7 U.S.C. § 1445b-3 (1982 & Supp. IV. 1986).
164. In these programs, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), established in 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-
714p (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), offers nonrecourse loans at a government-set loan rate, which acts as a
government-guaranteed minimum price for the commodity; if the market price falls below the loan rate,
the farmer simply forfeits the crop (the loan's collateral) to the government and keeps the loan. See, e.g.,
7 U.S.C. § 1425 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
165. Compare Clayton Ogg, Farm Price Distortions, Chemical Use, and the Environment, 45 J. SOIL
& WATER CONSERV. 45-47 (1990) (commodity programs present barrier to farmers' willingness or ability
to use alternative agriculture techniques); Bruce E. Lyman et al., Commodity Programs and Sustainable
Cash Grain Farming, 45 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERV. 86-87 (1990) (same); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE: FEDERAL INCENTIVES AND FARMERS' OPINIONS (1990) (same) with
CRAIG OSTEEN & PHILIP I. SZMEDRA, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDE USE TRENDS AND
POLICY ISSUES (1989) (commodity programs in part can retire land that was unsuitable for IPM use
anyway).
166. As a general matter, Congress in the 1965 Food and Agriculture Act "coupled" farmers'
agreement to observe acreage restrictions as a precondition to receiving price supports. See RICHARD
RHODES, FARM 227 (1989). The predictable outcome was to encourage growers to farm allowable acreage
as intensively as possible by mechanizing operations, fertilizing heavily, and using pesticides to control
weeds and insects. Id.; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 122, at 70 ("the prospect of higher pay-
ments has encouraged heavier use of fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation than can be justified by market
forces in any given year"). The 1985 Farm Bill exacerbated this pro-pesticide bias through "cross-compli-
ance" provisions which disqualified a grower from price supports if she exceeded her assigned "base acres"
by planting any other program crop, see Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985), codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3801-3845 (1988), a requirement that "discourages diversification into rotations involving other program
crops"-one of the hallmarks of IPM techniques that reduce the need for pesticides. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 122, at 11. In the 1990 Farm Bill, Congress attempted to "decouple" somewhat the
link between acreage requirements and price supports by allowing farmers to idle a percentage of their base
acres without "losing base" on which to calculate future deficiency payments; the Bill also allows farmers
to grow up to 25% of their base in several other crops. See POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM,
supra note 58, at 9.
167. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 122, at 239 ("without government [defi-
ciency] payments, continuous corn was found to be the least profitable of the rotations at $56.00 per acre
net return over variable cost compared with $90 for a corn-soybeans-corn-oats ... rotation").
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requires artificially high pesticide use because it is especially susceptible to
pest losses) and to discourage crop rotation (a cropping pattern that is often at
the cornerstone of modem "low-input" approaches to pest protection). 68
Third, the programs distort market forces that would tend to "locate" crops in
areas where pest control costs are low (fewer pesticide applications needed) by
guaranteeing artificially high prices for enrolled crops regardless of where the
crops are grown. 1
69
To avoid any misunderstanding, my argument is not necessarily that the
pesticide-related problems of the farm programs outweigh the social benefits
to farmers and rural communities that these programs hope to achieve. Nor am
I necessarily confident that changes in federal farm programs alone .would
induce farmers to reduce overreliance on pesticides. For present purposes, it
is sufficient to contend that the present rate of pesticide use on American farms
may be as much an artificial construct of the structure of American agriculture
and of our farm programs as it is a reflection of the inherently beneficial
attributes of pesticides themselves.
B. Past Attempts to Develop a Legal Framework to Reduce Pesticide Use
Although modem pesticide regulation under FIFRA does not address itself
to the underlying possibilities of ineffective and inefficient pest control, it is
not difficult to imagine the rough contours of a legal regime that would.
Indeed, prior to the commercialization of synthetic pesticides earlier in this
century, a considerable body of law sought to create a framework for farmers
to solve the collective action problems that effective pest control required.
Moreover, there now exist traces of governmental programs and initiatives that
seek to reduce the environmental consequences of chemically-dependent
agriculture. In this Section, I describe this body of law to highlight several
difficulties that any legal system of low-input agriculture must confront: the
creation, transfer and effective use of information; the lack of autonomy that
168. Harold 0. Carter, The Three R's of Agricultural Sustainability: Reality, Redirection, and
Restraints, in COUNCIL FOR AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE:
SCIENTISTS' REVIEW 98 (Lowell S. Jordan & James L. Jordan eds., 1990), reprinted in Alternative
Agriculture: Perspectives of the National Academy of Sciences and the Council for Agricultural Sciences
and Technology: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1990) (noting
that federal price support programs encourage monoculture). See also supra notes 160-67.
169. See, e.g., POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58, at 12 ("The location effect
is closely tied to the acreage effect, by encouraging agricultural production in program commodities in areas
where, without government subsidization, production costs would be too high. .... since growing crops
appropriate for local conditions minimize pest infestations is a factor in the use of IPM, the location effect
does inhibit the use of IPM").
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collective pest-control measures might create; and the possible inequities
among individual farmers that can arise in a system of collective action. 170
At the core of any alternative legal framework must be an appreciation of
the strengths and limitations of what is typically described as "alternative"
agriculture. To sidestep a sometimes esoteric debate over what measures
should qualify as "alternative,"'' there are basically four types of alternative
measures most commonly in use, and about which a scientific literature has
developed or is developing. First, there are "cultural" methods to control
insects, weeds, and diseases, such as crop rotations, altered planting dates,
cultivation, and the planting of border crops.' Second, there are "biological
control" methods such as the release of predatory or parasitic insects. 1"'
Third, there is the deployment of "biorational" pest control measures such as
pheromone-baited traps,'74 the release of microbiological pathogens of insects
or weeds,'75 and the use of genetically engineered pest control products.'76
Fourth, and probably most importantly, there is the use of "integrated pest
management" (IPM), a decisionmaking system designed-to use all "suitable"
pest control techniques, including chemical pesticides, to keep pest populations
below economically injurious levels while satisfying environmental and
production objectives.'
It is fairly plain that alternative pest controls can impose on farmers two
types of costs that are generally not imposed to the same extent by chemical
pesticides. First, there are often significant information costs involved with
more finely-tailored alternative forms of crop protection-such as the need to
"scout" a crop to discern the optimal timing of pesticide applications (perhaps
the most common IPM technique) or the need to familiarize oneself with the
relative effectiveness of a wide assortment of nonchemical measures or prod-
ucts-that clearly transcend the information costs involved in the more routine
spraying of a chemical pesticide that may be "automatically" effective against
a broad range of pests.'78 Second, to the extent that pest-specific products
170. From a different perspective, these same "difficulties" may also be counted as additional reasons
why farmers might rationally have preferred pesticides over alternative methods of pest protection.
171. See Susan M. Braxton, Alternative Methods of Pest Control and Factors Influencing Their
Development and Deployment 24, 26 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (1990) (IPM
is sometimes criticized as a "last hold" for those who want to rationalize the use of agricultural chemicals).
172. See Brian P. Baker, Pest Control in the Public interest: Crop Protection in California, 8 UCLA
J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 31, 33 (1988).
173. See, e.g., L. E. Caltigarone, Landmark Examples in Classical Biological Control, 26 ANNUAL
REVIEW OF ENTOMOLOGY 213-232 (1981); P. DEBACH, BIOLOGICAL CONTROL BY NATURAL ENEMIES
(1974).
174. Pheromone-baited traps emit chemical scents that draw insects into devices from which they
do not emerge. See Braxton, supra note 171, at 1.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 1PM has been variously defined. Braxton, supra note 171, at 24.
178. See POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58, at IV-18 ("full implementation
of IPM strategies requires that more practitioners be trained to conduct scouting operations, make specific
401
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are used, they will by definition cost more than products that work against a
broader range of pests because the pest-specific user market will be smaller
and. the producer must charge proportionately higher prices to recoup her
investments in research and development.'79
Alternative pest control can also pose free rider and collective action
problems. For example, the release of predatory insects will rarely be in an
individual farmer's economic self-interest because they cannot be confined to
the farmer's property and thus will become to that extent a public good whose
full value cannot be recouped.8 ° Conversely, if farmers seek to join in an
areawide organization for the purposes of cooperative pest control, they may
face "hold outs" who attempt to free-ride on the cooperating farmers' ef-
forts-' 5 ' or, worse, hold-outs whose recalcitrant activities actually
undermine the cooperative efforts (say, by maintaining fields which serve as
"reservoirs" for common pests" 2 or by continuing the use of chemical
pesticides that kill predatory insects released by the alternative farmers).'83
Given the nature of these public goods and collective action problems, the
case for government intervention is strong and it should surprise no one that
there has already been some experience with corrective legal mechanisms and
public programs. In a particularly detailed historical analysis of collective pest
control measures, resource economist Brian Baker identifies two types of
coercive measures that state and local governments frequently used, mostly in
the pre-pesticide era, to ensure publicly coordinated pest control. 's First,
states used their police powers to declare pest-infested property a public
nuisance and to order property owners to destroy or otherwise control the
affected property at their own expense. Such orders were enforced by a
property lien to finance state action should the property owner refuse and the
state need to abate the nuisance itself.8 5 Second, states authorized the
creation of pest control districts upon the request of a majority of affected
property owners, allowed districts to levy crop taxes to support collective pest-
control measures, and delegated to these districts broad legal powers to enter
pest management recommendations, and evaluate and make adjustments based on the results... [iln some
cases, IPM services are not available in many other cases").
179. See, e.g., id. at 111-12-24 (although EPA has offered some regulatory relief as to the regulatory
costs of "alternative" pesticides, "registration and marketing are still substantial costs, [and thus] few
products have been brought to market [under even an "Orphan Drug Act" for pharmaceuticals]").
180. See Brian P. Baker, Pest Control in the Public Interest: Crop Protection in California, 8 UCLA
J. ENvTL. L. 31, 33 (1988) ("Biological control agents present another case of market failure. When an
individual farmer releases a biological control agent, such as a predator or parasite, that organism cannot
be confined to the particular farmer's property").
181. Id. at 33.
182. Id. ("For example, if one farmer plants a hostable crop for a given pest, while all neighbors
cooperate, the non-cooperating farmer's crop can serve as a reservoir for the pest").
183. Id. ("Broad spectrum pesticides can kill predators and parasites introduced for biological control
purposes").
184. Id.
185. Id. at 35-36.
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upon and inspect all lands in the district and to "eradicate, remove or prevent
the spead" of pests. 8 6 In addition to these mechanisms, many states have
allowed (and still allow) common law tort remedies to farmers whose pest-
control strategies are improperly affected by the practices of neighboring
farmers.18
7
But measures such as these can raise both equity and procedural due
process issues which inevitably complicate their use. Forcing expensive, even
ruinous, pest-control measures on the few for the good of the many creates
equity concerns. Whatever might be the constitutional fate of such measures
under the Supreme Court's modem takings-clause jurisprudence, they present
the same imbalance of costs and benefits that has made collective "solutions"
to other environmental problems politically difficult to implement.' 8 The
efficiency of collective pest control decisions might also be slowed by due
process requirements: the need to give affected growers "some kind of
hearing" to argue for or against coercive actions against them proposed by the
community (which ironically is the same kind of procedural "inefficiency"
championed so forcefully by environmentalists themselves in related
situations)." 9
Perhaps because collective pest control measures posed complications such
as these, the country's fairly well-developed legal infrastructure of public
nuisance law and pest control districts was quickly abandoned when inexpen-
sive, seemingly "miraculous" chemical pesticides became widely available
shortly after World War II. The new chemicals not only provided farmers with
immediate and visible results, but they allowed individual farmers to control
their own destinies with a minimum of transaction costs in a way that appealed
to their understandable preferences for autonomy. 90
'Even when, in the 1960s, evidence began to mount that the chemicals were
not quite so miraculous as they had seemed, the government was reluctant to
require farmers to forsake the autonomy-enhancing advantages of pesticides.
The regulatory focus was on creating administrative machinery under FIFRA
to guarantee the flow of "reasonably safe" pesticides. Despite support for
186. Id. at 42.
187. Note that the key term is "improperly." See A. Dan Tarlock, Legal Aspects of Integrated Pest
Management, in PEST CONTROL: CULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS 217, 232 (David Pimentel &
John H. Perkins eds., 1980) ("In three states, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Oregon, liability for damage caused
by spraying crops on adjoining land has been classified as ultrahazardous. In other jurisdictions liability
for injuries resulting from pesticide use is imposed only if negligence is shown").
188. See, e.g., Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice,
15 ENv. AFF. 437, 439 (1988) (recounting examples of political difficulty in siting hazardous waste
treatment facility).
189. See, e.g., Comment, State Mandated Pesticide Application and the Due Process Rights of
Organic Farmers, 17 PAC. L. 1301 (1986).
190. See Bosso, supra note 156, at 32 ("Chemicals, by contrast Ito cooperative ventures in
biological pest control], suited farmers' individualist ethos-each in control of his own destiny-and
provided relatively inexpensive, effective, and quick technological fixes").
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encouraging an altogether more sustainable "alternative" agriculture from the
National Science Foundation, 9' the Council on Environmental Quality, 192
the National Research Council's Board on Agriculture, 93 the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment,"s and EPA's own Science Advisory Board,' 95
Congress has legislated only voluntary programs and very modest research
efforts.
It is possible that the legislative and regulatory focus on pesticides, rather
than on low-pesticide (or no-pesticide) agriculture, reflects something about the
nature and limitations of environmental politics. I take up the question of
"politics," and its relation to regulatory design, in Part III. It is important to
recognize, however, that it is not difficult to conceive of policy strategies that
might encourage an alternative agriculture that is more ecologically and eco-
nomically sustainable.
191. In 1971, the National Science Foundation began funding "demonstration" programs designed
to showcase "ecologically oriented systems of control that maintain pest populations at non-economic
densities so as to optimize economic returns consistent with minimal environmental damage." See Maureen
Hinkle, Legislative Efforts for IPM 1 (Apr. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (referring
to a seven-year centrally managed, block-funded proposal demonstrating a 30-40 percent reduction in
expenses for producing certain crops using IPM techniques).
192. In 1972, President Nixori's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) released an extraordinarily
favorable report on IPM which the President highlighted in his State of the Union address. Id. at 10. In
1977, President Carter instructed CEQ to "encourage development and application of IPM techniques."
Id.
193. In 1989, the National Research Council's Board on Agriculture concluded in an influential study
that "[w]ider adoption of proven alternative systems would result in even greater economic benefits to
farmers and environmental gains for the nation," NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCI, supra note 122, at 6.
Although the Council's conclusions have received support from a variety of researchers in the field, its
"case-study" methodology has also attracted some withering criticisms. See, e.g., Leonard P. Gianessi,
Alternative Agriculture: Insights Into the Benefits of Agrichemicals I (paper presented at the 1989 Fall
Conference of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association, Oct. 19, 1989) (the Council's case studies
"support almost the exact opposite conclusion" that chemical pesticides have substantial benefits). Prompted
by the Council's study, and perhaps also from the contemporaneous support for "less polluting" farming
practices by EPA's Science Advisory Board, see EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note.27, at 22,
Congress in the 1990 Farm Bill sought to relax some of the structural impediments to crop rotation and
other IPM techniques. See POLICY RESOLUTION CONSTRAINTS TEAM, supra note 58, at 9-10.
194. In 1979, the Office of Technology Assessment declared that the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) had become the "lead Agency for pest management research, education and
demonstration," with six bureaus' dividing some $12 million in research funds annually under the
orchestration of a National IPM Coordinating Committee. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PEST
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN CROP PROTECTION, VOL. 1, 94 (1979). The 1985 Farm Bill began the Low-
Impact Sustainable Agriculture (LISA) program to fund applied research and USDA extension service
activities designed to "encourage" alternative methods of crop protection. Food Security Act of 1985,
codified in various sections of 7 and 16 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally W.A. Allen & E.G.
Rajotte, The Changing Role of Extension Entomology in the IPM Era, 35 ANN. REVIEW OF ENTOMOLOGY
379-97 (1990) (discussing LISA program). The 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments required states to
develop programs to control "nonpoint" sources of agricultural pollution and authorized some $23 million
in grants for "best management practices," including alternative agriculture techniques. See 33 U.S.C. §
1329 (1988).
195. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 27, at 22.
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C. Probing for Effective Cause-Based Reform
There are, currently, dozens of policy options to encourage low-input
agriculture, ranging from mandated reductions in pesticide use by target
dates' 96 to pesticide risk taxes'97 to expedited registration of "alternative"
pest control products. 9 ' I endorse none of these specific options here.
Rather, I want only to underscore two criteria that should guide the merits of
the long-overdue development of a true environmental policy for pesticides.
First, Congress should encourage governmental intervention that addresses
the underlying reasons for pesticide overuse. Fitting this criteria would be
consideration of two obvious problems for any system of low-input agriculture:
risk averse farmers may overuse pesticides as a minimax strategy to avoid
catastrophic crop losses, and farmers may overuse pesticides because of their
relatively low informational costs.' 99 Although the issues have their
complexities, 2°° the arguments appear strong at least in the near term for
public subsidization of "IPM" crop insurance premiums2 ' and of significant
enhancements for existing "extension" programs that have already been
developed to train farmers in the new techniques.2 2 Policies such as these
would be directed to two of the key impediments to widespread adoption of
low-input agriculture. To finance these subsidies, Congress might well want
to use some of the funds now made available under the farm programs, or
perhaps use public resources now spent on EPA's pesticide regulation
activities, leaving financing of the FIFRA program entirely to increased fees
paid by pesticide registrants.
Second, Congress should bypass the risk-dominated structures in EPA's
pesticide office and legislate direct disincentives to pesticide use. Such an
approach would have the benefit of "locking in" structural incentives for low-
input agriculture and avoiding the implementation slippage that has inevitably
occurred in pesticide regulation. Of course, this benefit might also be viewed
196. See POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58, at 85 (this proposal is currently
endorsed by the Natural Resources Defense Council and is patterned after state-ordered reductions of 50
percent pesticide use in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands).
197. See id., at 70-71.
198. See id. (discussing EPA proposed Safer Pesticides Policy).
199. See supra discussion in text at notes 153-55, 179-80.
200. For example, providing farmers crop insurance to the extent they use low-input techniques raises
the moral hazard that they will not use such techniques effectively (because they are "covered" for losses).
See POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58, at 72-73.
201. See Katherine Reichelderfer, Environmental Protection and Agricultural Support: Are Trade-
Offs Necessary?, in AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN A NEW DECADE (Kristen Allen ed., 1990); L. Alenna
Bolin, An Ounce of Prevention: The Need for Source Reduction in Agriculture, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
63, 80-88 (1990) (analyzing and proposing "organic crop insurance").
202. See POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58 (full use of 1PM strategies requires
further grower training).
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as a cost-both to legislators who want to reserve control over implementation,
and to analysts who rightfully fear that Congress might lock-in the wrong
incentives (or level of incentives). Certainly the lessons from pesticide regula-
tion predict that such concerns would attend any "direct" congressional action.
Accordingly, it is here that incremental, rather than comprehensive, decision-
making would be most appropriate. Congress might consider, for example,
fairly limited taxes only on those pesticides posing the greatest risk, °3 ratify-
ing the availability of common-law liability for pesticide use (perhaps with an
"IPM" defense), or including farmers among other users of toxic chemicals
who must report to the Toxic Release Inventory their discharge of such
chemicals into the environment. Mechanisms such as these create market-like
incentives, as opposed to rigid command-and-control requirements, that can
take account of regional and farm-specific differences and permit growers
significant flexibility in deciding how best to avoid the disincentives.
III. Political Theory and Policy Reform
For all the possibilities of effectively reframing the policy debate over
pesticides, there remains the inescapable question of politics. While risk-
oriented reforms are attractive because they promise to bypass politics, one
must confront the possibility that risk-based regulation may itself have a
peculiarly normative political structure and, in any case, can be used to further
(or thwart) politically pre-determined ends. On the other hand, if cause-oriented
reforms are attractive because they promise to bypass some of the problems
in risk-based regulation, is politics flexible and public-regarding enough for the
kind of "probing" that might be required?
The debate over environmental law reform has only recently broadened, at
least in the legal literature, to consider explicitly a theory of politics. Certainly
this broader debate comes none too soon. For if either interest group
theory °" or public choice theory 5 is even roughly correct, with the
203. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REGULATINo PESTICIDES IN FOOD: THE DELANEY
PARADOX table 3-16, at 74 (1987) (noting that almost all oncogenic risk from herbicides can be traced to
a single ingredient, linuron, and that nearly 60 percent of all oncogenic pesticide risks in food are from
fungicides).
204. To the extent that "interest group theory" is an independent theory of politics, it captures two
central ideas. First, political decisions are heavily influenced by "factions" and reflect compromises reached
by bargaining among factions-rather than reflecting detached deliberation about "the" public good. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 32 (1985) ("Distinct
from the [civic) republican understanding of government is a competing conception that might be called
pluralist. Under the pluralist view, politics mediates the struggle among self-interested groups for scarce
public resources"). Second, "interest group theory" usually takes a pessimistic view of pluralism due to the
belief that the "logic of collective action," see infra notes 214-15, will provide structural advantages in
political effectiveness to narrow special-interest groups vis-a-vis larger, more-difficult-to-organize groups.
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 183, 194 (1991) ("While large groups of relatively impecunious individuals might
theoretically pool their resources to defeat the wealthier interests, the costs of organizing will usually
outweigh the potential benefits of the influence sought"). The result will be a legislative (or administrative)
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implication that political outcomes reflect the relative power of special interests
rather than public-regarding deliberation, then one should immediately question
whether environmental policymaking (and environmental law reform) should
be anchored so firmly in politics, be they those of Congress or the Executive.
Indeed, it is to just such a pessimistic theory of politics that "free market
environmentalists" point when urging the creation of "well-specified property
rights"' to support common-law tort actions or market-based incentive
systems for environmental protection,' both putatively free from
"politicians . . . [who] are rewarded for responding to political pressure
groups.""2  Although I doubt whether free market environmentalism is
sufficiently "free" from politics to claim an autonomous intellectual
process that skews policy toward whichever special-interests are politically active rather than toward a more
reflective conception of good "public" policy. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE 15 (1991) ("[t]he basic assumption is that taxes, subsidies, regulations, and other political
instruments are used to raise the welfare of more influential pressure groups") (quoting Becker, A Theory
of Competitition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECoN. 371, 371 (1983)).
205. Broadly speaking, "public choice" theories of politics use economic methodologies to study
political institutions. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 204, at 12-13. To a large extent, the economic
theories of group formation that animate interest-group theory also play a central role in public choice
economics, leading at least two influential scholars to categorize interest group theory as part of public
choice. Id. at 12-13 ("Under our definition, interest group theory is part of public choice... [even though
under] some other definitions... the subject of interest groups is not part of public choice .... "). To the
extent that interest group theory and public choice theory are different, public choice would be the more
inclusive theory that considers such other economic aspects of politics as "cycling" and the arbitrariness
of political outcomes, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 283 (1988) ("One branch of public choice
theory examines legislation and voting as a game in which rational behavior by the game players yields
unhappy results for the group as a whole."), and the influence of procedural mechanisms on public goods
legislation, id. at 291 (procedural obstacles for weak-demand patterns from which public-benefit laws
usually emerge in contrast to lack of procedural obstacles to consensual demand patters that bring
concentrated benefits and dispersed costs). A "fuller" public choice theory, however, produces even more
skepticism about the ability of political processes to produce good public policy than does interest-group
theory alone. See generally James Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-I (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison
eds. 1984).
206. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Versus Political Environmentalism, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297, 303 (1992) ("[flree market environmentalism stresses the importance of
well-specified property rights as the proper mechanism to provide the incentive for entrepreneurs acting
on specific time and space information").
207. Id. at 304 ("The free market environmentalist approach to this problem [of overfishing, or other
commons-related environmental problems] would establish property rights through individual transferable
quotas... [that] give each fisherman a right to a proportion of the catch, thereby eliminating the incentive
to over-fish the resource.... Free market environmentalism can also solve pollution problems through
common law tort remedies if property rights are established and polluters can be identified").
208. Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Versus Political Environmentalism, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297, 302 (1992) (citing ANTHONY C. FISHER, RESOURCE AND ENviRONME, 'rAL
ECONOMICs 54 (1981) ("We have already abandoned the assumption of a complete set of competitive
markets .... [But there is also] the question of the planner's motivation to behave in the way assumed
in our models, to allocate resource[s] efficiently. ... ); Emery N. Castle, The Market Mechanism,
Externalities, and Land Economics, 47 J. FARM ECON. 542, 552 (1965) ("Imlarket 'failure' in some abstract
sense does not mean that a nonmarket [governmental] alternative will not also fail in the same or in some
other abstract sense").
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foundation, 9 its proponents certainly make a valid point in arguing that
environmental reform proposals cannot be fully evaluated without considering
their political dimensions.
A. Accounting for the Current Shape of Environmental Law: Pluralism,
Public Choice, and Positive Political Theory
The attractiveness of policy reform stems in large part from the fact that
our current system of environmental law increasingly resembles a Rube Gold-
berg machine so built to accommodate its own political assumptions that it can
barely keep up with the moral and technical challenges in the field. Consider,
for example, the effects that shifting theories of political pluralism and agency
capture have had on the texture of environmental law. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, one of the dominant theories of politics centered around an
optimistic brand of pluralism, that legislatures (and federal agencies) would
produce coherent public policy after considering the interests of all competing
interest groups.21° This image of politics spawned the conviction that there
existed broad but dfscernible public purposes in environmental statutes,21 '
that the newly created EPA would effectuate these purposes even though it was
delegated extraordinarily broad implementation discretion,2"2 and that judicial
209. See Krier, supra note 146, at 342-43 (questioning why the "very evils of government about
which [free market environmentalists] complain" won't distort the political process necessary to establish
marketable emission trading schemes or other forms of environmentally-oriented markets); Michael C.
Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 371, 381 (1992)
("marketable pollution permits, for example, 'still require a political determination of the level of pollutibn
that will be allowed'). Although not yet argued by many free-market environmentalists, the point I develop
in text infra accompanying notes 259-66 may provide a partial solution to the conundrum that poorly
functioning political institutions would invariably distort any politically-established markets for envi-
ronmental protection: if legislators were to establish market-based systems during "republican moments"
when public-regarding legislative behavior tends to triumph over special-interest-regarding behavior, the
resulting markets might be expected to function in more of a public-regarding fashion than interest-group
theory otherwise predicts.
210. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law
and Politics, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 264 (1991) ("[iln the early years of EPA, an optimistic brand
of pluralism was the reigning political theory in the United States ... indicating that the interests of
competing groups could be melded together in a coherent fashion to produce moderate, conflict reducing,
public policy").
211. See, e.g., Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 268-69 (1975) (relying upon Clean Air
Act's underlying objective of technology-forcing to allow EPA to consider questions of feasibility in
approving state implementation plans); Portland Cement Ass'n v.. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 383 n.36
(D.C. Cir. 1973) ("courts should endeavor to give statutory language that meaning that nurtures the policies
underlying legislation ... when circumstances not plainly covered by the terms of the statute are subsumed
by the underlying policies to which Congress was committed") (quoting Justice Harlan); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[t]he court must seek to discern and
reconstruct what the legislature that enacted the statute would have contemplated for the court's action if
it could have been able to foresee the precise situation").
212. The notion that federal agencies would creatively and purposively accommodate environmental
interests, were such interests only brought to the agencies' attention, was one of the guiding premises of
the environmental-impact-statement requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (1988). See Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239,
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review of EPA decisions should ensure that all affected interest groups were
given adequate opportunities to participate meaningfully in agency decision-
making.
213
Yet already by the mid-1970s, the shape of environmental law began to
change in reaction to a competing, more pessimistic brand of pluralism that
took agency capture as its central concern. This theory of politics traced its
intellectual pedigree to Mancur Olson's economic theory of collective ac-
tion.2 14 Olson postulated that large groups of individuals, each of whom
stood only to gain fairly small marginal benefits from governmental action
(say, citizens who would enjoy somewhat cleaner air), were at an inherent and
significant political disadvantage relative to smaller groups of individuals, each
of whom stood to lose fairly significant resources from governmental action
(say, polluting sources who would bear the immediate costs of strong anti-
pollution requirements).21 5 When applied to environmental decisionmaking,
the logic of collective action engendered fear that industry would dominate
either congressional politics or the administrative processes through which
environmental statutes are implemented.216 Troubled by the possibilities of
agency capture, Congress turned to increasingly specific statutory provisions
in environmental legislation" 7 and to the use of agency-forcing devices such
240 (1973) ("NEPA's obvious, if unstated, assumption was that by requiring the agencies to explore,
consider, and publicly describe the adverse environmental effects of their programs, those programs would
undergo revision in favor of less environmentally damaging activities"). Cf. Environmental Defense Fund
v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (in the context of providing hearings on pesticide
cancellations, "[wlhen administrators provide a framework for principled decision-making, the result will
... enhanc[e] the integrity of the administrative process").
213. The optimistic brand of pluralism explains in particular the tendency of courts of appeals, and
especially the tendency of the District of Columbia Circuit, to emphasize in the early 1970s, "meaningful"
access of affected groups to agency decisionmakers. See, e.g., NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (requiring agency to engage in a "genuine dialogue" with interest persons); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cit. 1976) (Bazelon, J.) (emphasizing importance of procedures to ensure participation
by affected groups in agency decisionmaking). The Supreme Court in 1978 cabined this practice to the
extent it required procedures not provided by statute or agency rules. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
214. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1965).
215. Id. See FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 204, at 23 ("Olson pointed out that political action
generally benefits large groups. For example, everyone presumably benefits from improved national
security. But any single person's efforts to protect national security normally can have only an infini-
tessimal effect. Hence, a rational person will try to 'free ride' on the efforts of others .... ").
216. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59,
60 (1992) ("[tlhe two basic predictions are that environmental groups will not organize effectively and that
environmental statutes will not be passed").
217. Reauthorized versions of RCRA and CERCLA reflect congressional attempts to restrict EPA
discretion by tightening statutory provisions. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
278-79 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2953-54 (anticipating abuses of discretion by EPA); H.R.
REP. NO. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5597 (statutory
amendment prohibits Administrator from attempting to circumvent Committee's intent to restrict land
disposal). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 824 ("Congress has shifted from the
discretional model of legislation to alternative models that give less discretion to the administrative
agencies").
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as statutory deadlines"1 8 and statutorily defined "default" rules that took
effect in the absence of agency action. 19 It remained unclear, however,
whether Congress could itself be free of the distortions predicted by Mancur
Olson's theory. Mindful perhaps of the implications of political theory, there
followed something of a reversal in judicial review of environmental
decisionmaking, with courts now less confident of discernible legislative
purposes to guide statutory interpretation2 ° and somewhat more willing to
subject agency decisions to "hard look" review as a check against arbitrary
action."'
This hardly ended the ways in which theories of politics affected the
features and assumptions of environmental law. By the early 1980s, there
emerged a competing theory of capture based on the premise that environmen-
talists had become power "elites" who could, by manipulating the media, key
congressional committees, and agency staff (what classical political economists
refer to as "iron triangles" or "subgovernments"), "I empower themselves at
the expense of sound environmental policy.22 3 This theory, which Professor
Sidney Shapiro terms "new class" capture,2" provided much of the ideologi-
218. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 217, at 827 (Congress sets deadlines for EPA action
because "[ilt doesn't trust [the] EPA" (quoting ENvTL. & ENERGY STUDY INST. & ENVTL. L. INST.,
STATUTORY DEADLINES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION: NECESSARY BUT NEEDED IMPROVEMENT iii,
41 (1985))).
219. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1) (1988) (under RCRA, EPA has up to 32 months to determine
that prohibiting the land disposal of wastes is not necessary for environmental protection, but if the agency
falls to make that determination on time, the statutory prohibition goes into effect immediately). See
generally Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 217, at 839 ("in a series of provisions sometimes called
'hammers,' Congress has given the EPA a certain period of time to regulate; if at the end of the specified
time the agency has failed to act, the 'hammer' falls, and the regulatory result set forth in the statute
automatically goes into effect").
220. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v, NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (courts misperceive their role when
they search for statutory "purpose" to answer questions that are not precisely addressed in legislation).
221. -See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 n. 39 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("it
cannot be forgotten that EPA is a regulatory agency and in the past in Washington almost all regulatory
agencies have eventually come under the control of those that they are charged with regulating") (quoting
1972 National Wildlife Federal Conservation Report); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (courts should supervise agency action because a "court, isolated as it is from
political pressures .... would be a more suitable forum for review than even the Congress"); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring EPA to provide detailed explanation
of its reasoning); Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 210, at 220 ("Courts began to view agency
proceedings with suspicion,.and the bureaucracies' assertions that they were watching out for the interest
of the disorganized public were no longer taken as dispositive.").
222. See, e.g., Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 87 (Anthony King, ed. 1979); J. LEIPER FREEMAN, THE POLmCAL PROCESS 11 (1955).
223. See, e.g., Paul H. Weaver, Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict, 50 PUB. INTEREST 45,
60 (1978) ("With each passing year it becomes clearer that the real animus of the new class is not so much
against business or technology as against the liberal values served by corporate capitalism and the benefits
these institutions provide to the broad mass of the Amercian people .... ") (cited in Sidney A. Shapiro &
Donald T. Homstein, The Counter-Reformation of Administrative Law (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at
37, on file with author)).
224. See Shapiro & Homstein, supra note 223, at 37 ("Near the end of the 1970's, academic critics
of social regulation argued that a new coalition of interests--the "new class"-had captured social
regulation.").
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cal foundation for efforts by the Reagan and Bush Administrations to expand
White House involvement in environmental policymaking.2 1 And, as
environmental law adjusted to such new regulatory initiatives as regulatory
review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) through Executive
Orders 12,291 and 12,498,226 there were signs of even greater complexity as
Congress responded with tighter statutory deadlines," 7 direct limitations on
OMB,2 8 and increasing use of appropriations bills to effectuate substantive
changes in environmental policy." 9 The cumulative result of these partisan
politics and theoretically grounded misgivings was a byzantine system of
environmental law, which reflected in large part the battleground for interne-
cine political warfare.
Of course, it is possible that there is method to the madness, or so claim
the proponents of positive political theory (PPT)-perhaps the newest theory
of politics to attempt an explanation of environmental law.230 The central
methodology of PPT is game theory and the central concept is that legislators
are quite aware of the slippage which can occur in implementing
environmental laws and take appropriate proactive measures to maximize their
225. See JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS xiii, 6 (1984).
226. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §601nt (1989), requires
executive-branch agencies to assess the benefits and costs of proposed rules and to regulate ("to the extent
permitted by law") only when benefits exceed cost. Exec. Order No. 12,498, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1989 Supp.), requires regulatory planning by agencies in a regulatory agenda as well as clearance through
the Office of Management and Budget of activities that might precede rulemaking.
227. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S6286 (daily ed. May 21, 1986) (statement of Sen. Durenberger)
(Congress has used deadlines to prevent OMB from holding up the issuance of EPA regulations).
228. See Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfield, Rulemaking in the Shadows: The Rise of OMB and
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisionmaking, 16 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 143, 179-80 (1991)
(congressional efforts to require disclosure of ex pane contacts between interest groups and OMB). See also
GAO Criticizes Budget Office Theory on 'Risk-Risk' Analysis for OSHA Rule, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 16, at 738 (July 17, 1992) (Senate legislation to cut funding for Competitiveness Council); House Votes
to Cut Funds of Quayle Council, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 776 (July 19, 1992) (House votes to cut
funding for Competitiveness Council).
229. See Seattle Audubon Society v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 90-1596, 60 U.S.L.W. 4273 (U.S. Mar.
24, 1992) ("Congress may amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, so long as it does so
clearly"); Reilly Favors Return to 1987 Manual, Cites Emerging Consensus on Delineation. 23 En't Rep.
(BNA) No. 17, at 1252 (Aug. 21, 1992) (appropriations bill blocks EPA from continuing immediately with
certain drinking water regulations); Senate Version of EPA Appropriation Bill May Block Further Dirty
Water Regulation, 23 Env't Rep (BNA) No. 17, at 1260 (Aug. 21, 1992) (appropriations bill required Corps
of Engineers to use the 1987 "wetlands manual" to prevent substantive changes that had been made in an
updated manual).
230. In their introduction to a recent symposium on positive political theory, Professors Daniel Farber
and Philip Frickey define positive political theory as the non-normative application of rational choice theory
(which assumes that individuals seek to optimize their preferences about outcomes) to such institutional
arrangements in politics as bicameralism, committee work, delegation to administrative agencies, and
judicial review of agency decisions. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreward: Positive Political
Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462-63 (1992). Using this definition, PPT is distinct from public
choice theory, which is typically viewed as more normative, or disapproving, than PPT and which focuses
more on the motivation of individual legislators to get reelected rather than the motivation of legislators
to optimize their preferences (both self-serving and altruistic) through attention to institutional arrangements.
Id. at 458-63.
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positions. 3' Under PPT methodology, for example, there is room for the
pessimistic idea that legislators will seek credit for supporting an
environmental statute with apparently sweeping "goals" or "rights," knowing
that there are sufficiently difficult implementation problems which will narrow
the statute's real-life sweep.2 32 But PPT methodology can also support the
more hopeful idea* that a statute's legislative coalition, mindful of
implementation's importance, will seek to "hotwire" administrative procedures
in a way that effectuates the winning coalition's substantive ends and protects
the legislative "deal" from the predations of agency capture (whether classical
or new class capture). 233 Even in those instances where statutes contain
implementation processes that seem at odds with substantive commitments,
PPT can support the neutral idea that this was simply the best mix of
substance and procedure which the winning coalition could muster, without
necessarily implying the handiwork of unprincipled politicians seeking only to
"game" the system for electoral advantage.'Y In whichever form it takes,
PPT seeks to provide insight into the link between substance and procedure in
environmental law, a linkage that should not be ignored in evaluating proposals
for environmental law reform.
B. Political Theory and Environmental Law Reform: The "Totalitarian"
and "Republican Moment" Arguments
Although recent scholarship has begun to explore political theories that can
explain and evaluate the shape of environmental law, there has been far less
effort made to analyze the principal substantive paradigms offered for environ-
mental law reform-risk oriented and cause-oriented approaches-in light of
231. Although this is necessarily a general and oversimplified description, it is important to recognize
that PPT need not subscribe to the view that legislators are unduly influenced by special interests. It can
account for altruistic or "Burkean" legislators who come by their conceptions of the public good despite
the asymmetrical power of special interests. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 174-75
& n.16 (1990) (PPT can accommodate the notion that public officials are motivated in whole or in part by
the other-regarding behavior described by Edmund Burke in his "Speech to the Electors of Bristol"). Once
conceptualizing a position, however, PVI' hypothesizes that public officials "game" the system by making
rational choices to maximize these positions and that politics can be described and analyzed by models
operating on this assumption. See id. at 183-85 (proposing a model to predict general-interest regulation
in the presence of "slack," a' concept akin to the "slippage" described in text).
232. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56-57
(1982) (opportunities for legislators to shift both credit and blame for policy choices to agencies).
233. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 432-33 (1989) ("The purpose
of this Article is to contribute to the positive political theory of the structure and process of administrative
agencies .... [We hypothesize that] effective political control of an agency requires ex ante constraints
on the agency ....").
234. See. Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions:' The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
213, 230 (1990).
412
Vol. 10: 369, 1993
Pesticide Regulation
political theory. In this Section, I seek to identify some of those connections
that have been, or could be, made.
Risk-oriented reform, which is typically defended on the grounds of eco-
nomic rationality,235 is also defended (albeit to a lesser extent) as a politically
superior mechanism for decisionmaking. Two types of claims are made and
appear to be based on distinct theories of politics. The first claim argues from
civic republicanism-4he constitutionally-based view that government decisions
should be made after public-regarding deliberation reflecting the values of all
members of society236-that Congress or bureaucratic organizations can
better identify and debate normative issues when environmental policy is
framed as a problem of risk prioritizing. 7 In the spirit of this tradition, Pro-
fessor John Applegate recently suggested that EPA periodically submit to
Congress a risk-based regulatory agenda which "could be the occasion for a
thorough airing of the agency's direction and priorities, both internal and
external, before the public or its authoritative representatives." '238 In a
similar spirit, EPA itself has sponsored statewide and citywide planning efforts
in which participants deliberate and develop more localized environmental
goals or strategies that reflect a mix of scientifically-based risk assessments
and politically perceived environmental priorities.239 In both cases, the
priority-setting exercise is viewed as more democratic and deliberative than the
current system, which is presented either as blindly administering statutorily-
235. See Hornstein, supra note 7, at 577 (risk-reduction approaches are based on a conception of
rational decisionmaking which "mimics ... the comparative methodology of expected utility theory, the
dominant approach in economics and social science generally to making decisions under conditions of
uncertainty or risk").
236. Civic republicanism can be defined conceptually as a theory of politics based on civic virtue,
"that is, on the willingness of individuals to sacrifice private interests to the common good," FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 204, at 43. It operates as a model of government that rejects "the pluralist assertion
that government can, at best, implement deals that divide political spoils according to the pre-political
preferences of interest groups. Instead, it argues that government's primary responsibility is to enable the
citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the common good." Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512
(1992) (citing for similar definitions Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513 (1988)
and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1548-49 (1988)).
237. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 26, at 330 (proposal to have EPA present a risk-based
regulatory agenda to Congress "would involve Congress in setting the overall direction of the agency..
. openly managed, the regulatory agenda could be the occasion for a thorough airing of the agency's
direction and priorities, both internal and external, before the public or its authoritative representatives");
Stewart, supra note 43, at 10,208 (making a "democratic case" for risk-based market incentives in which
Congress would focus on the important questions of which risks, and how much risk, to regulate.
238. Applegate, supra note 26, at 330.
239. See OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AN
OVERVIEW OF RISK-BASED PRIORITY SETTING AT EPA, paper commissioned by the Center for Risk Man-
agement, Resources for the Future (Nov. 15-17, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(describing efforts among 19 state and local public bodies to develop local risk priorities); 16 COMP. RISK
BULL. 1, 6-8 (Sept. 1992) (describing efforts at the local level to develop public "referenda" on risk).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
based environmental requirements, without any integrative strategy or,
alternatively, as making the inevitable trade-offs in technocratic and politically
invisible decisions.
The second claim is a form of "new class" capture theory. It argues that
the scientific integrity of decisions based on risk-reduction will save us from
the demagoguery of environmental elites, who otherwise would highjack
environmental policymaking through the creation of spurious "perceptions" of
risk among a gullible public. Professor Frank Cross most recently articulated
this claim in an essay which castigates those who "attack probabilistic risk
perspectives" and would instead base public decisions on more manipulable
"risk perceptions."'  Professor Cross makes clear that it is the fear of
political totalitarianism which drives his faith in risk-based decisionmaking.
Aftera nod toward the potential legitimacy of public "perceptions" and "val-
ues" in a democracy,2' he argues that those who champion public
perceptions become "bedfellows" with the Nazis "[who convinced] the German
people of the scientific lie of Aryan superiority," 2 the Communists who
insisted on Lysenkoism,ui and racists who perpetuate the myth of
statistically unfounded racial stereotypes." With no apparent sense of irony,
Cross quotes anthropologist Mary Douglas for the proposition that people
seeking power often couch their arguments in "moral" rather than "scientific"
language that "equate[s] risk with sin." 5 Cross's major point is that science
plays "the important political function in the modem liberal-democratic state"
of combatting "the ability of empowered elites to command action based on
arbitrary or self-serving motives."'
Granting that there are grains of truth in both political claims for risk
reduction, it remains to be seen whether these combine into a theoretically
240. Frank B. Cross,. The Risk of Reliance on Perceived Risk, 3 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY
59, 60, 68 (1992). Cross argues that "reliance on risk perception is probably a natural consequence of post-
modernist thought, which questions the very existence of such concepts as truth and objective reality." Id.
at 60.
241. Id. at 69 ("The above criticism of reliance on risk perception does not imply that democratic
governments should ignore public values and perceptions of risk entirely. Such a contention would be
hopelessly naive in a democracy.")(emphasis added). Cross does acknowledge that "[ulnquestioning defer-
ence to the conclusions of scientists is also potentially counterproductive" and that "[hlistory shows that
perceptions or opinions of government scientists, if not science itself, can be controlled or manipulated by
authoritarians much like the perceptions of the public." Id. at 69-70. At times Cross seems only to be
making the fairly modest point that decisionmaking should not "defer automatically or even presumptively
to public perceptions of risk, unchecked by scientific data." Id. at 70. But the overall tone of his essay
points more accurately to his broader conclusion that "[tlhe search for objective truth through the scientific
method offers a far sounder value formation than does government reliance on public perceptions of risk."
Id.
242. Id. at 64.
243. Id. at 64, 68, 70.
244. Id. at 64 (quoting Eduardo Galeano, Language, Lies and Latin Democracy, HARPER'S; Feb.
1990, at 21).
245. Id. at 67 (citing Mary Douglas, Risk as a Forensic Device, DAEDALUS, Fall 1990, at 13-16).
246. Id. at 68 (citing YARON EZRA-, THE DESCENT OF ICARUS 195 (1990)).
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coherent position. There is an immediately apparent contradiction: the political
argument from science, that risk-based policymaking avoids intuitive decisions
by an unsophisticated electorate, appears to leave relatively little breathing
room for the participatory and value-oriented reflection promised by the civic
republicans. Although a strained reconciliation might be imagined, in which
formal risk assessments merely serve as starting points for less-scientifically-
based public deliberations about risk, one wonders whether such a charitable
attitude toward discourse will be exhibited by those who see in different risk
perspectives only would-be Nazis and Communists. 7 Even were the two
political claims somehow to coexist, it is unclear whether the resulting mix of
science and public values portends all that much of a "reform" from the
existing political dialogue on risk.
Apart from this internal tension, both political claims for risk reduction
share a more significant defect-they do not seriously account for the distor-
tions in political discourse that can be introduced by well-organized, well-
financed interest groups. The danger is that risk-based reforms will exacerbate
the unequal power that special interests may already have over general (public)
interests. This can occur for.two reasons. First, because risk-based decision-
making is extraordinarily information intensive, the economics of informa-
tion8 offers strategic advantages to special interests in producing or other-
wise influencing the processing of information.4 9 Second, the often drawn-
out process of making risk-based decisions is more accessible to those, such
as special interests, that can consistently deploy technically competent
scientists, economists, attorneys, and public relations firms to represent their
interests at all important decisional points."0
247. See, e.g., EDITH EFRON, THE APOCALYPTICS: How ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS CONTROLS
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CANCER 9 (1984) ("1 bumped into evidence of such hostility to the objective
disciplines of science, evidence of so aggressive a rejection of facts and logic, that I could scarcely credit
my senses.").
248. Because information is a "public good" that cannot easily be controlled for profit by its
producer, there are no market incentives in the private sector to produce good information. See FRrrz
MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTON OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (1962) ("The
production of knowledge is, for the greater part, not guided by the market mechanism."); Kenneth Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. RE-
SEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (1962) (the market for good
information is further reduced because purchasers do not know its value until it has been produced, thereby
reducing incentives for investment in information-producing enterprises). See also Mary L. Lyndon,
Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1795, 1801-05 (1989) (discussing economic disincentives to data production).
249. Because there is no active market for good information, government regulators are peculiarly
dependent on the regulated firms themselves for data generation. This creates numerous incentives for
firms to choose testing procedures most likely to shed favorable light on the substances they wish to
market. See, e.g., Paul Portney, Toxic Substance Policy and the Protection of Human Health, in
RESOURCES FOR THE FrUTIURE, CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 138 (Paul R. Portney ed.,
1978); Lyndon, supra note 248, at 1804.
250. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027,
1071-72 (1990) (discussing how organized special interests can manipulate the "rationalities" of efficiency
or expertise in such a way as to give them advantages in the regulatory process).
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It seems particularly dangerous for proponents of risk-reduction, who so
freely use economic methodology to justify their substantive conceptualizations
of risk,5' to all but ignore the interest group distortions that economic meth-
odology predicts in politics. Because there is so much room for discretion in
deciding which aspects of risk to measure in evaluating environmental prob-
lems,2 52 risk-based decisionmaking can itself become a device by which
politically powerful groups can effectuate their interests-now clothed as
merely the objective determinations of "science"-at the expense of less
powerful groups. The point can be made more concrete by considering Profes-
sor Cross's allusion to the usefulness of science in unmasking statistically
unfounded racial stereotypes.253 Apart from the troubling inference in Cross's
argument that in a science-based world stereotypes may be less objectionable
when they are statistically defensible,' Cross makes the key assumption that
science will always be deployed neutrally and objectively to unmask the
statistical falsity of racial prejudice. In fact, environmental risk assessments are
often structured to downplay the distributional aspects of risk in general and
to ignore racial and ethnic dimensions of environmental problems in particu-
lar. 5 On the basis of "aggregate" risk assessments, for example, policy has
been set based on scientific assurances of low health risks from toxic
chemicals or solid- and hazardous-waste facilities,5 6 only to have those
251. See Homstein, supra note 7, at 579 & nn.78-79 (risk-reduction proponents use the economic
imperative of "transitivity" on which to base the claim that their methodology offers a "rational" approach
to risk).
252. To illustrate the point with the range of "endpoints" involved in pesticide regulation, see infra
notes 436-43. For the general proposition that the decision on which end points to focus a risk assessment
is itself a value-laden choice, see Dale Whittington & Duncan MacRea, Jr., The Issue of Standing in Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 4 J. POL'Y ANALYsIs & MGMT. 665 (1986) (insufficient attention has been paid to which
benefits, and whose benefits, should be counted in cost-benefit analysis). Of course, once the risk
assessment focuses on particular end points, there is also room for considerable discretion in deciding how
to measure the probabilities and magnitude of expected losses. See, e.g., Carl F. Cranor, Scientific Conven-
tions, Ethics, and Legal Institutions, I RISK: IssuEs IN HEALTH & SAFETY 155, 157 (1990) (risk
assessments that vary in only one variable can produce estimates which vary by a million-fold: a level of
indefiniteness akin to "not knowing whether you have enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off the
national debt"); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 89, 92-95 (1988) (arbitrary judgment calls in the experts' estimation of the carcinogenicity of airborne
benzene).
253. "In a far more distressing example, there is widespread public perception that young black
males are exceptionally dangerous and violence-prone. Yet statistical data from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other sources indicates that young black males may be no more violence-prone than other
races and that the perception may be due to bias in whom is arrested." Cross, supra note 240, at 65.
254. Although being prejudged by an "inaccurate" stereotype will be especially unjust to the victim,
the larger problem with stereotypes is not that they lack statistical validity, but that they are used to
prejudge an individual based on "mean" or "median" characteristics of the group to which the individual
belongs.
255. Lazarus, supra note 35, at 87 n.265 (There has "never been a consistent EPA policy to address
equity issues with respect to racial and income groups") (quoting OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND
EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY-REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNrrIES- REPORT
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM THE EPA ENVIRoNMENTAL EQUITY WORKSHOP 32 (Draft Feb. 1992))
[hereinafter DRAFT EPA ENViRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT].
256. Id. at 23-26.
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assurances themselves later "unmasked" as having ignored the
disproportionately higher risks faced by members of racial minorities who have
waste facilities sited near their neighborhoods 7 or who tend to hold the jobs
where toxic chemical exposure is relatively high. 5 The point is not to
discredit science. It is, rather, to underscore that the scientific risk-reduction
paradigm does not offer a safe haven from the distorting influences of subtle
class- or race-based biases or outright interest group politics.
Even if interest group and public choice theories are overstated or far too
simplified (as may well be the case), risk-based decisionmaking may still not
mean better environmental politics. This is because environmental law, which
appears to benefit the many at the expense of the few, is often cited as
"Exhibit No. I" in the case for public-interest-regarding political discourse and
action. As Professor Daniel Farber recently observed, according to special-
interest theory, there shouldn't be any environmental law. 9 Yet, before civic
257. See, e.g., ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY
31 (1990) (two large hazardous waste landfills, representing more than one-third of the licensed hazardous
waste landfill capacity in the United States, are in towns that are 78.9% and 93% black); UNITED CHURCH
OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, ToxIc WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES xiii-xiv
(1987) ("[tlhree out of every five Black and Hispanic Americans lived in communities with uncontrolled
toxic waste sites"); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS. AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 3 (1983)
("Blacks make up the majority of the population in three of the four communities where the landfills are
located"). But see Jay Hamilton, Politics and Social Cost: Hazardous Waste Facilities in a Truly Coasian
Work 24 (Duke University, Institute for Policy Sciences and Public Affairs Working Paper) (June 1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (challenging conclusion of United Church of Christ study and
finding that "controlling for other factors [in particular what Hamilton calls "collective action potential"
measured by voter turnout among the population) race is not a statistically significant factor in the
expansion selection process"). But see Lazarus, supra note 35, at 21-29 (reporting on methodological
challenges to studies alleging environmental racism).
258. Although EPA has regulated coke oven emissions based on estimates of carcinogenicity among
"median" or "average" workers, 90% of the steelworkers most heavily exposed to carcinogenic emissions
are nonwhite and have been found to suffer from regulatory cancers at a rate eight times greater than would
normally be expected. See Lazarus, supra note 35, at 28 (quoting DRAFr EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY
REPORT, supra note 255, at 20). A similar racial bias in the structure of risk assessments can be found
in EPA's failure to consider that nonwhites often eat fish in which carcinogens bioaccumulate at
disproportionately higher rates than the population at large and sometimes prepare their food in ways that
differ from the general population, such as trimming less fat, and thereby increasing their exposure to
contaminants. See Lazarus, supra note 35, at 28, n. 74 (citing DRAFT EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY
REPORT, supra note 255, at 17-18).
259. "[From the perspective of positive political theory, the puzzle is not that Congress produces
public goods such as clean air so inefficiently, but that Congress manages to produce any public goods at
all." Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 59 (1992).
Farber criticizes attempts to explain environmental law simply as special-interest legislation designed to
mask rent-seeking by regulated industries, id. at 62-64, or by "upper-middle-class backpackers," id. at 64-
65. Farber persuasively argues that as a general matter, environmental legislation presents an empirical
problem for special-interest or public choice theories of politics. Id. at 60 ("For example, air pollution
legislation benefits millions of people ... it also imposes heavy costs on concentrated groups of firms.
[Special interest] theory predicts that the firms will organize much more effectively than the individuals,
and will thereby block the legislation . . . . Yet the reality is quite different."). Despite his general
observation, Farber does leave room for the influence of special interest politics on the shape of
environmental legislation. Id. at 64. 1 find this reservation more than justified in my analysis of pesticide
regulation, see infra notes 337-86.
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republicans rejoice, there needs to be more attention paid to the mechanisms
by which public demand for environmental goods apparently gets translated
into legislation.2 6' Farber borrows from civic republicanism the concept of
"republican moments" to explain environmental legislation.2 6' According to
this hypothesis, environmental statutes are enacted not during the "normal"
political periods that are typically responsive to conventional interest group
pressures, but rather during "extraordinary moments" when broad segments of
the population become intensely interested in environmental issues, often due
to well-publicized environmental "crises" or other attention-getting "symbolic"
events.2 62  During moments such as these, legislative "shirking"
diminishes263 as legislators "find themselves in the spotlight, and their
positions shift closer to those of the public at large."216  Although there
certainly remain unanswered questions about the political significance of these
extraordinary moments,2 65 a growing body of empirical evidence supports the
importance of republican moments to the legislative process in general.2 66
If Farber's hypothesis is correct, there is a danger that risk reduction may
be counterproductive to environmental protection. This is because risk-based
conceptualizations of environmental problems tend to downplay the subjective
attributes of risk that often underlie the high public salience of environmental
issues; indeed, it is to avoid just such "sensationalizations" of "the facts" that
260. See Farber, supra note 259, at 65 ("If environmental statutes do in signficiant part reflect a
broad public demand, how does that demand get translated into legislation?").
261. See id. at 66, quoting James Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power
in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 291-93 (1990):
Our history has from the outset been characterized
by periodic outbursts of democratic participation
and ideological politics. And if history is any
indicator, the legal system's response to these
"republican moments" may be far more important
than its attitude toward interest group politics.
The most important transformations in our
political order.., were brought on by
republican moments.
262. Farber gives as examples the heightened political activity surrounding the original Earth Day,
the Love Canal episode, and the Three Mile Island incident. Farber, supra note 259, at 66-67. See also
Hornstein, supra note 7, at n.67 ("It is well recognized that support for and the shape of environmental
legislation often galvanizes in the heat of crisis") (citations omitted).
263. There is support for this proposition in other areas of 'political activity as well. Political
scientists Michael Levine and Jennifer Forrence, writing in the positive political theory tradition, have
observed that in periods of heightened public concern, legislative outcomes are pushed in the direction
preferred by the median voter. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 167-98 (1990).
264. Farber, supra note 259, at 66.
265. See Thomas S. Ulen, Comments on Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental
Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 82, 86-87 (1992) ("Despite its surface plausibility ... I am not yet sure what
counts as a republican moment. Can it arise only at the national level ... [i]s it conceivable, for example,
that one portion of the state of Illinois could experience a republican moment while another did not? ...
What about anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany?"). See infra notes 290-386 and accompanying text (finding
cautious support for the republican notion idea in pesticide regulation).
266. See Pope, supra note 261, at 324-41.
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the risk-reduction paradigm is typically defended.267 What seems to have
been missed, however, is that any "bad marks" which such volatile political
debates earn on the grounds of technical scientificity may be more than offset
by "good marks" on the grounds of public-regarding debate which lifts
environmental issues out of the business-as-usual influence of special interest
politics. 68 The mistaken assumption of the civic republican claim for risk
reduction is that the public will be as equally focused and motivated to explore
its collective preferences for environmental protection during times of
dispassionate scientific debate as it is during the "republican moments" that
have so often characterized environmental politics. Yet a large body of
literature in cognitive psychology predicts that people typically respond to risk
more through the use of simplifying heuristics than through the dispassionate
statistical methodologies of Homo economicus.269 Indeed, it is to just this
literature that proponents of risk reduction often point in emphasizing the
virtues of scientifically based risk priorities over the priorities of
laypersons.270 Again, however, the proponents of risk reduction fail to follow
through on their assumptions. If the public is relatively unmoved by the
niceties of scientific risk assessments, then a policymaking regime based on
such assessments will have stripped itself of one of the energizing political
mainsprings that motivates public-regarding debate and that has given
environmental politics its public-interest rather than special-interest
characteristics. The result will be a political system that enjoys less of the
virtues of civic republicanism, rather than more.
Lest a political critique only be leveled at risk-oriented reform, it is worth
highlighting that policies proposed under cause-oriented reform often fail to
reflect a coherent political theory as well. The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA),27' for example, purported to mandate that all federal
267. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 240, at 61, 70 ("The real question is the value of reliance on risks
as perceived by the general public or on risks as perceived by 'experts' ... [t]he search for objective truth
through the scientific method offers a far sounder value foundation than does government reliance on public
perceptions of risk"); EPA ScIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 27, at 4 (urging a cautious shift from
priority setting based on problems believed to be significant by the "general public" toward priority setting
based more on expert risk rankings); Reilly, supra note 25, at 48 (Reilly "betting on" the scientists).
268. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 263, at 167-98 (during periods of heightened political
interest legislative outcomes are pushed toward the positions of the "median" voter).
269. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 So. 280, 283 (1987) (laypersons may not view
risk the same as experts); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3-20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (discussing
representativeness, availability, and anchoring heuristics); Hornstein, supra note 7, at 606-10 (collecting
sources); Gillette & Krier, supra note 250, at 1073-80 (collecting sources).
270. See, e.g., MARGARET MAXEY, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES
ETHiCS MAKE 3 (1990) (public's sentimental aversion to technological risk); AARON WILDAVSKY,
SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 59 (1988) (public's irrational fear of technology); Peter W. Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 281
(1985) (public's irrational acceptance of seat belt usage in airplanes which are relatively safe and resistance
to seat belt usage in automobiles which are relatively dangerous).
271. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370b (Supp. 1990).
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agencies develop strategies to integrate environmental considerations into the
country's "nonenvironmental" programs, with little analysis given to the
bureaucratic disincentives that would govern (and eventually would overcome)
NEPA's actual implementation success.272 So too, without the use of:a com-
mon metric such as risk reduction, cause-oriented policymaking may very well
court the type of political arbitrariness (or worse) to which Professor Cross
alludes, especially when confronted with environmental "solutions" that create
benefits for some but costs to others. 73 And to the extent that special interest
theory validly describes distortions that can occur in environmental politics, it
is difficult to understand the confidence with which proponents of cause-
oriented reform speak of a new era of environmental taxes and incentive-based
regulations given the special interest "feeding frenzies" that have traditionally
plagued the establishment of federal tax policy.274 Nor is it clear why propo-
nents of cause-oriented reform so quickly deride risk-based decisionmaking
without considering the possibility that the power of special interests over
environmental policymaking may be best kept in check by powerful
bureaucratic organizations that can plausibly claim to base their regulatory
decisions on sound science.
75
To make the foregoing more concrete, I turn now to lessons that may be
drawn from the politics of federal pesticide regulation.
C. Constructing a Positive Political Theory of Pesticide Regulation
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of pesticide regulation under FIFRA and
FFDCA is that its critics seem to see in it two entirely different things. One
broad criticism is that the scheme allows for public hysteria over pesticides to
displace a more scientific approach. A particularly virulent form of this criti-
cism was foreshadowed in attacks on Rachel Carson as a socially valueless
"spinster" who irrationally concerned herself with "cats' deaths from DDT
272. See Sax, supra note 212, at 239 ("1 think the emphasis on the redemptive quality of procedural
reform is about nine parts myth and one part coconut oil). Id. at 248 ("[l~f we want to change [bureau-
cratic] behavior, we must give ... signals that will register"). But see Matthew McCubbins et al., Positive
and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 307, 318-28 (1990) (special issue) (the proceduralism required by NEPA effectively stopped
the nuclear power industry in its tracks).
273. See, e.g., John D. Graham, The Safety Risks of Proposed Fuel Economy Legislation, 3 RISK:
ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 95, 106 (1992) (the pollution prevention approach of increasing fuel effi-
ciency can cause significant increased risks of death and serious injury to small car drivers and passengers).
274. See Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
'Durability of Tax Refirm, 71 MINN. L. REv. 913, 934 (1987) ("The political process of using the specter
of taxation to milk private groups for contributions hardly corresponds to the legislative process as taught
in eighth-grade civics classes").
275. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, BUSINESS MEETINGS ON FIFRA EXTENSION, PART
11, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (Comm. Print 1975) (statement of Russell Train, EPA Administrator) (EPA
attempts need to persuade farm bloc representatives that the Agency used "science" to regulate pesticides
and did not act "precipitously or recklessly").
420
Pesticide Regulation
while not caring about the 10,000 people who die daily throughout the world
from malnutrition and starvation." '76 Less contemptuous arguments, but still
urging the need for more scientific decisionmaking, were launched against
EPA for its suspension in 1979 of the herbicide 2,4,5-T,277 for its regulatory
actions in 1984 against the nematicide ethylene dibromide (EDB),2 78 and for
its cancellation in 1989 of the growth regulator daminozide (Alar).2 79
Currently, the argument is reflected in Les v. Reilly,"' a case in which the
Ninth Circuit recently upheld a literal interpretation of the Delaney Clause in
FFDCA Section 109 despite arguments that a zero-risk interpretation of
Delaney would be "irrational" because it might preclude the substitution of
new pesticides posing "trivial" risks for existing pesticides which pose more
significant risks.u 1
On the other hand, there is an equally long tradition of criticizing pesticide
regulation under FIFRA and FFDCA for being overly cautious and methodical.
EPA was criticized for dragging its feet on both EDB2 2 and Alar,8 3 as
well as for its more general failure to consider a broader range of risks posed
by pesticides such as risks to farmworkers, 2 particular risks to children,28
276. See Hynes, supra note 121, at 18 (quoting Edwin Diamond, former editor of NEWSWEEK).
277. See R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA Halts Most Uses of Herbicide 2,4,5-T, 203 SCl. 1090 (1979) ("Aln
example of government at its worst-basing a hasty product suspension on data which have not been
subjected to scientific review") (quoting Etcyl Blair, spokesperson for 2,4,5-T's producer, Dow Chemical
Company); see also SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFrH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 24-26
(1990).
278. See William B. Havender, EDB and the Marigold Option, Jan.-Feb. 1984 REG. 13 ("Extremists
controlled the momentum of these events .... "); JASANOFF, supra note 277, at 130-33.
279. See Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1989, at All (full page advertisement signed by sixty-
five scientists decrying EPA's "unfounded attacks on the safety of our food supply"); JASANOFF, supra note
277, at 141-51.
280. 968 F.2d 985 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993).
281. Id.
282. See JASANOFF, supra note 277, at 135 (criticizing EPA for having authority to investigate
substitutes to EDB for six years before acting).
283. See Linda M. Correia, "A" is for Alar: EPA's Persistent Failure to Promptly Remove
Hazardous Pesticides from the Food Supply, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, 868, 878 (Aug. 14, 1992)
("The Alar case illustrates EPA's timid approach to the enforcement of the pesticide laws").
284. See, e.g., Federal Protection of Farm Workers Cited as Inadequate in GAO Report, 15 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1689 (Feb. 28, 1992) (General Accounting Office critique of EPA's "cursory
protection" of farmworkers from pesticide dangers); Little Known About Potential Adverse Effects of
Thousands of Chemicals, OTA Study Reports, 14 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 251 (May 18, 1990)
(critique by Office of Technology Assessment that EPA's focus on carcinogenicity has downplayed
neurotoxic effects that may pose an even greater threat to human health, especially among farmworkers);
Farm Workers Need Better Protection AgainstToxic Chemical Exposures, Report, Says, 13 Chem. Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 725 (Sept. 8, 1989) (no excuse for ignoring 313,000 cases of pesticide-related
illness among farmworkers).
285. See, e.g., Aldicarb Use on Citrus, Potatoes Poses Danger to Children, Leahy Charges, 15
Chem. Reg. Rep (BNA) No. 49, at 1784 (Mar. 13, 1992) (EPA failed to protect children from dangers
associated with aldicarb application to citrus crops); Regulatory Focus on J0 Foods Could Reduce Exposure
Risk to Children, Senate Panel Told, 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 461 (July 12, 1991) (residue
limits do not always reflect safe levels for everyone, especially children, because of the composition of their
diet and their low body weight relative to exposure).
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the risks of inert ingredients," 6 ecological risks,"e7 and the risks of ground-
water contamination.288 In the most recent congressional hearings on FIFRA
reform, the statute was characterized as having "simply... failed to assure
that there will be timely and appropriate action taken to protect human health
and the environment from pesticides. ' ' s"
The major contention I make in this Section is that these twin criticisms,
rather than reflecting only administrative missteps by EPA, reveal statutory
tensions that were quite consciously designed by Congress into FIFRA itself.
Although FIFRA in one sense freed pesticide regulation from the provincialism
of agricultural interests in both Congress and USDA, in another sense FIFRA
was set free only to wander in a procedurally complex labyrinth of risk-based
decisionmaking. The quite predictable result is an analytical treadmill which
makes-and is designed to make-forward progress strenuous if not
impossible.
1. A "Republican Moment" Explanation of FIFRA
A conventional theme in the literature on pesticide regulation is that some-
thing like a prolonged "republican moment" began with the publication in
1962 of Silent Spring and ended in 1972 with significant, modernizing
amendments to FIFRA. Such a conclusion is reflected in Philip Spector's
observation that the 1972 amendments "made largely in response to the
growing public concern about the environment in the 1960's and early 1970's,
were designed to ensure more thorough consideration of the ecological and
human health risks associated with the use of pesticides." 2" Political
286. See, e.g., EPA Plans to Disclose Entire Inert Ingredients List Under FOIA, 14 Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 20, at 789 (Aug. 17, 1990) (some inert ingredients are known to be more toxic than the active
ingredients, and the public, because EPA has not required labeling of inerts, has no way of taking adequate
precautions); Food Safety Concerns Seen Prompting Major Changes in Federal, State Regulation, 13 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1436 (Feb. 16, 1990) (EPA faulted for not considering potential health effects
of inert ingredients).
287. See, e.g., New Tactics Needed to Address Ecology, Science Advisory Board Tells EPA Officials,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 266 (May 25, 1990) (SAB Report criticized EPA for placing too much
emphasis on human health issues and ignoring broader ecological issues); Group Recommends Field Tests,
Research, More Dialogue in Assessing Impacts on Birds, 13 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 632 (Aug.
4, 1989) (bird mortality from pesticides indicates that there is broader ecological damage occuring).
288. See, e.g., Thomas Says a Groundwater Protection Bill May Be Needed to Seperate Federal,
State Duties, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 438 (May 22, 1987) (EPA's piecemeal approach to ground-
water protection from various sources including pesticides needs to be integrated); Conservation Group
Assesses Contamination, Outlines Water Protection Program in Report, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at
1672 (Jan. 30, 1987) (calling for end of "regulatory patchwork" governing protection of ground water from
pesticidal and other forms of contamination).
289. See Hearings on Pesticide Safety Improvement Act of 1991 Before the Subcomm. on Dep't
Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture, House Comm. on Agriculture, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 176
(1992) (statement of Erik Olson, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council).
290. Phillip L. Spector, Regulation of Pesticides by the Environmental Protection Agency, 5
ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 233 (1976).
422
Vol. 10: 369, 1993
Pesticide Regulation
scientist Christopher Bosso, in one of the most comprehensive analyses of
pesticide politics,29" ' similarly refers to the political "sea changes" instigated
by Silent Spring and says of the 1972 amendments, "if environmentalists did
not get all they desired, they at least got a law that by many standards was
better than before." '292 Judged by the closed politics of clientelism that
characterized what had been termed a "pesticide subgovemment" prior to
1972,291 there is certainly an important element of truth in the conventional
wisdom. To develop the point, as well as to develop the evidence which may
undermine it, it is important to consider briefly the state of pesticide regulation
prior to 1972.
In its earliest years, pesticide regulation was desultory at best under both
the 1906. Pure Food and Drug Act,2" which delegated to USDA's Bureau of
Chemistry the duty to protect consumers from impure food, and the 1910
Insecticide Act,2 9 which delegated to USDA the authority to protect farmers
from false advertising and nonefficacious pesticides. Lax regulation by the
Bureau of Chemistry caused USDA in 1925 to dissolve the Bureau and
transfer its functions to USDA's newly created Food Drug and Insecticide
Administration (later renamed the Food and Drug Administration)(FDA).2 96
In the 1930s FDA scientists began to use animal experiments and extrapolate
from them the possible long-term effects of pesticides on humans.2 97 These
incipient efforts were stymied in 1937, however, by Representative Clarence
Cannon, chair of the powerful House Subcommittee on Agricultural
Appropriations and a former apple grower who once proclaimed, "lead
arsenate on apples never harmed a man, woman, or child". 9 In a USDA
appropriations bill, Congress prohibited the FDA from using funds "for
laboratory investigations to determine the possibly harmful effects on human
beings of spray residues on fruit and vegetables. '"2 99 In one of the first
political efforts to shape science in support of pre-conceived social conclusions
about pesticides, Cannon assigned research jurisdiction over the health effects
of pesticides to the Public Health Service (PHS) a body which used the far less
291. CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLrCS (1987).
292. Id. at 109-5, 177.
293. See Anthony J. Nownes, Interest Groups and the Regulation of Pesticides: Congress, Coalitions,
and Closure, 24 POL'Y SC. 1 (1991). See also BOSSO, supra note 291, at 59 ("The politics of FIFRA
commenced under conditions particularly conducive to small-group, or subgovemment, dynamics ....
[T]he primary relationships under such conditions are those among congressional leaders, the president, and
the centralized bureaucracy, and the regulated interests").
294. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 1-15 (1906)) (repealed 1938).
295. Insecticide Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-152, 36 Stat. 331 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 121-134
(1910)) (repealed 1947).
296. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 49.
297. Id. at 50.
298. See THOMAS R. DUNLOP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CrmzENS AND PUBLIC POLICY 50 (1981).
299. See BOSSO, supra note 291, at 50 quoting JAMES WHORTON, BEFORE SILENT SPRING: PESTI-
CIDES AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN PRE-DDT AMERICA 230 (1974).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
discriminating analytical approach of merely questioning farmers and field
hands about their health.3 ° Although, in 1938, the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act 30 gave FDA the authority to set legal "tolerances" for pesticide residues,
the tolerances still had to be based on PHS methodology. Furthermore, the new
statute gave judicial appeal rights to any parties who might be "grievously
affected" by even the inadequate tolerances that FDA could establish.3°2 An
executive reorganization in 1940 moved the FDA from USDA into the new
Federal Security Agency, but its pesticide-related work remained firmly within
the jurisdiction and watchfulness of congressional appropriations committees
that were dominated by senior farm bloc legislators.
30 3
The development of inexpensive, synthetic chemical pesticides between
1940 and 1945 led to enactment in 1947 of the original Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act3 as a mechanism for regularizing the
market for these new chemicals.30 5 The original FIFRA required USDA to
"register" pesticides whenever their "labels" contained sufficient "directions
for use which ... if complied with [were] adequate for the protection of the
public."30 6  Pesticides without such labels were considered "misbranded"30 7
and, although producers could insist that USDA register a product "under
protest" (even when USDA had rejected a registration application or had
proposed to cancel an existing registration),30 an action could be brought by
the appropriate United States Attorney alleging that these "under protest"
pesticides inadequately protected the public. 3 9 In such a case, the
government shouldered the burden of proving its allegations.30 None of this
was controversial. FIFRA came into the world by voice vote without
"significant comment or debate," 31I reflecting the widely shared political
perception that pesticide policy was mostly a matter of accommodating the
interests of growers and the emerging chemical industry.3 2
300. Id. at 50.
301. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1046 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970)).
302. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 51-52.
303. Id.
304. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947).
305. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 55-56 (industry sought a labeling statute to prohibit fly-by-night
producers of imitations of the new synthetic chemicals).
306. Pub. L. No. 80-104 § 2(u)(2)(c), 61 Stat. 163 (1947).
307. Id.
308. Id. § 4(c).
309. Id. § 6(c).
310. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 593 & n. 34 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (the effect of the "under protest" provision in the original FIFRA made it incumbent upon the
government to prOve the pesticide unsafe before the product could be removed from the market).
311. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 58 (noting that passage of the Act was mentioned only in passing
in the NEW YORK TIMES Food Section).
312. Id. at 59.
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During the 1950s, public attitudes toward pesticides took shape with most,
but not all, policies decidedly supportive of pesticide use. The only skeptical
policies stemmed from congressional investigations chaired by New York
Representative James Delaney into the growing use of synthetic chemicals in
agriculture and the pharmaceutical industry,313 and resulted in the addition
of Sections 408 and 409 to the FFDCA in 1954 and 1958, respectively.
314
Apparently mindful of the way scientific methodology might be manipulated
to shade the effects of pesticides, Representative Delaney explained that
Section 409's ban on pesticide residues found to induce cancer in humans or
animals (the so-called "Delaney Clause") had "slammed shut and locked" the
door against the entry of carcinogens into the food supply."I Yet, despite
such bold rhetoric, the Delaney Clause in fact became one of the least-used
provisions of the FFDCA, 6 and the enactment of Sections 408 and 409
attracted little popular attention from a public who viewed the congressional
debate as "esoteric and technical." '317 In contrast, there were far more visible
public policies that openly supported pesticide use with almost unrestrained
enthusiasm. In addition to subsidizing pesticide development in the country's
land-grant colleges,3"8  USDA organized several highly publicized
"eradication" campaigns against the gypsy moth in the Northeast and the fire
ant in the South. So supportive of these efforts was Representative Jamie
Whitten, then Chair of the House Subcommittee on Agricultural Appropriations
(and known for two decades in Washington as the "permanent Secretary of
Agriculture"), 3 9 that he insisted on providing USDA with more funds for the
313. See generally, Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics: Hearings Before the House Select Comm.
to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Foods and Cosmetics, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. and 82d Cong., Ist &
2d Sess. (1950-1952).
314. See Richard A. Merrill, Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's Guide to the Food
Safety Provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 171, 179-80 (1978).
315. Food Additives: Hearings on Bills to Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with
Respect to Chemical Additives in Food Before a Subcomm. of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Comm., 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (1958). Delaney was speaking specifically about a 1955 FDA decision
that had approved a one part-per-million tolerance for residues of the pesticide Aramite after concluding
that such a residue level "would offer no hazard to the public." Tolerances and Exemptions from
Tolerances for Pesticide Chemicals in or on Raw Agricultural Commodities, 20 Fed. Reg. 7301 (1955)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 120). As Professor Richard Merrill has further chronicled, Delaney later
supplemented his view of Section 409 by mentioning the Aramite decision by name: "Mr. Speaker, the
significance of FDA's former ruling on Aramite was that for the first time a precedent was set that might
give legal sanction to the introduction of so-called 'safe' quantities of cancer-inciting additives into food
.... [It is the] firm purpose [of the Delaney Clause) to slam shut and lock [the door that the ruling had
opened]." 104 CONG. REc. 7783 (1958), cited in Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney
Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 55 n.288 (1988) (noting, however, other evidence indicating the language may in fact be
ambiguous).
316. See Merrill, supra note 314, at 178.
317. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 80.
318. See National Research Council, supra note 122, at 77 (most federal research funds to land grant
colleges for pest control supported work on chemical technologies aimed at boosting yields).
319. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 67.
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campaigns than it had requested.32 When mounting evidence of fish and
wildlife losses from these campaigns began to dissuade state officials from
further cooperating, USDA offered literally to give away the fire-ant
insecticide heptachlor to any private property owner willing to use it.32'
Despite a growing scientific consensus that the dangers presented by fire ants
had been overblown, 322 USDA redoubled a "barrage of government press
releases, motion pictures, and government inspired stories portraying the insect
as a despoiler of southern agriculture and a killer of birds, livestock, and
man. 323
Ironically, it was USDA's intransigent support for the increasingly unpopu-
lar eradication campaigns in the 1950s that created a receptive public for
Rachel Carson in 1962, and that ultimately prompted amendments to FIFRA
in 1964 and 1972. Before focusing on those amendments, however, it is
important to highlight one last aspect of the building "republican moment."
Among other things, Carson questioned the government's manipulation of
science to support the toxicological safety of pesticides by attacking the
government's reliance on a National Academy of Sciences-National Research
Council (NAS-NRC) pesticide panel which, in Carson's view, was dominated
by industry-sponsored experts." When Silent Spring itself ignited a public
controversy, President Kennedy bypassed NAS-NRC and sought policy advice
from the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which issued a
report in 1963 that largely supported Carson. 325 There followed counter-
studies from NAS-NRC attacking the PSAC,325 counter-counter-attacks on
the NAS-NRC for itself being "unscientific, ' 327 and a further "proliferation
of 'expert' studies, each claiming to be the definitive analysis on pesticides and
debunking claims propagated by rival studies. ' '32s It was against the back-
drop of this quite politicized scientific debate that over a dozen separate
committees or subcommittees of the 88th Congress held pesticide-related
hearings between 1963 and 1964.
320. Id. at 82.
321. Id. at 102.
322. Id. at 85-86.
323. Id. at 88.
324. Id. at 116-17 (describing Carson's original writings in the New Yorker, from which SILENT
SPRING was drawn).
325. See PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COUNCIL, USE OF PESTICIDES (1963); see Bosso, supra
note 291, at 121-22 ("The PSAC panel acknowledged the benefits to society from chemical use, but overall
concluded that 'the decisions on safety [were] not as well-based as those on efficacy,' and that 'until
publication of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson, people generally were unaware of the toxicity of
pesticides').
326. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REPORT 920A, B, &
C: PEST CONTROL AND WILDLIFE RELATIONSHIPS (1962-1963).
327. See BOsSO, supra note 291, at 124 (citing Audubon Society policy analyst Frank Graham).
328. Id. at 121.
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The 1964 FIFRA Amendments which followed this burst of legislative
activity are most widely noted for eliminating the ability of producers to
compel USDA "under protest" to register a pesticide or to continue a
pesticide's registration.3 9 Although it was generally acknowledged that few
producers had used this provision,33 ° its elimination was interpreted as
signaling an important shift in the burden of proof needed by the government
to keep pesticides off the market.3 11 Whereas the "under protest" provision
of the original FIFRA effectively required the government to prove the
dangerousness of a pesticide in a judicial "misbranding" action,332 the 1964
Amendments gave USDA final authority to refuse registration or to cancel
existing registrations without going to court.3 3  Judicial review of the
agency's factual determinations was limited to the familiar "substantial
evidence" test.
334
In addition, USDA was given the authority to "suspend" a pesticide's
registration immediately "to prevent an imminent hazard to the public." 335
The 1964 Amendments have been interpreted as sending something of a
warning shot over the bow of the "pesticide subgovernment"; the entrenched
pro-pesticide interests on the congressional agriculture committees and at
USDA were put on notice that policymaking needed to become more
responsive to the public concerns that had been articulated by Rachel
Carson.3 36 This is the "republican moment" explanation for the 1964 FIFRA
Amendments. But before evaluating this explanation, and applying it to the
more fundamental 1972 amendments, it is important to sketch the theoretical
underpinnings of a competing explanation.
329. See, e.g., JOHN D. CONNER, JR. ET AL., PESTICIDE REGULATION HANDBOOK 2-3 (3rd ed. 1991).
330. See Hearings on Interagency Environmental Hazards Coordination Before the Subcomm. on
Reorganization and International Organizations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1963) (Only 23 of some 50,000 products were registered "under protest" between 1947
and 1963); see also Bosso, supra note 291, at 126.
331. 110 CONG. REC. 2948-2949 (1964) (remarks of Congresswoman Sullivan) ("I am strongly in
favor of the legislation now before you to require industry, rather than the Federal Government, to shoulder
the burden of proof in connection with the marketing of pesticides which may be unsafe for use as
intended"); see also H.R. REP. No. 1125, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2166, 2167 ("[Alt present, the Secretary can be required to register a product even though he is convinced
that it is ineffective and dangerous to human health. He can proceed against it... only after it has moved
in interstate commerce, and he then has the burden of proving that it violates the law").
332. See supra notes 307-10.
333. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Amendment Pub. L. No. 88-3(05, 78 Stat.
190(3) (1964).
334. Id. § 190(4)(d).
335. Id. § 3.
336. Bosso, supra note 291, at 125 ("The transformation in the pesticides debate was so swift that
those promoting the use of pesticides were unprepared to deal with new sets of policy claimants. The twin
blows delivered by Silent Spring and the PSAC report made it obvious to all save the most recalcitrant
defenders of the status quo that some change would emerge as the debate moved from the front pages to
the committee rooms and the federal office buildings").
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2. A "Game Theoretic" Explanation of FIFRA
In 1989, political economists Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry
Weingast (known collectively as "McNollGast") argued that Congress, when
it enacts statutes delegating policymaking tasks to agencies, will rationally
design administrative structures and processes which lead to the types of
substantive policy outcomes that are desired.3 37 The underlying dynamic
which 'forces Congress to think so strategically about administrative form,
McNollGast argue, is that agencies can to some extent ignore with impunity
the substantive policy preferences implied in legislation. Agencies can play a.
"game" within a reasonably broad "policy space" in which policy moves a
considerable distance from that envisioned in the enabling legislation, and
towards a new point which so benefits either the House, Senate or President,
that one or more of these players will rationally choose not to support (or will
choose to veto) any corrective legislation.338 From the point of view of the
enabling legislative coalition-the President (assuming he supports the bill) and
the winning majorities in the House and Senate-the prospect of such "policy
drift" is especially unnerving. Because neither the President nor the winning
coalition in the House or Senate knows ex ante at whose expense (policy-wise)
the agency's game will be played, each of them faces the dreary post.-
enactment prospect of "getting" to the agency before the others do. 3 9 Yet
this defeats the purpose of banding together into a legislative coalition in the
first place. So, McNollGast predict, rational players will find it in their best
interest to design into the enabling legislation ex ante administrative structure;
that protect against agency noncompliance.3'
For the purposes of analyzing FIFRA, the significant aspect of the
"McNoIlGast Hypothesis" is its tenet that administrative structures and
processes can play distinctly political roles. First, Congress can design
337. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
338. Id. at 435-39.
339. Id. at 439 (although "each of the three wants to minimize the chance that one of the other two
will influence the agency against its interests . . . all have an ex post incentive to spend resources
persuading the agency to sway policy their way. This is a negative sum game.")
340. McNolGast explain:
First, if political actors are risk averse, all
three will prefer greater certainty in policy
implementation as compared to random noncom-
pliance (that is, noncompliance that may drift
away from the preferred outcome of each of the
three). Second, each of the three wants to
minimize the chance that one of the other two
will influence the agency against its interests.
.... Third, none of the parties wants to
let the agency choose which political actor to
favor.
Id. at 439.
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administrative structures and processes so as to create informational
requirements which affect the difficulty (or ease) of agency policymaking.
There requirements can also give significant advantages to a favored
constituency by increasing "the dependence of the agency on information the
constituency supplies."'" Second, Congress can require agencies to act only
after observing certain procedural complexities, in part to create "fire alarms"
on Capitol Hill, allowing alerted legislators to intercede before the agency can
put together an uncorrectable "fait accompli." 3  The McNollGast Hypothesis
has sparked a debate both about its theoretical premise 3 and its empirical
value as a "positive" model of political behavior. 3 The sole statutory
illustration offered by McNollGast themselves, the Clean Air Act, has drawn
a particularly exhaustive critique.345 FIFRA, however, may provide fertile
ground on which to test the model's robustness.
The 1964 FIFRA Amendments offer both some support and some difficul-
ties for the McNollGast model. On the one hand, it is plain that Congress gave
careful attention to the administrative structure and processes that USDA was
to follow; indeed, these processes seemed to have been crafted by Congress to
undermine the amendments' hallmark relaxation in the burden of proof. This
was accomplished in two ways. First, although USDA could now refuse to
register or cancel a registration without worrying about protest registrations,
it could do so only after a formal "public hearing" if requested by the disap-
pointed party.1 6 These formal cancellation proceedings soon became the
most time-consuming adjudicatory proceedings in the federal government. 47
Second, even before demanding a public hearing, disappointed parties were
given the right to have USDA's proposed decision "referred to an advisory
committee" composed of experts "selected by the National Academy of
Sciences"-which at the time was the most visible scientific body known to
be critical of Rachel Carson and generally convinced of the safety of
pesticides." Although the advisory committee's reports were not binding on
341. - Id. at 440.
342. Id. at 441.
343. See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies": Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 484 (1989) (McNoll-
Gast's model ignores the difficulty "of successful political manipulation of process or structure without
agreement on substantive policy choices").
344. Id. (The model's difficulties "are borne out by the most casual observations of administrative
programs, few of which show evidence of the kind of political manipulation their model predicts").
345. Craig N. Oren, Clearing the Air: The McCubbins-Noll-Weingast Hypothesis and the Clean Air
Act, 9 VA. J. ENvm.L. L. 45, 46 (1989) ("their paper is marred by errors of interpretation and fact that give
an incorrect picture of the politics and provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments and of the linkage
between substance and agency structure").
346. Pub. L. No. 88-305, 78 Stat. 190(3) (1964).
347. See, e.g. Thomas 0 McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729
(1979).
348. See supra notes 324-27.
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USDA, the 1964 Amendments seemed to specify with unusual clarity that
courts were to affirm USDA's decisions "if supported by substantial evidence
when considered on the record as a whole, including any report or
recommendation of an advisory committee." 349
On the other hand, for all the evidence of Congress's understanding that
process can affect substance (one of McNollGast's central premises), McNoll-
Gast predicted that the winning coalition would use process to safeguard-not
undermine-the substantive gains made in the statute. This suggests either that
process "losses" were traded off against substance "gains," (a bargaining
strategy that has been suggested by others350 but is not consistent with the
McNollGast model) or that, contrary to the "republican moments" explanation
for the 1964 Amendments, it actually is not particularly clear whether the pro-
pesticide or anti-pesticide side really won in 1964. 51'
Events between 1964 and 1972, surprisingly, provide support for both the
McNollGast Hypothesis and a republican moments theory of legislation. The
defining event during this period was a "jolt" to business-as-usual politics
caused by rising public concern about the pesticide DDT and by the emergence
of environmentalism as a national political force. In a series of lawsuits in state
courts between 1966 and 1969, the newly formed Environmental Defense Fund
effectively put DDT "on trial" before a national audience.352 Evidence of
DDT's risks mounted, followed by numerous state and local prohibitions on
DDT use353 and, in 1969, a federal task force's recommendation for a phased
elimination of all but essential uses of DDT over two years. 54 Given the
predictable ineffectiveness of FIFRA, and the USDA's pro-pesticide mindset,
it is not surprising that FIFRA played almost no role in these events; indeed,
in early 1969 the General Accounting Office issued a report severely criticizing
the lethargic track record USDA had developed under FIFRA.3 55 Following
that most quintessential of republican moments, Earth Day 1970, President
Nixon sought to capitalize on rising voter support for environmental issues by
creating EPA, and transferring to it all responsibility for administering FIFRA,
for pesticide tolerance-setting under FFDCA, and for several other pesticide-
related research functions that had been scattered across the federal govern-
349. Pub. L. No. 88-305, 78 Stat. 190(3) (1964).
350. See Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORO.
213, 220 (1990) ("public agencies will tend to be structured in part by their enemies-who want them to
fail").
351. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 125-32 (noting the competing "successes" of pro-pesticide and
anti-pesticide forces in the 1964 Amendments).
352. Id. at 135-37 (describing litigation and the role it played in forming the Environmental Defense
Fund as well as environmentalism generally):
353. Id. at 138 (collecting state and local statutes).
354. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION
ON PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 8 (1969) (the Mrak Commission).
355. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEED TO IMPROVE REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT
PROCEDURES INVOLVING PESTICIDES (Sept. 10, 1968).
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ment.35 6 In 1971, the D.C. Circuit interpreted FIFRA's cancellation provision
to require the initiation of cancellation proceedings against a pesticide when
the Agency had expressed "substantial questions concerning [its] safety." '357
The combined effect of all this activity was plainly a shift in pesticide policy-
making toward more regulation. And, as the McNollGast model predicts,
because the shift worked to the advantage of some of the political principals
(for example, President Nixon), it was impossible for others to budge the new
equilibrium point through corrective legislation.
But, although the status quo ante could not be completely regained (that is,
FIFRA could not be immediately returned to USDA), the 1972 FIFRA Amend-
ments demonstrate a major conceptual limitation of the McNollGast
Hypothesis. The limitation stems from the fact that legislators and agencies
rarely view statutes as all good or all bad; some provisions are preferred over
others. When policy "drifts" during implementation, it usually occurs one
provision at a time (typically through a rulemaking). Accordingly, if the
agency plays McNollGast's implementation game, it has no guarantees that the
disaffected principals will not be able to form retaliatory coalitions to change
other provisions which the agency would prefer to leave alone or to withhold
from the agency something that it doesn't have but wants. Knowing this, one
wonders why the agency will attempt to get away with what it can on any one
policy; to paraphrase McNollGast, if an agency is risk averse it will prefer
certainty in its delegated authority to random retaliation by its principals. 358
But if the agency does insist on gaming the system as to a single policy, it
may be possible for disaffected principals to get back some of the ground they
lost.
Just such retaliation happened in the politics of FIFRA in the 1972 and
1975 Amendments. In 1972, environmentalists pressed the political advantages
given them by the public's heightened anti-pesticide sentiment by insisting on
recission of the registrant's "right" to refer agency decisions to the NAS
advisory committee; after 1972, such referrals became discretionary with the
EPA trial examiner.359 Next, environmentalists also gained a much-desired
"classification" system for registering pesticides either as "general use" or
"restricted" pesticides, with restricted-use chemicals allowed to be used only
under the supervision of "certified applicators." 3 ° Finally, the standard for
356. EPA was created by Executive Order in 1970. See Alfred A. Marcus, EPA's Organizational
Structure, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 5, 9-10 & n.25 (1991).
357. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also
Angus Mactntyre, A Court Quietly Rewrote the Federal Pesticide Statute: How Prevalent is Judicial
Statutory Revision?, 7 L. & POL'Y 249 (1985).
358. See McNollGast, supra note 337, at 439.
359. See Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, § 6(d), 86 Stat. 973, 986-87 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136d(d)
(1972)).
360. Id. § 3(d).
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registration became no "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment"
rather than a stricter "substantial environmental effects" test that had been
proposed in a competing bill.36' Moreover, EPA could now require
registrants to support their registrations with specified types of data.362 All
of these provisions can be viewed as collectively relaxing EPA's burden of
proof for regulating pesticides; to give McNollGast credit, they can also be
viewed as examples of legislative victors "hardwiring" administrative
structures and processes into legislation to ensure that the "right" substantive
policy choices would subsequently be made.
The problem, however, is that other provisions in the 1972 Amendments
plainly made it more difficult for EPA to regulate pesticides. Most
significantly, an indemnification provision was added which required EPA to
indemnify "any person" who suffers financial losses "by reason of a
pesticide's suspension or cancellation" 363-a provision which hung around
the Agency's neck until 1988, forcing it to contemplate depletion of its
operating budget any time it began efforts to protect public health. In addition,
a new section 3(c) provided that a pesticide's "lack of essentiality" could not
be used as a criterion for denying registration 36 -- despite strenuous
arguments from EPA that essentiality should be a primary criterion to reduce
what was then viewed as a "glut of available products. 365
In short, the development of FIFRA through 1972 presents evidence for
and against the McNollGast Hypothesis as well as evidence for and against a
republican moment explanation of environmental legislation. Developments
after 1972 continue to suggest that the politics of pesticides are more dynamic
and complex than can be captured by either of these theories alone.
Almost immediately after the 1972 Amendments were in place, EPA's
Office of General Counsel (OGC) intensified its efforts to cancel the registra-
tions of several organochlorines including DDT, Aldrin/Dieldrin, Hepta-
chlor/Chlordane, and Mirex.366 OGC attorneys, however, soon learned how
demanding the "unreasonable risk" standard could be; the bellweather proceed-
ing against DDT became mired in the endless evidentiary possibilities for
asserting, and challenging, the extent of all the various risks (to wildlife, to
361. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 160 (table 7) (describing competing legislative proposals).
362. See Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, § 3(c)(1), 86 Stat. 973, 979-81 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 136a(c)(1)
(1972)).
363. Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, § 15(a), 86 Stat. 973, 993-94 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 136m(a) (1)-(2)
(1972)).
364. See Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, § 3(c)(5), 86 Stat. 973, 981 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 136a(c)(5)
(1972)).
365. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 163.
366. See Angus Maclntyre, Administrative Initiative and Theories of Implementation: Federal
Pesticide Policy, 1970-1976, in PuBLic POLICY AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 205, 215 (H. Ingram
& R. Godwin eds., 1985).
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farmworkers, to consumers) posed by DDT.367 To streamline the cancellation
proceedings, OGC attorneys streamlined the analysis. Rather than an open-
ended inquiry into the universe of risks and benefits, the Agency began to
focus its case on animal data showing a pesticide's carcinogenicity, on
evidence of widespread human exposure to the pesticide, and on evidence of
increasing pest resistance from which the Agency could downplay the
pesticide's benefits. 36 Using this formula, EPA prevailed in each of its
cancellation proceedings, although even under the streamlined inquiry the
adjudicatory proceedings each took over two years to complete. 369
As EPA successfully began to ban pesticides, however, it only highlighted
the immensity of the Agency's regulatory task: the enormous effort required
by the handful of cancellation proceedings hardly made a dent in the Agency's
statutory duty to reregister the entire inventory of 50,000 existing products,
containing hundreds of active ingredients. 3 ° The 1972 Amendments had
required EPA to promulgate implementing regulations within two years and to
complete reregistration of all existing pesticides within four years. 371
Although this task belonged to the Agency's scientists in the Office of
Pesticide Programs (OPP) rather than to the OGC attorneys, OPP staff
borrowed the streamlined analytical approach pioneered by OGC in the
cancellation proceedings and crafted an innovative regulatory device, the
"rebuttable presumption against registration" (RPAR) for use in the Agency's
registration and reregistration programs.37 2 If a pesticide ingredient was found
to be oncogenic in test animals, it. automatically triggered a RPAR process
under which the burden of proof formally shifted to manufacturers to submit
data rebutting the presumption to avoid Agency issuance of notices of intent
to cancel.373 If further data were not required, products were eligible for full
reregistration.374 The RPAR was viewed as a promising regulatory initiative
that "proferred a substantial reduction of [the reregistration] caseload by
providing a screening device which would rapidly isolate, and focus available
evaluation capacity on, the worst chemicals while the safer ones underwent pro
forma reregistration."375
367. See id. at 215 ("In many respects the first hearing, against DDT, was a disaster for EPA ...
.[The proceeding was unfocused and the adversaries could adopt a strategy of evidentiary all-inclusive-
ness which obscured the central questions").
368. See id. at 216.
369. Id.
370. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE
REGULATION OF PESTICIDES II (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter the KENNEDY REPORT] (35,000
products had been registered under prior federal laws and 15,000 under various state laws).
371. Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 4, 86 Stat. 973, 998-99 (1972) (amended 1978).
372. See Macintyre, supra note 366, at 217.
373. See 40 C.F.R. § 162.43(f)(l)(i)(A)(3) (1976).
374. Id. § 162.43(f)(1)(i)(A)(l).
375. See MacIntyre, supra note 366, at 215-16.
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These EPA initiatives, however, provoked a political backlash that demon-
strates both the strengths and fragility of the McNollGast Hypothesis in con-
structing a positive political theory of environmental legislation. The 1972
Amendments contained a sunset clause which required reauthorization of
FIFRA before October 1975.376 Concerned that EPA's initiatives reflected
too risk averse an attitude toward pesticides, the agrichemical industry com-
plained to Congress that EPA's pesticide programs had been wrenched away
from scientists by agency lawyers.377 FIFRA approached expiration several
times, to be extended only for pointedly short periods of time while the House
Agriculture Committee held hearings excoriating EPA Administrator Russell
Train for acting "unscientifically" and extracting a pledge from Train to
"demote" OGC attorneys and elevate OPP scientists as the "primary" office
at EPA in charge of pesticide policy.378 Not content with this concession,
Congress amended FIFRA in 1975 to establish a Scientific Advisory Panel
(SAP) which EPA was required to "consult" prior to making cancellation
decisions or promulgating regulations affecting registration.379 In addition,
the 1975 Amendments required EPA to notify USDA of proposed
cancellations, changes in classification, or proposed regulations (an amendment
that would have granted USDA "veto" power over all EPA pesticide decisions
came within eight votes of passing the House),3 80 and required EPA to "take
into account the impact of major regulatory action on production and prices of
agricultural commodities, retail food prices, and otherwise on the agricultural
economy."38 '
Although these changes are repeatedly described in the legislative history
merely as securing good science38 2 and balanced consideration of risks and
benefits,383 one observer of FIFRA has concluded that the 1975 Amendments
"gave back to the agriculture lobby a little of the ground it lost when pesticide
regulation was removed from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and placed
within the newly established EPA." 384 Another commenter has stated more
376. See Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, § 27, 86 Stat. 973, 998 (1972) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 136y (1988)). Although a sunset clause might be rationalized by McNollGast as a warning
device designed to prevent policy drift at EPA, its existence is otherwise difficult to square with
McNollGast's prediction that legislators try to "hardwire" administrative procedures into statutes so as
to make it unnecessary for Congress to rely on its oversight capabilities.
377. See MacIntyre, supra note 366, at 219-20.
378. Id. See also House Comm. on Agriculture, Business Meetings on FIFRA Extension, June-
November 1975, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1975) [hereinafter FIFRA Extension Meetings].
379. See Act of November 28, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-140, sec. 1, § 6(b), 89 Stat. 751, 751-53
(codified at 7 U'.S.C. § 136d(b), (d) (1975)).
380. See id.; 121 CONG. REC. 9190-91 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1975) (remarks of Representatives
Young and Latta) (USDA "veto power" amendment).
381. See Act of November 28, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-140, sec. 1, § 6(b), 89 Stat. 751, 751-53
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §136d(b), (d) (1975)).
382. See FIFRA Extension Hearings, supra note 378, at 125, 138, 146.
383. Id. at 125
384. See JASANOFF, supra note 277, at 124.
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bluntly, "[tlhe 1975 amendments . . .were the result of agribusiness
dissatisfaction with EPA's attempts to take effective, forceful action to protect
public health and the environment."3 5
The 1975 Amendments demonstrate both the limits and usefulness of the
McNollGast Hypothesis. Although, as McNollGast predict, the new legislative
coalition tried to "hardwire" administrative structures and processes (SAP and
USDA consultation) which reflected the coalition's substantive preferences
(which had now plainly shifted to the agriculture side of pesticide policy),
Congress in 1975 retaliated against EPA by "unwiring" the administrative
features of the 1972 Amendments that had made aggressive regulation of
pesticides possible in the first place. At least as to pesticide regulation,
McNollGast overemphasize the singular importance of administrative structure
as a political device and underestimate the more traditional policing function
of legislative oversight and correction. On the other hand, consistent with the
McNollGast Hypothesis, the 1972 and 1975 amendments together indicate the
usefulness of administrative procedures in telegraphing to Congress significant
agency action that Congress might choose to police. What seems clear in any
case is that, by 1975, the republican-moment aspect of pesticide regulation
could not alone provide a political theory of FIFRA. As political scientist
Angus Maclntyre concludes, "[a]t the very least, 'the environment' lost its aura
of sacrosanct national priority . . . . [as] industries [began] challenging the
environmental carte blanche in a manner that was infeasible before the 1972
presidential elections. 38
6
3. FIFRA and the Politics of Risk Analysis
By 1975, the core elements of contemporary pesticide regulation were in
place. The ease with which EPA could cancel a registration had been tempered
by the new procedural requirements of consultation with SAP and USDA and
by the substantive requirement of weighting more heavily the agricultural
benefits of pesticides. At the same time, EPA's primary regulatory program
had shifted from cancellation to reregistration, and from the lawyers at OGC
to the scientists at OPP.
This basic structure, of pesticide regulation as a regularized, scientific
endeavor, has been reinforced in all subsequent FIFRA amendments. In 1978,
FIFRA was amended to expand the role of the SAP387 and to allow for "Spe-
cial Reviews" (a new term given to RPARs) only on the basis of a "validated
385. William E. Reukauf, Regulation of Agricultural Pesticides, 62 IOWA L. REv. 909, 918
(1977).
386. Maclntyre, supra note 366, at 218.
387. See Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, sec. 11., § 6(b), 92 Stat. 819, 828
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136d (1978)) (requiring SAP review of proposed and final regulations).
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test or other significant evidence of unreasonable adverse risk." '388 EPA
shifted its reregistration focus from the 50,000 end products to the more
manageable 600 active ingredients of these products,8 9 and was given "data
call-in" authority in the 1978 Amendments by which the Agency could require
registrants to provide data to support a pesticide's continued registration.390
In 1980, FIFRA was again amended to increase the role of "science" and the
SAP,391' with EPA now required to obtain peer review of its scientific find-
ings3 92 and to consult with the SAP on suspension as well as cancellation
decisions.393 In 1988, FIFRA was amended yet again, to accelerate reregistra-
tion through a newly created five-step process designed to complete, by 1997,
the development of "registration standards" for all active ingredients and the
reregistration under those standards of all active ingredients. 394
Although the growing centrality of risk assessments under FIFRA is often
taken to underscore the "scientific" nature of EPA's regulation of pesticides,
risk analysis also serves as a procedural device that favors pesticide-using
political constituencies in three ways. First, because EPA has no independent
method of developing data, risk analysis makes EPA dependent on the data
generated by pesticide manufacturers-raising opportunities for various types
of bias. Informational bias is not limited to cases of outright data falsification,
although certainly it is important to note that falsification scandals have more
than once rocked OPP's registration programs.39 5 The more intractable prob-
388. See Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, sec. 6, § 3(c), 92 Stat. 819, 826
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(8) (1978)).
389. See Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, sec. 1, § 2, 92 Stat. 819, 819 (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C. § 136(w) (1978)).
390. Section 3(c)(2)(B); see Robert Perlis, The Push for Data on Existing Pesticides, 4 NAT. RES.
& ENvT. 6, 7 (1990).
391. See Act of December 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-539, sec. 1, § 25(d), 94 Stat. 3194, 3194
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d) (1980)) (SAP authorized to create its own subpanels and requiring
Administrator to solicit comments from SAP on suspension as well as cancellation decisions); Act of
December 17, 1980, Pub.'L. No. 96-539, sec. 2(a), § 25(e), 94 Stat. 3194, 3194 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §
136w(e) (1980)) (EPA required to specify procedures for peer review of'the design, protocols, and con-
duct of major scientific studies performed by or relied upon by EPA in initiating changes in classifica-
tion, suspension or cancellation).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-532, sec. 102(a), § 3(a), 102 Stat. 2654, 2655-63 (1988) (codified as amended in 7 U.S.C. § 136a-
l(b)-(g) 1988)).
395. The major scandal involved Industrial Biotest (IBT), the nation's largest chemical testing
firm, which in 1976 caused OPP to halt all registration action after IBT was found to have falsified
outright registration data for over 200 pesticides. See Bosso, supra note 291, at 199; STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY AND THE REGULATION OF PESTICIDES 4 (Comm. Print 1976) ("[Sleveral years of regulatory
effort will have to be completely reexamined, substantially redone, and fundamentally redirected if the
Congress and the public are to have a reasonable basis to conclude that today's pesticides do not pose a
significant risk to human health and the environment").
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lems are foot-dragging in submitting data to OPP396 and the ability of
industry to shade the way data is presented (without falsification) simply by
emphasizing the subtle but genuinely contestable "inference options" on which
risk assessments depend.397 In the mid-70s, an internal EPA audit on the data
underlying twenty-three randomly selected pesticides found that "all but one
of the tests reviewed were unreliable and inadequate to demonstrate safe-
ty"398 -a level of unreliability that, by 1992, continued for at least some
pesticides. 99 Not only has OPP proven incapable of policing for such subtle
manipulations of data, ° but the quantity of data is so voluminous that EPA
has repeatedly acceded to pressures merely to "satisfice" in its data manage-
ment: in the mid-1970s EPA sought to create the illusion of regulatory prog-
ress by reregistering pesticides simply by determining whether safety data was
"on file" rather than accurate;" in the late 1980s EPA was crediting itself
for the "completion" of interim pesticide registration standards when in fact
the standards had only identified missing data.4 2 By mid-1992, the Agency
openly worried that the rate at which it rejected industry studies was "too
high" because it would prevent reregistration by the new target date of 1997,
or even beyond an extended target of 2002.03 In short, the risk assessment
enterprise is so information intensive that it creates strategic incentives to avoid
a serious scientific examination of "true" levels of public health and
environmental risk.
Second, despite the burden of proof ostensibly shouldered by pesticide
manufacturers under FIFRA, the informational demands of risk analysis doom
the regulatory process to a perpetual state of slow motion. The General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) reported in March 1992 that, "[a]fter some 20 years
396. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PESTICIDES: 30 YEARS SINCE SILENT
SPRING-MANY LONG-STANDING CONCERNS REMAIN 3-5 (July 23, 1992).
397. On the theoretical literature on industry incentives to bias data in this way, see supra notes
248-49. On the importance of inference options to risk assessments, see supra 250-52.
398. Reukauf, supra note 387, at 917, citing Joint Hearings on Safety Testing of Pesticides in
Nongovernment Labs Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Comm.
and the Senate Judicary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 619-20, 646, 649 (1976) (testimony of Melvin D.
Reuber, M.D.). In the EPA hearings on the suspension of heptachlor/chlordane, there were uncovered
"innumerable examples or sloppy and inaccurate data, in addition to abundant evidence that much of
the pathology data as submitted by industry was based upon the diagnostic opinion of pathologists...
whose views were at best extremely conservative." EPA's Implementation of the Pesticides Control
Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34-35 (1976) (letter from Jeffrey H. Howard et a. to Hon. William S. Moorhead).
399. U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 396, at 8 ("EPA officials reported that as much
as 60 percent of the disinfectants data in one system may he inaccurate or incomplete").
400. Id.
401. See Comment, Pesticide Regulation: Risk Assessment and Burden of Proof, 45 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1066, 1090 (1977) (citing KENNEDY REPORT, supra note 370, at 15). As of March 1975,
EPA's reregistration "task force" had only two scientists; OMB had turned down EPA's request for 100
additional positions to staff the reregistration project. Id.
402. Id.
403. See Lowered Data Rejected Rate Needed to Meet 2002 Reregistration Target, Chem. Reg.
Daily (BNA) (Aug. 4, 1992) available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNACRD File.
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collecting data to reevaluate the health and environmental effects of 19,000
older pesticides, EPA ...had reregistered only 2 products."' ' Despite a
congressional deadline of 1997 recently set for reregistration, GAO confirms
EPA's own projections that the reregistration effort will extend "until early in
the next century." 5 Even when EPA chooses to act, the risk analyses re-
quired for Special Reviews or cancellation proceedings effectively innoculate
pesticide manufacturers against timely action. Special Reviews, which were
introduced in the mid-1970s to accelerate the cancellation process which then
took an average of two years, now themselves average over seven years.
To take action against the fungicide Captan, EPA's Special Review required
nine years;' action against the ethylene bisdithiocarbamates (EBCDs),
another fungicide, took twelve years;0 action against Alar took seventeen
years from the date EPA first learned of data suggesting carcinogenicity.'
As a practical matter, the burdensomeness of risk analysis has tempered FIF-
RA's success in shifting the burden of proof to manufacturers.
Third, risk analysis offers the conceptual umbrella of "science" under
which numerous non-scientific values can take shelter from public scrutiny and
yet prolong the longevity of pesticides that may be neither desirable nor
needed. Consider, for example, the decidedly nonscientific question of deciding
how risk averse to be when evaluating uncertain data. Pursuant to its
understanding of congressional intent, EPA adopted in a rulemaking the fairly
risk averse posture of both depending on animal data to estimate a pesticide's
human carcinogenicity and on using a "dose-response" relationship that
"credited" animal cancers which arose at anatomical sites for which humans
did not have exact analogues (such as tumors that arose in the forestomachs
of mice).41 ° Yet during the SAP's review of the nematocide EDB, members
of the SAP questioned in the name of science the wisdom of both of these
judgments, suggested that attempts at quantification would be unscientific and
simply based on "gimcrack mathematics," and argued instead for "qualitative"
404. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 396, at 1.
405. Id. at 1.
406. See Marina M. Lolley, Carcinogen Roulette: A Game Played Under FIFRA, 49 MD. L.
REV. 975, 991 & n.141 (1990) (citing EPA, Office of Pesticides: How Long and How Resolved (Oct.
1989)).
407. See Captan; Intent to Cancel Registrations; Conclusions of Special Review, 54 Fed. Reg.
8116 (1989) (concluding Special Review) (announced Feb. 24, 1989); Rebuttable Presumption Against
Registration and Continued Registration of Pesticide Products Containing Captan, 45 Fed. Reg. 54,938
(1980) (initiating Special Review) (announced Aug. 18, 1980).
408. Linda M. Correia, "A" is for Alar: EPA's Persistent Failure to Promptly Remove
Hazardous Pesticides From the Food Supply, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 880 (Aug. 14,
1992) ("EPA spent 12 years evaluating EBDCs. One Special Review began in 1977, and another in
1987. Final cancellation is still pending").
409. See id., at 868, 869.
410. See EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986)
(approving dose-response relationship based on different tumor types and sites observed in same study).
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scientific judgments about carcinogenicity.411 This appropriation of "science"
to cover nonscientific preferences was reflected again in the SAP's review of
the plant growth regulator Alar. Unlike the EDB episode, this time the SAP
refused to answer the "qualitative" question that had been put-whether, on
the basis of seven studies indicating carcinogenic effects, EPA could make a
qualitative, "weight-of-the-evidence" judgment about Alar's carcinogenicity.
Instead the panel insisted that regulating Alar would be unscientific because
some of the studies had followed inadequate protocols.412 This was, of
course, another way of imposing in the name of "science" a scientist's
occupational preference for deliberate methodology onto an equally legitimate,
but more risk averse, political preference for prophylactic action on the basis
of "enough" information. In the case of Alar, the SAP's nonscientific value
judgments delayed regulation in the name of "science" for several years even
though later studies have confirmed that Alar's dangers were sufficiently great
to have justified EPA's initial regulatory judgment.413
Given that risk analysis has political features and pro-pesticide consequenc-
es, it is not surprising to account for the politics of pesticides since the mid-
1980s. Since FIFRA has settled into its risk analysis mode, pesticide opponents
have rationally sought to move the debate "to the media and the corridors of
politics, where it can be conducted under different and more flexible ground
rules from those acceptable to science. 41 4 This accounts for events such as
the celebrated "60 Minutes" episode about Alar in which CBS reporter Ed
Bradley described Alar as "the most potent cancer-causing agent in our food
supply;"4'1 increased state and local regulatory efforts; 416  increased
congressional activity in such environmentally-oriented fora as the House
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agricul-
ture417 and the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure; and efforts to build incentives for "low-input" agriculture in the
(non-risk-analysis-oriented) farm bills of 1985 and 1990.411 In all of these
instances, the political attention directed to pesticides has often been derided
as nonscientific. Such events are better characterized, however, as parts of a
political debate that seeks to move beyond the political bias of risk analysis.
411. See JASANOFF, supra note 277, at 136.
412. Id. at 144-49.
413. See id. at 146-49.
414. Id. at 151.
415. See James Warren, How "Media Stampede" Spread Apple Panic, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 1989,
at Cl.
416. See JASANOFF, supra note 277, at 132 (state actions on EDB), 147 (state action on Alar); on
the legality and prevalence of state actions on pesticides generally, see supra notes 117-18.
417. DORFA has been a prime congressional locus for efforts to reform FIFRA to reduce many
of the biases that I have identified. See, e.g., The Pesticide Safety Improvement Act of 1991: Hearings
on H.R. 3742 Before the Subcomm. on Dep't Operations, Research, and Foreigo Agriculture of the
House Comm. on Agriculture, 102d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. at 1-2 (Nov. 19, 1991 & Mar. 18-19, 1992).
418. See supra notes 193-94.
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IV. Probing for Cause-Oriented Reform: Making the Most of Science and
Politics
If there is a central lesson to be learned from pesticide regulation for
environmental law reform in general, it is that strategies are needed which can
both strike while the iron is hot and strike while the iron is cold. By "hot" I
mean in the heat of widespread political interest-in what might be called
republican moments. Prevailing sentiment formed during such times not only
represents collective preferences which are democratically legitimate, but also
collective preferences which tend to reflect the qualitative attributes of environ-
mental risk that are poorly captured by scientific risk assessments. By "cold"
I mean during ordinary periods of political activity (the "nonrepublican mo-
ments"). Structures which promote responsible environmental action during
these periods can sustain environmental protection long after passions have
subsided, and might also better apply undramatic but often valuable scientific
analysis. In this Part of the Article, I shall expand on these distinctions and
propose mechanisms for integrating the two approaches, using as illustrations
both pesticide regulation and the frequently mentioned "alternative" project of
encouraging low-input agriculture.
At the outset, it is important to recognize the misstep that may have been
made in 1990 by EPA Administrator Reilly when, in the name of "science,"
he so strongly endorsed risk-oriented reforms; 4"9 by so strongly linking sci-
ence and risk reduction, he threatened unnecessarily to undermine the
credibility of each. As a theoretical matter, science alone does not (and cannot)
reflect a society's collective preferences about environmental risk because it
does not possess a mechanism to aggregate a citizenry's numerous, and
subjectively held, individual risk preferences a.4 2  The task of collective
419. See William K. Stevens, What Really Threatens the Environment?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1991, at C4. Stevens reports:
William K. Reilly ... told a Senate committee in
Washington on Friday that in many cases, the public
and Congress are at odds with scientists over which
environmental threats are the most serious. He has
begun a campaign to reassess those priorities, and he
leaves no doubt that his money is on the scientists.
See also Reducing Risk, Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection: Hearings on
Recent Science Advisory Board Report Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1991) (statement of William Reilly, Administrator, EPA) (Reilly argued that EPA
"must ground itself on solid science" rather than being "transported by middle-class enthusiasms").
420. The most theoretically rigorous methodology for comparing risks is expected utility theory,
developed in JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (1944). Yet von Neumann and Morgenstern couldn't have been more emphatic in defending
expected utility theory as normative only for individual decisionmaking under risk and in cautioning
against its use to justify collective decisions that govern individuals with different subjective attitudes
toward risk. See id. at 19 n.3 ("We have not obtained any basis for a comparison, quantitatively or
qualitatively, of the utilities of different individuals") (quoted and discussed in Homstein, supra note 7,
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decisionmaking, in a democracy, falls to politics and will involve any number
of inescapably nonscientific judgments. By disparaging politics and
overemphasizing science, Reilly not only distracts us from the need to study
and improve the politics of risk, but he threatens to "set up" (and ultimately
tarnish) the science of risk analysis by demanding it play a role for which it
lacks theoretical capacity.
Although this point is often illustrated by the difficulties faced by science
in comparing different kinds of risk,42 it can be nicely illustrated even by
the more limited scientific task of assessing the relative risks of pesticides.
Traditionally, EPA has tended to use carcinogenicity as a common metric.4 22
Yet even by this single measurement, how are we to decide "scientifiCally" on
an acceptable level of cancer risks to sensitive consumer subpopulations such
as children (just this question underlay much of the dispute over Alar42 ) or
on the acceptability of a pesticide that may present high cancer risks to
consumers but much lower risks to farmworkers and applicators than would
the most likely chemical replacement (a trade-off for which EPA's decision on
EDB has been criticized)?" How are we to compare pesticides which
present risks of such non-cancer "endpoints" as birth defects, 421 reproductive
failure,426 acute poisonings,427 and neurological defects? 2  And then, of
at 590-92 n.138).
421. See Hornstein, supra note 7, at 592-604 (explaining inability of expected utility theory to
accommodate equitable considerations).
422. See supra text accompanying note 368 (discussing EPA's traditional focus on carci-
nogenicity in cancellation and suspension proceedings). The importance of carcinogenicity is
highlighted by the Agency's current "risk-based" objection to the Delaney Clause of FFDCA Section
409 (which appears flatly to prohibit any residue in processed foods of any pesticide which induces
cancer in man or animal). EPA refused in 1988 to give the Clause its apparent meaning because, to do
so, could create disincentives to the development of new, safer chemicals, and so retard the replacement
of older, higher risk pesticides already on the market. See 53 Fed. Reg. 41,104, 41,109 (1988).
423. See Correia, supra note 408, at 875-78; Marina M. Lolley, Comment, Carcinogen Roulette:
The Game Played Under FIFRA, 49 MD. L. REV. 975, 987-88 (1990).
424. See William R. Havender, EDB and the Marigold Option, Jan.-Feb. 1984 REG. 13, 16
(banning EDB in the name of cancer risks among consumers lead to a more volatile, alternative fumi-
gant which presented increased risks to grain milling workers). In addition to arguing that EPA made
an unjustifiable trade off, Havender also criticizes the Agency's conclusion that EDB presented signfi-
cantly high cancer risks to consumers. See id. at 14 ("current average levels of [EDB] exposure do
seem quite safe").
425. See, e.g., Chemical Exposure During Pregnancy Linked to Fetal Death, Birth Defects, 15
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1790 (Mar. 13, 1992) (women exposed to pesticides during first
trimester of pregnancy have higher-than-expected numbers of congenital abnormalities); Study Links
Paternal Jobs, Birth Defects, 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1129 (Nov. 8, 1991) (male silvacu-
Itural workers exposed to pesticides sire children with higher-than-expected numbers- of congenital
abnormalities).
426. See MARc LAPPE, CHEMIcAL DECEPTION 41-42 (1991) (sterilization of male grape pickers
caused by DBCP).
427." See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
428. See, e.g., Data Extrapolation From Animal to Human From Neurotoxicity Advised by
Science Panel, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 516 (June 5, 1992) (link between pesticides and
neurotoxic effects); Long-term Exposure To Organophosphates May Lead to Chronic Neurological
Effects, 15 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1146 (Nov. 15, 1991) ("study of 90 male pesticide
applicators from 10 New York counties indicates that long-term, low-level exposure to organophosphate
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course, trade-offs must somehow be negotiated among risks to existing human
populations and those posed to future generations (say, through groundwater
contamination 429) or to fish and wildlife.4 30 The difficulties among each of
these myriad choices, moreover, will likely be compounded by a level of risk
aversion which shifts depending on whether there exists a reasonable, non-
chemical pest control alternative to the pesticide under consideration. Issues
such as these cannot be resolved simply by comparing even perfect stochastic
estimates of the frequencies of harm. The issues involve both quintessentially
political questions as well as the possibility that the collective risk preferences
themselves can be shifted by government action (say, through policies that
overcome market barriers to low-input agriculture and thus create alternative,
non-chemical policy options for political decisionmakers).
None of this should be taken to diminish the obvious importance of science
and risk analysis. What should be diminished, rather, is devotion to a system
of decisionmaking that aspires ex ante to a comprehensive, fully synoptic
analysis of environmental risks as a predicate to policy formulation. Although
the trend in environmental law (as in administrative law in general) has
generally been toward comprehensive rationality, this policymaking strategy
is no more "superior" to other decisionmaking strategies than a hammer is
superior to a screwdriver: its appropriateness depends on the task at hand. As
Dean Diver found, incrementalism possesses the singular ability to accom-
modate uncertainty and diversity431 whereas some amount of ex ante policy
specification through comprehensive planning and priority-setting can avoid
resource intensive ex post requirements for policy elaboration.432 What
proponents of elaborate risk-reduction programs seem to have forgotten is that
solving environmental problems cannot be done with only one type of tool: "a
fully mature theory of policymaking," Diver found, "should be able to
accommodate both [incrementalism and comprehensive rationality], with each
as master in its appropriate realm. '433
The history of pesticide regulation-replete with cancellation, suspension,
and reregistration efforts that are slowed by the ostensible demands of science
into a glacial pace-not only underscores the warnings Diver made of hyper-
rationality,4" but also wams us of the political uses to which science can be
pesticides may result in chronic neurological effects").
429. See D. FAIRCHILD, GROUNDWATER QUALITY AND AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES 292 (1987)
(groundwater contamination by pesticides in the United States has grown from 12 states finding 12
different pesticides in groundwater to at least 23 states contaminated by 17 different chemicals).
430. See CARSON, supra note 119, at 103-52.
431. See Cohn S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393,
430 (1991).
432. id.
433. Id. at 430.
434. Id. at 429 ("According to a 1980 study, [Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule-
makings] 'take four to five years or more to complete' .... [and may nonetheless suffer from poor
442
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put. What began in the 1964 and 1972 FIFRA Amendments as an attempt to
correct an inefficient and unrestrained market in pesticide use, became through
the demands of risk analysis an analytical treadmill. The congressional use of
scientific proceduralism as a device to ensure FIFRA's ineffectuality should
stand as a warning to those committed to scientific environmental policy that
there indeed can be too much of a good thing. So too should FIFRA's ineffec-
tiveness warn us that risk analysis can pose political dangers. The politics of
pesticides are complex, reflecting a mixture of republican moments, interest-
group pressures, and unprompted congressional attention to important albeit
dry matters of administrative management. 35 A requirement that policy
formation be justified only in the language of risk analysis might not only strip
environmental politics of its republican moments, but it might structurally
favor during the "off-season" of implementation many of the special interests
that government seeks to regulate.
But perhaps the larger danger of risk-reduction methodologies is that they
can become the tail that wags the dog, forcing EPA to define its mission away
from serious analysis of environmentally sustainable policies. So demanding
has risk analysis been in pesticide regulation that it has distracted EPA from
any serious attention to the underlying reasons why pesticides might be over-
used in the first place or to developing policies (or proposing legislation) that
might encourage low-input agriculture. In short, as has been noted by others,
EPA has been transformed from an agency in search of an environmental ethic
into one in search merely of "consistency" and "follow-up," 436  a
"professional agency with no environmental soul. '437 Thus, although FIFRA
allows EPA to conduct a risk-benefit analysis of pesticides in which benefits
quality of decisions] measured by both political accountability and technical accuracy").
435. The 1988 FIFRA Amendments, in particular, may reflect Congress' willingness sometimes
to transcend interest-group pressures even in the absence of any countervailing "republican moment."
In 1988, Congress was presented with a "package" of amendments to FIFRA, mostly designed to
regularize the reregistration process, that had been negotiated by a coalition of environmental, chemical,
and consumer groups. See Anthony J. Nownes, Interest Groups and the Regulation of Pesticides:
Congress, Coalitions, and Closure, 24 POL'Y SCIENCES 1, 9-11 (1991). Not only did Congress enact the
package in the interest of getting FIFRA "back on track," but it eliminated the indemnity requirement
which had hamstrung EPA's regulatory zeal since 1972-even though there were no apparent political
rewards for doing so in light of the failure of the private parties to include this policy change in their
proposed package. Id. at 16 ("it should not be overlooked that [the 1988 Amendments] brought an end
to the indemnity provisions which had engendered bitter conflict between long time adversaries ....
While groups can set the agenda (by reducing the level of conflict between them), elected officials
make the ultimate decisions"). But see Christopher J. Bosso, Tranforming Adversaries into Collabora-
tors, 21 POL'Y SCIENCES 3, 20 (1988) ("[fjor Congress to rely on "predigested policies" for successful
policy formation says volumes about its own institutional capacities, something many interest group
theorists inexplicably ignore"). On the 1988 Amendments generally, see Scott Ferguson & Ed Gray,
1988 FIFRA Amendments: A Major Step in Pesticide Regulation, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,070 (Feb. 1989); Pamela A. Finegan, Comment, FIFRA Lite: A Regulatory Solution or Part of the
Pesticide Problem?, 6 PACE EmvTL. L. REV. 615 (1989).
436. Hynes, supra note 121, at 171.
437. Id. at 140 (quoting Thomas Jorling, former EPA Assistant Administrator).
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might be measured against alternative non-chemical pest control options, EPA
is wary of assuming the informational burderts of such an inquiry; accordingly,
its benefits assessments "do not generally contain detailed economic analyses
of alternative nonchemical or IPM strategies . . . [thereby placing] the
economic value of [such measures] near zero ... [and] overstat[ing] the
economic benefits of the individual pesticide under review as well as the
impact of pesticide cancellation." '438 So too, until recently the Agency failed
to appreciate that risk-based decisionmaking effectively subsidizes conventional
pesticides (which are protected from removal by the scientific demands of
Special Review and formal cancellation proceedings) and burdens newer,
nonconventional pesticides such as pheromones and microbials (which must
run the gamut of testing analysis before registration).439 Even today, as EPA
faces criticism even from its own Science Advisory Board for being
insufficiently attentive to initiatives that can reduce agricultural inputs,"0 it
remains leery of any such undertaking because it fits poorly with the Agency's
organizational emphasis on managing data and making risk-based reregistration
decisions under FIFRA. 44'
Lest my criticism be misunderstood, I am not arguing for the expungement
of science or quantitative analysis from pesticide regulation. It is too late in the
day simply to frame environmental law reform as a matter of choosing politics
over science. I am arguing, however, for better use of environmental
politics--especially political action that reflects the earmarks of republican
moments-to avoid the uncritical reliance on risk analysis during implementa-
tion. And I am arguing for better use of science and quantitative analysis, to
highlight reasonable cause-oriented reforms that can obviate the need for our
current obsession. on quantifying and ranking environmental effects. The
indications are strong that the current regulatory apparatus has wrung from our
industrial and transportation systems most of the easy, cost-effective gains in
environmental protection."' Precisely because further gains are necessary,
but will not be as easy, there is a need for the best politics (although not
438. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 122, at 218; accord Environmental and Econom-
ic Benefits of Low-Input Farming: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Seass. 29-30 (1988); D. HUETH & D. BOTTRELL, INTEGRATED PEST
MANAGEMENT AND NONCHEMICAL ALTERNATIVES IN EPA's ANALYSES OF PESTICIDE BENEFITS 3
(1986) ("It was apparent that the [nonchemicall alternatives are seldom seriously considered in the
analyses. The decision to exclude the alternatives may be due to the lack of quantitative data on the
alternatives or because of value judgments made by the (Science Support Branch] or [Economic Analy-
sis Branch]").
439. See POLICY CONSTRAINTS RESOLUTION TEAM, supra note 58, at 14-17.
440. See EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 27, at 22 ("preventing pollution at the
source-through ... less-polluting transportation systems and farming practices, etc.-is usually a far
cheaper, more effective way to reduce environmental risk, especially over the long term").
441. See generally HUETH & BOTTRELL, supra note 438.
442. See Krier, supra note 20, at 24 (explaining diminishing rates of return).
444
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necessarily the most voluminous legislation) and the best science (although not
necessarily the most exhaustive inquiries) that we can muster.
Reform of pesticide regulation is in theory, and will probably soon prove
to be in practice, a logical starting point for self-conscious attention to cause-
oriented reform. FIFRA reform legislation was reported from most of the
relevant congressional committees near the close of the 102nd Congress, and
has been reintroduced early in the 103rd." 3 Congressional attention to pesti-
cides will be driven by the often-noted implications of the proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement for acceptable levels of pesticide residues'
and the Ninth Circuit's recent holding in Les v. Reilly, which will require EPA
to revoke tolerances and cancel registrations for some twenty-five or more
pesticides ' 5 unless affected by congressional action. A recently released
major study by the National Academy of Sciences has focused attention on the
EPA's inadequate attention to the tolerance of children to pesticide
residues.' And, rounding out the indicators of increased political attention,
is a newly-elected vice president who has argued for the need to reduce
pesticide use." 7
Unfortunately, the expected upsurge in public attention to pesticides will
be largely squandered if the congressional debate is framed, as it is likely to
be, solely in terms of "risk." By all indications, FIFRA reform will focus on
administrative improvements to expedite risk-based decisional processes for
reregistration and cancellation.4' And the debate over food safety legislation
443. See Keith Pitts, Staff Director, House Subcomm. on Department Operations, Research, and
Foreign Agriculture, Comm. on Agriculture (telephone conversation with Donald Homstein, Sept. 21,
1992).
444. See, e.g., NACA Sees Food Safety Bills Introduced Early in New Congress, 16 Chem. Reg.
Rep. (BNA), No. 28, at 1228 (Oct. 9, 1992) (bills to "modernize" the Delaney Clause's zero-risk
standard for pesticide residues, now expected to be among the first pieces of legislation introduced in
the 103rd Congress, "will likely be tied to consideration of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
• . [because] a substantive difference between the U.S. regulatory system and other nations' systems is
the reliance on testing of pesticides based on the maximum tolerated dose levels for carcinogenic
effects") [hereinafter NACA Sees Food].
445. See Federal Court Grants Stay of Mandate in Delaney Clause Case, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 29, at 1243 (Oct. 16, 1992) (application of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, which will affect up
to 25 pesticides, will be delayed in the "worst-case" until mid-1993 when the Supreme Court might
rule on an expected petition for certiorari); NACA Sees Food, supra note 444, at 1228 (food safety
legislation "will be one of the first bills introduced when the new Congress convenes in January"
1993).
446. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN 8-
12 (1993) (recommending that EPA needs to acquire more, and better, data on the risks of pesticide
residues to children).
447. See ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE 141 (1992) ("Do we really need all these
poisons? One of the most extensive studies of pesticide use ever conducted, by Cornell University,
concluded in 1991 that farmers who used natural alternatives to chemical control of pests (such as
integrated pest management and crop rotation) could abandon many pesticides and herbicides without
reducing yields at all and without significant increases in the price of food").
448. See Pesticide Safety Improvement Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 3742 Before the Subcomm.
on Dept. Operations, Research and Foreign Ag. of the House Comm. on Ag., 102d Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 4 (1992) (legislative proposal to change cancellation proceedings from formal adjudication to
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may well be dominated by the "Delaney paradox" (claiming that the Delaney
Clause increases aggregate carcinogenic risk by prohibiting the registration of
new pesticides with safer carcinogenic profiles than older, existing ones that
are awaiting reregistration or are otherwise permissible under FFDCA). The
Delaney debate can be expected to focus on an esoteric battle between those
who prefer a specified one-in-one-million standard of acceptable risk" 9 and
those who prefer the unspecified requirement of "reasonable risk." 450 Al-
though some discussion of risk methodologies is unavoidable and probably
beneficial, there is every reason to hope that the debate can be supplemented
by formulation of a concrete, long-overdue framework for reducing inefficient
pesticide use.
There may well be other decisional criteria, and certainly there are numer-
ous other policy options, that should guide public programs for low-input
agriculture. But the critical point is that any significant development by Con-
gress along these lines would begin the project of reclaiming environmental
law and policymaking from the failure that has marked twenty years of modem
pesticide regulation. Virtually any meaningful reform along the lines suggested
here, moreover, would indicate how creative and pragmatic government pro-
grams can create real policy alternatives within a framework that would have
us simply choose among the risks we like least. More broadly, a thoughtful
congressional initiative on preventing unnecessary pesticide use could mark a
new beginning for integrating science, economics, and politics in
environmental protection.
informal rulemaking, and to build in informational incentives into the reregistration process). Certainly
I am not arguing that procedural improvements to FIFRA, by themselves, are unimportant. Indeed,. I
am currently a consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United States working on recommen-
dations along just these lines.
449. See Food Safety Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Dep't Operations, Research and
Foreign Ag. of the House Comm. on Ag. H.R. Doc. No. 58, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (1992).
450. Compare S. 1074, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991) (proposing 1-in-l-million risk standard) with
H.R. 2342, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (arguing for a reasonable risk standard).
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